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Abstract 
This study reassesses agricultural performance in China during the economy's transition 
from a centrally planned system to one increa~ingly reliant on the market mechanisms. 
The essence of economic reform was to reduce direct intervention by the government in 
the operation of the economy and to allow more decision-.naking autonomy to economic 
agents. But the process of reform is not yet complete. The Chinese economy today is 
neither a perfectly free market nor a stylized central planning system. 
The central argument is that the agricultural sector is being increasingly integrated with 
the rest of the Chinese economy, and the world economy through the process of 
economic liberalization. Economy-wide policies and changes elsewhere are as important 
as sector-specific policies in affecting agricultural performance. At the same time, 
restrictions on factor movements and price distortions remain and affect agriculture's 
response to exogenous changes. Agriculture's response to initial refornis has been seen 
as a 'miracle'; growth jumped to 7 per cent between 1979 and 1984. The relative 
contraction of agricultural production in 1985 and years after is less clearly understood. 
A simple illustr:itive model is constructed for theoretical analysis. This framework is 
applied to understand agricultural growth in China and it is found that dramatic changes 
in farmers' feasible choice set were dominant factors determining agricultural growt:1 and 
contraction in the second half of the 1980s. This case underlines the importance of 
restrictions on factor mobility in the Chinese economy. Changes in factor markets may 
sometimes offset changes in pr? ::e structure and require particular attention in analysis. 
Price policies for grain m China were endogenously determined through bargaining 
between farmers and the state. In the early stages of economic development under a 
repressive and vindictive central state system, farmers tend to be weak in the state-farmer 
policy game. This study develops a state-farmer agricultural policy game framework. 
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Fanners' relative bargaining power is negatively correlated with agriculture's share in the 
economy and the share if agricultural population, and positively correlated with income 
per capita and the market price of grain. Farmers in China were still relatively weak in 
policy game with the government. But it can be expected that farmers' bargaining power 
will continue to increase as the economy develops. There is a danger that with growing 
bargaining position demand for agricultural subsidies will grow. 
Farmers' production decisions are gui Jed by a combination of policy regulations and 
market signals, but their behaviour can be modelled by profit maximization framework 
given careful data adjustment. Supply elasticities estimated through an application of the 
McFadden unit profit function indicate that continuation of grain self-sufficiency will be 
both difficult and costly. 
To understand both direct and indirect effects of policy on agriculture, a computable 
g~neral equilibrium model is huilt. A set of experiments including changes in the world 
market, economic reforms such as tariff reduction, variation in macroeconomic policies 
and a rapid expansion of rural industry are undertaken. The Chinese economy and the 
agricultural sector adjust to exogenous change but the adjustment is smaller than it 
would be in the case of perfect factor mobility. Money becomes non-neutral in the 
presence of price distortion in Chinese economy. 
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Analysis of Agricultural Policy in the Post-Reform Chinese 
Economy: Some Issues 
Chinese agriculture has experienced more than a decade of economic reform. The 
government has made significant efforts during this period to eliminate inappropriate 
administrative restrictions and to allow markets to guide economic activities. Chinese 
fanners aJe now freer than at any time in the past forty years to pursue theiJ own 
objectives. Policy intervention, however, still occurs in a wide range of economic 
activity, incl .. ding restrictions on factor mobility and through state control of some 
agricultural products. At the same time, agriculture is being integrated more and more 
with the rest of the economy through the process 0f economic liberalization and 
development. Agricultural policy analysis should provide insights into the dynamics of 
economic change in a refonning economy. 
The mechanics of a refonning economy are different from those of a stylized market 
economy or a typical centrally-planned system. It is therefore of interest to investigate 
how government policies are affecting agricultural perfom1ance in China :oday. 
Despite the incompleteness of the reform process and the many unsolved problems and 
difficulties that China faces, it is evident that the achievements of economic development, 
no matter whether they are measured by growth rates or structural transformation, are 
remaJkable (Perkins 1988; Johnson 1988; GaJnaut 1989). 1 China· s recent success is 
becoming a frequently cited C"'Se in the economic literature. Economic growth is 
I For discussions of the problems and difficulties that China is encountering in economic refonn se1: 
Kojima (1990), Johnson (1988) and Perkins (1988). 
1 
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improving the welfare of more than one billion people or nearly a quarter of the world's 
population.2 
There are many myth::. ::iurrounding how this outcome is being delivered and how policy 
changes are contributir..~ to increased output and raised productivity. Controversy 
surrounds some policy issues and reform strategies (Sung and Chan 1987; Jackson 
1991). But the Chine~e experience illustrates a feasible path for the transformation of a 
centrally-planned economy into a market economy, particularly in contrast to the more 
problematic big-bang type of reform being att-;mpted in East Europe and the former 
Soviet Union (McMillan and Naughton 1991). 
Rapid economic growth in China has been closely associated with an increasing degree 
of openness. Both growth and structural change have resulted in higher capacity to 
export and higher demand for imports and Chinese economic growth is having significant 
effects on other economies. Bec~rnse China is such a very large country, any increase in 
its exports and imports has important implications for international markets and thus for 
both exporting and importing countries (Drysdale 1988; Drysdale and Elek 1991; Lardy 
1992). East Asia or the Western Pacific is a new growth pole in the world economy. 
Rapid economic growth in Japan, in th~ newly industrialized economies, and, more 
recently in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, has greatly changed the global pattern of 
economic growth. The ascendarn;:y Gf China adds significant weight to this global change 
(Drysdale 1988; Garnaut 1989). 
China's Agricultural Performance 
Economic reform in China was initiated in agriculture at the end of the 19.?0s. 
Agricultural performance over the past decade has been unique and interesting (Table 
1.1). Before econornic reform, agricultural growth was sluggish because of policy 
discrimination and inappropriate institutional arrangements (Lin 199 lc ). In the first half 
2 The success or failure of economic development in China is a significant durruny variable in the 
global welfare function. 
2 
of the 1980s, China experienced dramatic growth in agricultural production in response 
to the increases in procurement prices and the introduction of the household 
responsibility system (HRS). This period of agricultural success impressed the world and 
was regarded as some kind of 'miracle' (Longworth 1989). China's agriculture was 
feeding 24 per cent of the world's population from 7 per cent of the world's arable land 
(Drysdale and Elek 1991). But the situation changed quickly. From 1985, agricultural 
production, grain in particular, dropped into a so-called stagnant phase, a state in which 
it remained for the following three years (Niu 1989; Anderson 1990a; Lin 1992). 
Criticisms of agricultural reform policies were widely expressed by both government 
officials and economists (Niu 1989).3 At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s, following a set of policy adjustments, agricultural production began to recover 
(Table 1.1). This extraordinary development path has encouraged much analysis and 
speculation, with a considerable literature developing around the controversy over 
government policies towards agriculture (McMillan et al. 1989; Lin 1992; Huang 1992; 
Du 1992). 
Table 1.1 Annual growth rates of agricultural (1utput in China, 1978-90 
(per cent) 
Agriculture Fanning Grain Livestock 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
8.1 9.4 7.8 4.9 
7.5 7.2 9.0 14.6 
1.4 -0.5 -3.5 7.0 
5.8 5.9 1.4 5.9 
11.3 10.3 9.1 13.2 
7.8 8.3 9.2 3.9 
12.3 9.9 5.2 13.4 
3.4 -2.0 -6.9 17.2 
3.4 0.9 3.3 5.5 
5.8 5.3 2.9 3.2 
3.8 -0.2 -2.2 12.7 
3.9 1.8 3.4 5.6 
7.6 8.6 9.5 7.0 
Source: State Statistics Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook 1991, China ~tatistics Press, Beijing:318, 
346. 
3 There were a few exceptions in 1985 and 1986. Some researchers, mostly in the R(:search Centre 
for Rurli.l Development (RCRD) of the State Council in China, presented a different argument (Gao 
1987; Huang l 988a). 
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The Central Hypothesis 
There are opposing arguments in the literature about the impact of agricultural policy in 
the 1980s in China. Some economists criticize policy change because of the agricultural 
stagnation in 1985 (Niu 1989). Others recognize the success of economic reform because 
of the rapid increase in farmers' real income during this period (Huang 1992; Ma and 
Garnaut 1992). Again, some economists praise agricultural policy during 1989-91 
because of the recovery of grain and other agricultural outputs (Ye 1992). Others worry 
that fanners' real income only increased at an annual average of 0.7 per cent during 
1989-91 (Huang 1992; Du 1992). Perceptions of the impact of policy lead to quite 
different policy recommendations. Hence, there is considerable merit in a reassessment of 
the China's agricultural reform policies. 
The resolution of these policy questions requires investigation of the political economy 
of policy formulation, and a thorough exploration of the mechanisms by which both 
sector-specific and economy-wide policies affect agriculture and the economy. An 
understanding of China's agricultural development will contribute to the development 
of a better framework for future agricultural policy analysis. 
From these perspectives, this study seeks to formulate and test a central hypothesis th<Jt 
economy-wide policies and changes are as important as sector-specific policies in 
affecting agricultural performance. At the same time, some restrictions on factor 
movements anrl ;:rice distortions remain and affect the response of the agricultural sector 
to exogenous changes. 
An Analytical Framework 
The most important characteristic of the Chinese economy today is that it is neither a 
stylized market economy nor a typical centrally-planned economy. This presents some 
problems for agricultural policy analysis. Farmers in China may respond sensitively to 
market changes as a consequence of profit maximizing behaviour, but they may also be 
subject to constraints such as limited resource mobility and state purchase quotas. 
4 
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Given these particular features of the agricultural economy, a parallel-line framework is 
proposed and applied in this study. One line is the incentive structure and the other is the 
feasible choice set (or the area within which farmers can freely re-allocate production 
resources). In conventional economic analysis, incentive structures are stressed because 
the feasible choice set does not expand or contract significantly in a mature market 
economy. In an economy undergoing a process of dramatic transformation, the feasible 
choice set of farmers can expand rapidly within a short period. Changes such as the 
abolition of all controls over agricultural products in 1985 in China had an impact on 
farmers' feasible choice set (Huang 1992). The feasible choice set therefore plays a role 
in influencing agricultural performance of potentially equal to the incentive structure. 
The incentive structure of agricultural production is a core concept. According to 
Schultz (1978), incentives consist of economic information that farmers use in calculating 
their expected costs (including costs associated with risk) against the returns they expect 
to receive. The incentive structure is, in the first place, determined by policies specific to 
agriculture, including price, marketing, input, credit, mechanization, land reform, 
research and irrigation policies (Ellis 1992). It is also influenced by the trade regime, 
monetary and fiscal policy and policies targeted at industries, particularly rural industries 
(Krueger et al. 1988; Mundlak et al. 1989). In Chinese c:.griculture, most commodities 
have now been allowed to respond to market forces. Intervention, however, remains in a 
range of agricultural markets including those for grain, wool and cotton. This system 
generates a special pattern of price asymmetry. The prices of fully liberalized 
commodities quickly respond to changes in demancl and supply, while prices of other 
products exhibit wry different responses depending on the degree of control. 
The effectiveness of the incentive structure, however, depends on factors affecting factor 
mobility or the farmers' feasible choice set. In a market economy, all markets are 
assumed to be competitive and resources are therefore perfectly mobile within the 
economy. In a centrally-planned economy, no resource movements can occur other than 
those administered by the government. The Chinese economy today sits between these 
two extremes. Restrictions on factor mobility remain in many areas. There is limited 
5 
mobility of labour between rural and urban areas.4 Labour movement between 
agriculture and industrial activities in the rural sector are, nonetheless, both quick and 
strong in response to changes in the environment This limitation of the feasible choice 
set and the limited factor mobility in the Chinese economy have important implications 
for the process of economic adjustment in the farm sector. 
In most previous studies of Chinese agriculture, two extreme assumptions have been 
made concerning the interaction between agriculture and the rest of the economy. Some 
assume that agricultural resources can only be used for agricultural production, implying 
that resource movement between agriculture and industry does not exist. Others assume 
perfect factor mobility. Sicular (1988a) explicitly incorporates perfect factor (labour) 
mobility into a general equilibrium fiamework.5 If limited factor mobility was a feature of 
the Chinese economy in the 1980s and early 1990s either of these assumptions leads to 
biased analysis. 
By applying a new analytical framework to examine the impact of policy on Chinese 
agriculture, this study seeks 
• to clarify changes in the agricultural sector during the reform period 
• to study theoretically the significance of these changes to agricultural policy analysis 
• to understand the unexpected pattern of agricultural performance in the second half of 
the 1980s by applying the analytical framework developed in the study 
• to explore current agricultural price policy and its endogeneity 
• to construct a quantitative framework incorporating the special features of the 
economy 
• to measure empirically various policy influences on agriculture. 
4 The volume of labour movements, particularly into the cities, has been increasing in recent years. ' 
5 The third good in the Sicular model of the Chinese economy incorporates elements of both the 
market and plan systems and is referred to as human time or labour/leisure. All goods, including labour, 
can be traded on markets (Sicular 1988a:294). 
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Methodology 
One most important feature of this study is its economy-wide perspective on agricultural 
policy analysis. J ,::.increasingly recognized that changes in macroeconomic policies have 
had important effects on agricultural perfonnance (Krueger et al. 1988). Interaction 
between different parts of the economy, including feedback effects, can be captured in an 
economy-wide framework. Direct effects are only a part of the policy story in a real 
economy; some indirect or second-round impacts are equally important. Indirect effects 
become more important as the Chinese -:conomy becomes increasingly integrated 
through the process of economic refonn. Interactions within the economy resulting from 
exogenous shocks, including policy changes, constitute another important part of the 
policy story. Assessing agricultural perfonnance from an economy-wide perspective may 
also lead to different conclusions from those derived from an agriculture fundamentalist 
perspective. This is one of the reasons for the emergence of quite different views on 
agricultural policies in the past decade in China (Garnaut and Ma 1992). 
Although an economy-wide perspective is always kept in mind throughout the analysis, 
the methodology applied in the study combines both partial and general equilibrium 
frameworks. In testing the different hypotheses in the literature about agricultural 
stagnation after 1985 (Chapter 4), in investigating the endogeneity of policy change 
(Chapter 5) and in estimating production elasticities of the Chinese agriculture (Chapter 
6), a partial equilibriwn framework is useful. 
A general equilibrium framework, on the other hand, aliows a more thorough exploration 
of policy consequences. A general equilibrium model is constructed. The usual 
computable general equilibrium model assumes competitive factor and product markets. 
While competitiveness of product market is acceptable in modelling as an approximation 
to reality, competitive factor markets can hardly be accepted as a reasonable assumption 
in the case of China in the 1980s. Innovation in this respect can contribute to both 
theoretical modelling and practical policy analysis. 
7 
Structure of the Study 
A review of economic reform identifies the characteristics of the reformed Chinese 
economy and the special conditions imposed on agricultural policy analysis (Chapter 2). 
While a higher degree of economic integration requires that agricultural performance 
should be examined from an economy-wide perspective, continued government 
intervention necessitates particular caution in analysis. 
The two most important characteristics identified in Chapter 2 are then examined in a 
theoretical framework in order to establish their effects on economic structure and on the 
way in which the economy responds to exogenous changes (Chapter 3). 
There are two types of direct incentive policy in Chinese agriculture. One involves the 
existence of a low state purchase price alongside the free market price (the two-tier price 
system) such as in the case of grain, and the other is the state monopoly of the purchase 
'Jf agricultural products, such as in the case of cotton and wool. Sicular (l 988a), through 
application of a simple general equilibrium framework, demonstrates that, in the case of a 
two-tier price system, the level of the state price does not affect the levels of current 
production and consumption. Lin (1993) in a recent study argues that, if the quotas are 
endogenous, the state price does have an important effect on farmers' production 
decisions. These arguments are re-examined in the light of the findings of this study. 
Attention is then given to how changes in monetary policy affect agriculture. Because of 
special features of the Chinese economy, money is non-neutral. The likely relationship is 
explored, this should contribute to a better understanding of agricultural perfom1ance by 
bringing macroeconomic changes into the picture. 
Limited labour mobility between rural and urban areas is another important characteristic 
of the Chinese economy. The impact of labour mobility is examined by introducing 
economy-wide disturbances including changes in macroeconomic and trade policies. This 
is important to testing the central idea in the study: economy-wide policies are having 
more important effects on the agricultural sector than at any time in the previous forty 
years, but these effects are still constrained because of limited labour mobility. 
8 
The theoretical framework is then applied to examinillg agricultural development in the 
second half of the 1980s (Chapter 4). Various explanations have been advanced for the 
relative contraction in agricultural production after 1985 including worsening agricultural 
terms of trade, completion of the household responsibility system reform in 1983, 
adverse weather and the Rybczynski theorem. However, none of these can be regarded 
as dominant. Based on the broad framework developed in this study, an alternative 
feasible choice set hypothesis is presented and tested. This empirical analysis should 
reinforce the importance of the parallel-line analytical framework. 
The endogeneity of government policy is explored, particularly in relation to incentives 
to grain production (Chapter 5). In most studies of agriculture, government policies are 
treated as exogenous. Any changes in policies are assumed to be driven by known or 
unknown outside forces. This treatment fails to rationalize the motivation behind policy 
changes. In particular, if changes in policy are in fact a result of interaction between 
different economic factors, the feedback from the real economy to policy making is 
neglected. In the literature on endogenous government behaviour, policy changes are 
usually treated as the result of a complicated economic and political process. Individuals 
are organized into different interest groups which bargain with each other (or bargain 
with politicians). Economic policies characterize the equilibrium point at which the 
marginal benefit of a policy equals the marginal GOSt of lobbying or bargaining for it. In 
most studies related to agricultural policies, consumers and farmers are classified as two 
important counterparts in the economy, bargaining with each other for a particular level 
of subsidy or tax on agriculture. Such models do not clearly reflect the real story of 
agricultural policy in China. This study seeks to establish a new framework which 
accommodates the grain policy issue. The model is estimated empirically to reveal 
quantitatively the factors underlying changes in grain policy. The results seek not only to 
contribute to a better understanding of poEcy changes, but also to improve the quality of 
policy analysis through the incorporation of this framework into a general equilib1ium 
model. 
9 
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Production interactions in the semi-liberalized farming sector in China are estimated in 
Chapter 6. Supply elasticities for Chinese agriculture in other studies, whether estimated 
(Carter and Zhong 1988) or adopted (Gunasekera et al. 1991; Tyers and Anderson 
1992), were all very low, in the main lower than 0.5. Low responsiveness of agricultural 
supply due to natural constraints may be one explanation. However, as the Chinese data 
do not distinguish state and market prices, and production quota and market supply, 
estimations using these aggregate data may lead to biased results. The existing data are 
manipulated and elasticity estimates which reflect farmers' actual market behaviour are 
obtained. These estimates provide a partial picture of the effects of incentives on the 
structure of agriculture and they are later applied in COE modelling. The estimation of 
supply elasticities is given special attention because both price and quantity data 
presented in the Chinese statistical publications reflect government intervention. 
In Chapter 7 an economy-wide model for China (China model) is constructed using a 
COE framework. This China model incorporates policy intervention in grain, wool and 
cotton markets and some special features of the Chinese econu:ny. Restrictions on labour 
movements between urban and rural industries are captured. Non-agricultural sectors are 
separated into rural and urban industries (nine each). An attempt is made to show the 
impact of limited labour mobility on the Chinese economy. Agriculture, as the main focus 
of the model, is disaggregated into four sectors (fanning, livestock, forestry and fishing) 
and nine commodities (rice, wheat, other grains, cotton, other crops, W'Jol, non-wool 
livestock products, forest products and fish). In total, the model contains twenty two 
sectors and eighteen commodities. 
The China model is applied in Chapter 8 and several simulations are run for empirical 
analysis. The selection of simulations focuses on several crucial exogenous changes, such 
as changes in world market prices of grain (wheat). In particular, this study introduces 
some changes in economy-wide policies (such as monetary change) and changes in 
industrial sectors. The purpose of these simulations is to demonstrate that economy-wide 
policies and non-agricultural policies can have important effects on agricultural 
10 
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performance. The effects would be even stronger if there were no restrictions on labour 
flows between rural and urban areas. 
The final chapter summarizes the findings and policy impiications of the study, and 
discusses the problems encountered and study's shortcomings. Directions for future 
research are identified. 
11 
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Characteristics of Chinese Agriculture 
Although many planning functions have already been replaced by market mechanisms, it 
is obviously too early to der.cribe the Chinese economy as a market economy. The impact 
of agricultural policies in such an economy may therefore differ from those in stylized 
economic analysis. To identify how the Chinese economy is close to, or different from, a 
market economy is the fust step for this study. 
The economic system established by the Chinese government in the 1950s, particularly 
after 1952, derived largely from the Soviet system. Two of the basic characteristics of 
the economy were public ownership and central planning. In the urban sector, most 
industries were owned by the state with only a very limited number of collectively-owned 
small-scale enterprises. In the rural sector, industrial production was, generally, 
prohibited. Through socialist transformation in the 1950s, communes were created for 
agricultural production throughout the countryside by the end of 1958 (PLDRD 1989). 
Supported by public ownership of the economy, state plans strictly controlled all 
economic activities, including production, allocation and consumption. Economic plans 
were designed to facilitate the heavy-industry oriented development strategy (Lin 
1991c). The combination of public ownership and central planning left little room for 
firms and individuals to make their own production and consumption decisions 
independently. Market mechanisms did not play an important role in the economy. I 
Macroeconomic policies, such as fiscal and monetary policies, were not used to influence 
I Free markets, in general, did not exist in the pre-refonn Chinese economy. In some particular 
years, free exchange of small-amount unimportant agricultural products was permitted. This did not 
have any significant impact on the rural economy since production structure was strictly controlled by 
economic plans. 
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activities; rather, they were applied as measures to allocate resources and accommodate 
plans. 
Economic reforms have brought dramatic changes to the Chinese economy. Reform, 
initiated in 1979, started in the rural economy. Achievements of reform in rural areas are 
regarded as the most remarkable (Perkins 1988; Longworth 1989; Du 1992). Great 
changes, however, have since taken place in every part of the economy (Rawski 1992; 
McMillan and Naughton 1992). Economic reforms in China involve three interrelated 
aspects: microeconomic reform, macroeconornic reform and re-introduction of free 
market. All three serve the purpose of economic reform: reducing dir~ct intervention and 
administrative regulation and giving a greater role to the market. In this sense, economic 
reform in China can be viewed as economic liberalization. 
Microeconomic Reform in the Rural Economy 
Microeconomic or institutional reforms created greater incentives for firms and 
individuals to respond to changes in the economic environment. The key role tr.;:.t 
microeconomic reform plays in economic liberalization is to generate closer or more 
direct linkages between effort and returns. 
Problems with the Commune System 
Prior to the introduction of reforms, apart from a few state farms, the commune system 
dominated agricultural production. A commune was usually organized at three levels: 
commune, brigade and production team. The production team consisted of about thirty 
households, which served as the basic unit of production and accounting. All production 
activities, such as land allocation, the application of inputs and labour use, were decided 
by the team leader. In effect, because these decisions were largely constrained by 
government regulations and restrictions, team leaders had little decision-making 
autonomy. Each team member's effort was related to payment through a working-point 
system. Members who presented themselves in the field obtained a certain number of 
working points per day. Daily working points were democratically detennined at an 
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annual member meeting. At the end of the year, each member got his/her income 
according to the share of his/her accumulated working points in the team's total 
accumulated working points. The failure of this system was the difficulties experienced in 
monitoring agricultural production activities (Lin 1988). High costs of monitoring meant 
that members who presented themselves in the field but made no effort could usually get 
their working points. Each member therefore had to share his/her marginal product of 
effort with other members of the team whether or not the others chose to shirk. The 
consequence of this was the encouragement of universal shirking (Futterman 1987 and 
1990; Lin 1988) . 
This widespread incentive problem, together with low state prices and rigid plans, 
created difficulties for agricultural development. 2 In the second half of the 1970s, not 
only was it extremely hard for agriculture to proviJe sufficient food to feed the rapidly 
increasing population, but it became the source of a bottleneck to overall economic 
growth. This is the background to agricultural reform. 
The Household Responsibility System Reform 
The government, at the beginning of the reform program, only intended to encourage 
agricultural production by raising state purchase prices, increasing state investment in 
agriculture and improving management of the commune system. Any initiatives which 
disrupted collective production were strictly prohibited. Farmers in poor regions, 
however, such as Anhui province, secretly experimented with household-based 
production responsibility systems. Good harvests by teams which adopted the experiment 
attracted others to experiment in the next year. In 1979, only 1 per cent of all production 
teams adopted the household responsibility system. The acceptance rate grew to 14 per 
cent in 1980 and to 45 per cent in 1981. Finally, it was officially recognized at the 
beginning of 1980s when the household responsibility system was implemented as a 
2 During 1959-61. when the commune was just compulsorily implemented. the drrunatic reduction 
in agricultural.outputs resulted in a severe f runine. Aston et al. ( 1984) estimated that this famine resulted 
in excess of thirty million deaths. 
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national policy. Nearly 98 per cent of production teams had adopted the household 
responsibility system by the end of 1983 (Table 2.1 ). 
Under the new household responsibility system, land is theoretically owned by the 
collective and contracted to households. The land-leasing contract usually requires 
househc 'is to fulfil a certain amount of the state procurement quota for a product, and 
to deliver a levy to the collective. Households are free to decide on their resource 
allocation and production structure provided these requirements are fulfilled. One of the 
crucial differences between the household responsibility system and the commune system 
is that returns are now more closely and directly related to the effort. Farmers, pursuing 
maximum profits or net income, have the incentive to adjust their behaviour in response 
to changes in economic signals. 
Table 2.1 The household responsibility system reform and development of the 
rural township, village and private non-agricultural sector 
HRS adoption rate by Number ofTVP Number ofTVP 
production teruns (%) enterprises (million) employees (million) 
1978 0 1.5 28.3 
1979 1 LS 29.1 
1980 14 1.4 30.0 
1981 45 1.3 29.7 
1982 80: 1.4 31.1 
1983 98 1.3 32.3 
1984 99 6.1 52.1 
1985 99 12.2 69.8 
1986 99 15.2 79.4 
1987 99 17.5 88.l 
1988 99 18.9 95.5 
1989 99 18.7 93.7 
1990 99 18.5 92.6 
Note: Numbers of the township, village and private finns and employees before 1984 only cover those 
firms at township and village levels, while the numbers from 1984 contain all township. village and 
private firms (including rural private firms). 1n the table, HRS refers to the household responsibility 
system and TVP refers to the township, village and private enterprises. 
Sources: Lili (1992a), 'Rural refonns and agricultural growth in China', The American Economic 
Review. 82(1):37-38; State Statistics Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook 1991. China Statistics Press, 
Beijing:377. 
The household responsibility system reform finished in 1983. Its contributions to 
economic reform and growth in China are not restricted to establishing the direct 
linkages between effort and returns for agricultural farmers. It was the primary reason for 
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the continued increases in the state purchase prices of agricultural products during 1979-
84, the re-introduction of free markets ufter 1985, the rapid development of the rural 
industries and the effectiveness of indirect macroeconomic policies. 
Development of Township, Village and Private Enterprises 
The other important part of the rural economy, is the newly-developed rural industry as a 
result of economic reform. Rural industry includes township, village and private 
enterprises. As these firms werr established by farmers or collectives, mostly after 1983, 
they are less restricted by administrative regulations compared to the urban industrial 
sector. Of course, these firms also receive less assistance from the government. The 
formation of this special industrial and commercial sector in China was largely a result of 
the household responsibility system, increases in agricultural surpluses and segmentation 
between urban and rural areas. After the introduction of the household responsibility 
system, both agricultural productivity and output increased rapidly. Farmers are therefore 
interested in investing the agricultural surpluses on non-agricultural activities which have 
higher returns. As it is difficult to invest in the urban industry because of the 
segmentation between rural and urban economies, farmers established their own 
industrial and commercial enterprises in the rural areas (Du 1992 ). Free market 
opportunities outside the central plan created an environment in which this non-state 
sector could grow. Hence, these firms, from their inception, were more market-oriented 
compared to the state-enterprises. 
Re-Introduction of Free Markets 
Gradual abolition cf controls over free markets is another very important aspect of 
economic reform in Chma. In the planned economy prior to reform, nearly all the real 
and nominal variables were set by plans, though some of the planned goals were often 
not achieved. Prices were largely fixed by the government and did not play a role in 
regulating demand and supply. Instead, the most important function of prices involved 
their use as an accounting measure. 
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The Development Strategy and the Unified Purchase and Marketing System 
Like many other agricultural problems in both pre- and post-reform China, government 
intervention in agricultural markets had its roots in the development strategy adopted in 
the early 1950s.3 In the early 1950s in China, heavy industry was seen as a key to 
economic modernization. Development of heavy industry, of course, requires 
tremendous amounts of capital investment. China at that time was largely an agricultural 
economy.4 As in other under-developed economies, capital was very scarce. The only 
source of investment in the early stages of development was agriculture (Timmer 1988). 
Agricultural surpluses can be channelled into the industrial sector in two ways: first, 
through high rates of agricultural taxes, and second, through depressed agricultural 
prices. 
The Chinese government adopted low agricuhural prices to transfer resources from 
agriculture to industry (Ji and Lu 1980; Lin 1991c; Gao 1992). To facilitate rapid capital 
expansion, low wages for industrial workers were instituted so that state enterprises 
could generate large profits for investment in infrastructure and capital construction. This 
policy required that prices for food and other necessities, cotton, transportation and 
other raw materials were kept low. A set of agricultural policies, which included three 
main measures, was shaped to facilitate resource movements from agriculture to 
industry. The first included the abolition of free markets for most agricultural products 
and the introduction of a unified purchase and marketing system; the second involved the 
establishment of a state price for each prodm;t usually lower than the corresponding free 
market or shadow price; and the third covered the collectivization of agricultural 
production in the 1950s and the commune system thereaftel'. Flows of productive factors 
across regions and industries were prohibited. 
3 Lin arguc,d that the agricultural problems prior to the 1979 refonns Slt'mmed from the 
development strategy adopted by the Chinese govenunent in the early 1950s, and that the post-refonn 
problems also have their roots in the early development strategy (Lin I 99 I c:2). 
4 According to Lin (1991), in 1949, 39.4 per cent of the population resided in rural are1'..; and 
industry accounted for only 12.6 per cent of national income. 
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LarC:y (1983a) argued that the prices implicit in this set of policies were expected to 
perform functions that government tax and expenditure policies facilitate in most market 
economies. Prices in China in the pre-reform period were largely set with a view towards 
determining the allocation of resources between individuals and the state, between 
industry and agriculture, and among different regions. The other reason the government 
wished to control the price was to preserve price stability.s 
The government controls over agricultural products, however, varied between products. 
A three-category system was established for product management according to the 
importance of product to the national economy and to industrialization (Lardy l 983a; 
Sicular 1988b). The first category contained grain, edible vegetable oils, oil crops and 
cotton - products considered crucial to national welfare. The procurement quotas and 
prices for these products were centrally determined within the unified purchase and 
marketing system, and any non-official transaction of these products was strictly 
prohibited. Most other agricultural products, including hogs, cattle, eggs, fish, tea, 
tobacc0, sugar crops and medicinal herbs, fell into the second category. The procurement 
quotas and prices were also deterni.ined by the state, but more independence and 
flexibility was granted to the local government. 6 1n some cases, it was permissable to sell 
production above state quota on the free markets. The third category included all other 
agricultural products which were not subject to state procurement plans and could be 
exchanged in the market. 7 
Products in the first category were subject to 'unified procurement', and products in the 
second category to 'designated procurement'. Four sc-ts of prices for agricultural 
products existed before and in the early stage of economic reforn1. State quota 
5 While stability is a common reason for governmental intervention, it is critical in China. The high 
priority attached to this objective in China reflected China's very unhappy expenence with 
hyperinflation in the late-1940s. Price stability had been an important component of the Communist 
Party's claim for popular support (Lardy 1983a). 
6 Production quotas and prices for products belonging to the second category were usually 
determined by the local governments, such as provincial or county governments. 
7 According to Lardy (1983a), there were over a hundred products in the second category and 
hundreds of distinct subsidiary and native products in the third category. 
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procurement of most agricultural products occurred at 'quota prices', which were 
established by the state plan. For procurement above the state quota 'above-quota 
prices' applied, which added a 30-50 per cent premium to the procurement prices. There 
were also 'negotiated prices' which were mutually agreed upon by producers and the 
state commercial department. 8 The final set was 'free market prices' in rural and urban 
markets. Price data provided by Lardy (1983) illustrate the differences between the four 
prices. In 1980, for paddy rice, the state quota purchase price was 0.23 yuan per 
kilogram, the above-quota price 0.35 yuan, the negotiated price 0.55 yuan, the rural 
market price 0.55 yuan and the urban market price 0.62 yuan.9 
Adjustments of Smte Prices 
The function of the market increased as the reform process progressed and narrowed the 
room in which the plan could operate. The aim of this was to provide correct signals for 
firms and individuals in decision-making. This re-introduction of the market in China 
involved two elements. One is price adjustment in the initial stage of reform and the 
other is the introduction of free markets. 
The purpose of both price adjustment and abolition of controls over the free market in 
China is to get pricing right and to enable price signals to reflect closely the demand and 
supply relationship. Price adjustments in the early stage of the reform process, though 
they did not involve free markets, were targeted at correcting price distortions. This can 
therefore be regarded as the first step towards market mechanism. Price adjustment, in 
fact, was the most important component of the 1979 reform. At the end of the 1970s, the 
Chinese government realized that the low prices of agricultural products seriously 
discouraged agricultural growth and hindered overall economic development. To 
encourage agricultural production, upward price adjustments were announced at the end 
of 1978 and began to be implemented in 1979. Quota prices were increased by 20.9 per 
8 In practice, negotiated prices were often lower than market prices due to the monopoly power of 
the state commercial departments. 
9. The rural market price for milled rice was 0.78 yuan per kilogram. It was converted, for the sake 
of consistency, to the price for paddy rice by assuming a 70 per cent milling rate. 
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cent for grain, 23.9 per cent for oil crops, 17 per cent for cotton, 21.9 per cent for sugar 
crops and 24.3 per cent for hog meat (Lin I 99lc). The average increase for the qu0ta 
prices was 17 .1 per cent. Premiums paid on above-quota delivery of grain and oil crops 
was raised from 30 per cent to 50 per cent of the quota prices, and a 30 per cent bonus 
was introduced for above-quota delivery of cotton. The average increase in state 
procurement prices was 22.1 per cent. The weighted average procurement price, which 
includes both quota and non-quota procurement, increased 21.5 per cent for wheat in 
1979, 20.7 per cent for paddy rice, 20.5 per cent for corn and 17 per cent for cotton, 
while the price for wool remained unchanged (Table 2.2). At the same time, retail prices 
of some agricultural products, excluding basic necessities as grain and edible oils, were 
also raised in 1979. 10 A lump sum of 5-8 yuan per month was paid to each urban resident 
as compensation (Lin 199 Ic ). 
Price policies for grain and natural fibre products have been further revised several times 
since 1979. The wheat quota price was reduced by 4.6 per cent in 1980, soybean quota 
price was raised by 50 per cent in 1981 when its above-quota bonus was eliminated. In 
1984, the soybean price dropped by 13.3 per cent. 
Another important instrument for grain policy is the procurement quota. In 1979, 
alongside the price increase, the procurement quota was reduced by 5.9 per cent to 35 
million tonnes. This quota was further reduced to 34 million tonnes in 1980, and to 30 
million tonnes in 1981. 
In 1985, schemes were introduced for most agricultural products. A voluntary 
procurement contract and proportionate pricing were implemented for rice, wheat and 
corn.11 The contract procurement level was about 70.5 million tonnes (Sicular 1988b ). 
Following the decline of grain production in 1985 and stagnation thereafter, contracts 
were again made mandatory in 1986 (Lin 199lc). In 1986, apart from several price 
10 Reta.ii prices were raised by 33 per cent for pork, 32 per cent for eggs and 33 per cent for fish 
(Lin 199lc). . . 
11 The proportional price adopted in 1985 was computed as a combmauon of 30 per cent of the 
quota price and 70 per cent of the above-quota price in the previous year. 
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adjustments, the procurement quota was reduced to 55 million tonnes and further to 50 
million tonnes in the following year. A new award system (san guagou) for fertilizer, 
diesel oil and cash advance was introduced for grain deliveries. 
Table 2.2 Price indexes for grain and natural fibre products (1978=100) 
Wool Cotton Wheat Rice Com 
1965 41.11 78.40 87.04 86.01 84.34 
1970 64.12 88.54 100.00 98.98 100.00 
1971 64.12 89.62 100.00 99.08 100.00 
1972 88.24 91.42 100.00 99.08 100.00 
1973 90.00 91.42 100.00 99.08 100.00 
1974 90.00 91.42 100.00 99.47 100.00 
1975 90.00 91.42 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1976 90.00 91.42 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1977 90.00 91.42 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1978 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1979 100.00 117.00 121.5 J 120. 71 120.51 
1980 100.88 128.96 121.65 120.80 120.65 
1981 102.36 128.96 121.65 120.80 120.65 
1982 105.30 128.96 121.65 120.80 120.65 
1983 107.65 128.96 121.65 120.80 120.65 
1984 109.71 125.07 121.65 120.66 120.65 
1985 148.33 155.69 121.79 122.95 122.94 
1986 176.77 154.90 127.04 130.69 141.99 
1987 184.86 162.10 131.37 147.93 147.80 
1988 267.48 176.15 151.35 177.21 1: · .. 76 
1989 266.80 216.13 184.48 231.62 203.98 
1990 195.24 279.03 169.70 214.47 199.08 
Source: State Statistics Bureau, China Price Statistical Yearbook, various issues. China Statistics Press, 
Beijing. 
Cotton prices were further increased by 10 per cent in 1980 and 1.2 per cent in 1981, 
following the general increase in 1979. In 1984, a contract procurement system with 
proportionate pricing was introduced. 12 This contract price for the northern region was 
adjusted in 1985 and 1986. 13 A similar award system for fertilizers, diesel oil and cash 
advance as used for grains was introduced in 1986, while the contract procurement was 
also made mandatory (Lin 1991c). 
12 The proportional price for cotton in 1984 was computed as a combination of 60 per cent of the 
quota price and 40 per cent of the above-quota price in the previous year. 
13 Weights used to compute the proportional price changed to 30 per cent of the quota price and 70 
per cent of the above-quota price in 1985, and they were changed back to 40 and 60 per cent, 
respectively, in 1986. 
21 
The price of wool was not raised in the 1979 reform. During the reform period before 
1985, wool prices increased at a much slower pace than either grain and cotton prices. 
Wool output grew slowly as a consequence (Watson and Findlay 1992). According to 
Watson and Findlay, apart from the change in relative prices of wool to those of grain 
and meats, another important reason for slow growth was the lack of an effective market 
at the margin for wool. The combination of constraints on production and a rapid growth 
in demand resulted in the 'wool war' during 1985-88 in China (Watson and Findlay 
1992). Market prices rose dramatically during this period (Table 2.2). In 1985, there was 
also a change in the marketing arrangements for raw wool. The unified procurement 
system was replaced by purchase through contract or through the market (Zhang, et al 
1991 ). The state, however, found it difficult to obtain the wool it wanted and the state 
purchase price rose. The wool war lasted through to the start of 1989. 
Re-introduction of Free Markets 
Accompanying adjustment in state prices to market determination during 1979-84, local 
free markets and fairs were gradually given pennission to re-open as an outlet for farm 
surpluses. The number of rural fairs increased from 37,890 in 1980 to 41,184 in 1982 
and 50,356 in 1984. The number of urban fairs for agricultural products increased from 
2,919 in 1980 to 6,144 in 1984 (Table 2.3). 14 For many agricultural products, output 
could be exchanged in the free markets after the fulfilment of the state procurement 
quotas. Before reform, the only organizations that were permitted to purchase grain were 
state commercial enterprises and supply and marketing cooperatives. Before 1978, all 
purchase of grain was by the state. In 1979, state purchases accounted for 95.8 per cent 
of total grain purchases. This share dropped to 91.7 per cent in 1984. These data 
presented here do not accurately reflect the proportion of state and non-state purchases. 
A proportion of the agricultural products purchased by state departments in the later 
period was not part of the state procurement quota, such as purchase of grain at 
14 The numbers of rural and urban fairs increased to 59.473 and 13,106. respectively, in 1990 (State 
Statistics Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook 1991 :605). 
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negotiated prices by the state commercial department. A large part of the procurement 
was done at prices close to market determination. 
Alongside the growth of markets, the function of the economic plan weakened in the 
process of economic reform. The number of production planning categories had been 21 
before 1978, and was reduced to 16 in 1981 and to 13 in 1982. The number of planning 
targets had been 31 before 1978, and was reduced to 20 in 1981 (Wu 1983). Areas in 
which markets were established expanded accordingly. 
Table 2.3 Growth of markets in rural China, 1978-84 
Number of Number of Grain purchase Agricultural Procurement 
Year rural fairs urban fairs state/total ( % ) state/total ( % ) 
1978 100.0 82.4 
1979 95.8 82.2 
1980 37890 2919 93.1 80.4 
1981 92.4 SO.I 
1982 41184 3591 92.4 79.0 
1983 43515 4488 94.4 77.5 
1984 50356 6144 91.7 74.3 
Source: State Statistics Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, vruious issues, China Statistics Press, 
Beijing. 
Although radical introduction of free markets did not occur until the second half of the 
1980s, permitting market exchange of agricultural products at the margin during that 
period was very significant for rural development. In adjusting agricultural prices, the 
government not only considered market conditions fr · · particular products, it was 
also constrained by many other factors. To raise agricu1 ':..i.al prices, the government had 
to take into serious account consumers' income, the state budget balance and policy 
priorities. Most state prices of agricultural products in the first half of the 1980s were 
still far below their free market levels. But free markets at the margin generated the right 
incentives for farmers and resources were relocated according to the real market 
conditions. 
There were also some problems when free markets only existed at the margin. Since a 
large part of the agricultural products was still exchanged through state channels at low 
prices, the prices formulated by the free markets at the margin were often substantially 
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distorted. 15 Prices still di-:1 not accurately reflect the real opportunity costs of the 
economy. Since the free markets at the margin were only very small and were still 
influenced by governmental administration, farmers were not always able successfully to 
access free markets. Many farmers still do not regard free market prices as effective 
marginal signals in guiding production decisions. 
In 1985, a package of reform policies was implemented to re-introduce a free market for 
most agricultural products. For grain and cotton, mandatory quotas were to be 
eliminated and replaced by a combination of contract and market purchases. The state 
would sign contracts with farmers volw1tarily before planting seasons (Sicular 1988a; 
Huang 1991 ). For the other products, such as vegetables, fish and meat, government 
regulations were abolished and the state department would buy and sell in the markets. 
This reform fundamentally changed the mechanisms whereby the economy operated. 
Macroeconomic Reform 
Economic reform at the macro level aims at building an economic management 
mechanism with less direct and more indirect interventions. Macroeconomic policies 
change from direct resource allocation measures to indirect management instruments. 
One important step taken in macroeconomic reform was decentralization of decision 
making powers by the' central government. 
Decentralization was first reflected in the decline of central government's share in total 
government revenue. A salient feature of the role of the government since the beginning 
of reforms has been the continuous decline of its total revenue as a proportioa of GNP, 
from 34 per cent in 1978 to 25 per cent in 1986 and to 21 per cent in 1989 (Blejer et al. 
1991). The level of government revenue relative to national income was higher in China 
in 1988 than in countries with comparable per capita income, although the difference had 
15 Tue impact of low state prices on free market prices through income effect on the consumer side 
was one of the reasons for this. 
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narrowed considerably after the late l 970s.16 On the other hand, compared with other 
centrally planned economies (CPEs), China's revenue was substantially lower. The 
relative decline in government revenue share in China implies that more autonomy was 
given to enterprises. In addition, local governments had an increasing share of total 
revenue as well as more responsibility for regional development (Table 2.4). The ability 
of central government to control economic activities has consequently been reduced. The 
declining revenue share also reduced government capacity to influence the level of 
domestic spending (Findlay et al. 1992). Local governments are now more powerful and 
interested than ever in shaping regional production, taking local conditions such as 
resource endowment, infrastructure and comparative advantage into account. This also 
partially explains why local government-orie>nted enterprises developed so rapidly during 
the reform period.17 
Controls over trade were also decentralized. As the role of the trade plan has been 
decreased, direct controls over exports and imports have been exercised increasingly 
through a licensing system. Competition in the trade system was increased by abolition of 
the monopoly powers of the central foreign trade corporations and by allowing 
provincial authorities to establish their own trading corporations. 
Since decision making was decentralized, monetary policy was required to play an 
increasingly important role in macroeconomic management. In January 1984, the 
People's Bank of China was transformed into a separate central bank focusing on 
monetary policy and macroeconomic monitming. Its cownercial operations were 
transferred to the newly-established Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. Separate 
16 The revenue share in GNP in China was 34 per cent in 1978 and 19 per cent in 1988, while it 
was 16.7 per cent in low-income countries, 25 per cent in middle-income countries, 33.9 per cent in 
industrial economies, and 50-80 per cent in centrally planned economies (Blejer et al. 1991). Obviously, 
Blejer and others believed that income levels in China were comparable to those in low-income 
countries. However, in a recent study, Ma and Gamaut (1992) argued that income levels in China have 
been substantially underestimated, and that actual income should be multiplied by two or three. If their 
proposition is true, it implies that China should be relocated into the middle-income country group. If 
this is the case, China's revenue share of 21 per cent in 1989 seems very close to that of the average for 
the middle-income countries (25 per cent) since its income should be in the lower-middle level. 
17 Probably this is also the cause of problems in economic structure, such as repeated construction 
of textile industries (Findlay 1992). 
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banks operating in specific sectors of the economy were re-established, such as the 
Agricultural Bank of China handling the agricultural sector. Since 1986, two universal 
banks, the Bank of Communications and the China International Trust and Investment 
Company Bank, have been allowed to compete with the specialized banks in all areas of 
activity and a number of new banks at the provincial level have been established. 
Table 2.4 Government expenditure in the reform period 
Government exnenditure Agricultural invesunent as 
Total By central By local Price subsidy a share of total government 
(billion yuan) (%) (%) (%) invesunent (%) 
1978 111.1 1.0 10.6 
1979 127.4 6.2 11.1 
1980 121.2 9.7 9.3 
1981 111.5 ~ ..... o 46.0 14.3 6.6 
1982 115.3 49.9 50.1 14.9 6.1 
1983 129.3 49.7 50.3 15.2 6.0 
1984 154.6 47.8 52.2 14.1 5.0 
1985 184.5 45.4 54.6 14.2 3.3 
1986 233.1 41.3 58.7 11.0 3.0 
1987 244.9 42.1 57.9 12.0 3.1 
1988 270.7 39.2 60.8 11.7 2.9 
1989 304.0 36.j 63.7 12.2 3.3 
1990 345.2 39.8 60.2 11.0 4.1 
Source: State Statistics Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, various issues. China Statistics Press, 
Beijing. 
The financing of the operations of enterprises began to be shifted from direct grants from 
the state budget to loans extended Ly spedalized banks in 1984. The issuance of 
securities started in 1981 with the forced sale of treasury bonds to local governments and 
enterprises. Sales of treasury bonds were extended to individuals in 1982 on an 
involuntary basis. Recently, these bonds have been made exchangeable in the market. In 
China, monetary policy is implemented through a dual control system that relies on both 
direct credit controls and indirect levers affecting the coexistence of planning controls 
and market mechanisms in the economy. Under the credit plan, credit ceilings are 
established for each specialized and universal bank, and the banks, in turn, allocate 
ceilings to their local branches. 18 In the second half of the 1980s, efforts were made to 
IS The extent to which the credit ceiling has been enforced has varied considerably. At the end of 
1984 and the beginning of 1985, for instance. an explosion of credit restraint resulted in a dnunatic 
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place greater reliance on indirect instruments of monetary control, especially reserve 
requirements, interest rates, and central bank lendmg to banks. The central bank's 
control over credit was frequently limited, however, by the ability of local governments 
to put pressure on its own branches to extend credit to banks to enable them to meet 
regional credit needs (Blejer et al. 1991 ). 
New Characteristics of Chinese Agriculture 
Economic reforms have brought dramatic changes to the Chinese economy. Real GDP 
grew at an average rate of 8.5 per cent annually during 1979-90. The reformed Chinese 
economy, being different from both a market economy and a centrally planned economy, 
is showing a higher degree of economic integration in the process of economic reform. 
Since domestic reforms were accompanied by the open-door policy, the Chinese 
economy is now being increasingly integrated into the rest of the world. The share of 
exports in GDP increased from 2.45 per cent in 1978 to 4.41 per cent in 1984 and to 
7.86 per cent in 1990. 19 These suggest that the share of exports in GDP in China is 
increasingly approaching the normal level for very large countries (Perkins and Syrquin 
1988). Lardy (1992) provide another measure to show an increasingly important role 
played by trade in the Chinese economy. Supposing that the ratio of trade to GNP in 
1978 was 100, Lardy suggested that the ratio was 128 in 1990 (Lardy 1992:154). 
China is also becoming more crucial in international markets, particularly for particular 
products. China's trade with the world only accounted for 0.58 per cent of the world's 
total trade in 1970. It increased to 0.96 per cent in 1980 and ~.09 per cent in 1990 
(IEDB). 
growth of money supply. When monetary policy was being tightened, on the othe~ hand, credit ceilings 
were enforced more strictly. 
19 These data are calculated from China Statistical Yearbook 1991. Both exports and GDP were 
valued by RMB yuan. These shares are, however, much lower than those calculated from international 
data sources, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. According to Drysdale and 
Elek (1991), the share of exports in GDP was 13.38 per cent in 1989, while in Chinese statistics it was 
5.67 per cent in the same year. Perkins' (1988) estimates for 1978 and 1984 also seem much higher than 
the data provided here. 
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One interesting feature of China's trade is that it is more concentrated on trade with 
Asia-Pacific countries20. In 1970, trade with Pacific countries accounted for 52 per cent 
of its exports and 51 per cent of its imports. This rose to 72 ner cent for exports and 64 
per cent for imports in 1990. As the Chinese economy is becoming more integrated into 
the world economy, it has to pay more attention to changes in international markets and 
to its comparative advantages in shaping the pattern of production. 
The degree of economic integration within the Chinese economy has also increased. At 
the beginning of reform, the pursuit of regional self-sufficiency of grain was abandoned 
and producers are now freer to consider local conditions. Specialization of production is 
encouraged. Therefore, regional trade and resource flows have occurred. Though official 
segmentation between the urban and rural sectors has not been abolished, factor flows, 
such as labour flows, are frequently observed. An increasing amount of rural labour 
entered cities to find jobs as baby sitters, shoe-repairers, private-retailers and causal 
workers in urban enterprises. Farmers are also often organized into ronstruction teams to 
contract with urban finns or departments. On the other hand, experienced workers, 
retirees, and technicians, attracted by higher payments, joined township, village and 
private enterprises. 
The most important form of economic integration, for farmers, is the rapid expansion of 
the rural industrial sector during the reform period (Table 2.1 ). Before and in the early 
stage of economic reform, fanners had few opportunities to avoid risks by diversifying 
into other activities. The rapid growth of the rural industrial sector provided farmers with 
more employment and investment opportunities. Township, village and private 
enterpris~s (TVPs) grew during the reform period, particularly during 1984-90 when the 
number of these enterprises tripled and the number of employed workers nearly doubled. 
The real value of gross output of the rural industrial sector increased at an average 
annual rate of 21 per cent during the same period. In 1990, TVPs output accounted for 
20 The Pacific countries include Australia. New Zealand. Japan. Korea, Indonesia, Philippines. 
Singapore, Thailand. China. Hong Kong. Taiwan, the United States and Canada. 
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22 per cent of GDP and 35 per cent of national industrial output. As a result, farmers' 
income sources have been diversified, as have their investment and employment 
opportunities. In 1990, 37 per cent of farmers' net income came from township and 
village enterprises. 21 According to Jiang and Luo (1988:176-7), 8 per cent of farmers' 
net income was extracted from non-agricultural activities in 1978. This share :ose to 14 
per cent in 1982 and 25 per cent in 1986. Farmers' investment in the non-agricultural 
sector was much higher than in the agricultural sector in most years of the reform period 
(Huang 1992). Employment in township, village and private enterprises accounted for 24 
per cent of total rural labour in 1988, but that share dropped slightly to 22 per cent in 
1990. 
Farmers no more only undertake agricultural activities. They are increasingly involved in 
industry, commerce, transportation and other service sectors. As a result, the share of 
agriculture declined even within the rural economy, alongside the growth of agricultural 
outputs (Table 2.5). 
Table 2.5 Structural change of the rural economy in China(%) 
Agriculture Industry Construction Transportation Commerce 
1980 68.9 19.5 6.5 1.7 3.5 
1983 66.7 20.0 7.8 2.0 3.5 
1984 b3.4 22.9 7.3 2.6 3.7 
1985 57.1 27.6 8.0 3.0 4.3 
1986 53.1 31.5 7.8 3.2 4.3 
1987 49.6 34.8 7.7 3.6 4.4 
1988 4ci.8 3g,1 7.1 3.5 4.5 
1989 45.1 40.7 6.4 3.6 4.3 
1990 46.1 40.4 5.9 3.5 4.1 
Source: State Statistics Bureau, China Statistiwl Yearbook, vmious issues, China Statis~cs Press. 
Beijing:315. 
After ten years of reform, the Chinese economy is much more flexible and free to adjust 
its economic structure in response to changes in 111centive <;tructure. Trade flows, factor 
movements, resource relocation and production adjustn 1'.nts have all occurred, though 
not perfectly. Every part of the economy increasingly interacts with each other. 
21 This share docs not include income from private enterprises,. so the share of farmers' income 
from rural industry must be higher than that given here. 
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Economic integration is important to the application of a general equilibrium framework 
in this study. In a highly segmented economy, there would not be much room for sectoral 
interactions or indirect policy effects to play a significant role. In the current Chinese 
economy, farmers behaviour is not only subject to sector specific policies, such as 
procurement price and input policy, but is also affected by the other sectors of the 
economy and their feedbacks. 
Limited Factor Mobility or Limited Feasible Choice Set of Farmers 
Economic integrntion helps to raise the degree of factor mobility for farmers. Within 
agriculture, farmers are now free to decide on resource allocation and production 
structures conditional only on the fulfilment of certain government purchase quotas. A 
large amount of agricultural resources, including land, labour and capital, has moved 
from agriculture to industry, particularly rural industry, in the past decade. The number 
of employees in the township and village enterprises, mostly local farmers, rose from 
28.3 million in 1978 to 92.6 million in 1990 (China Statistical Yearbook 1991:377). 
Factor mobility, however, is still subject to many non-economic constraints. Important 
production factors include capital, land and labour. Land in the rural areas is legally 
owned by the collectives (or, previously, by production teams). In most cases, farmers 
are not allowed to transfer or sell the piece of land they farm nor can they use it for other 
purposes. 
Capital movements are limited in China. When the TVP enterprises were beginning in 
early years, they usually bought old machines from urban industries. Capital is, however, 
by no means mobile, not only because capital movements benveen differem: urban 
industries are not allowed, but also because farmers cannot move their capital into the 
cities even if higher profitability exists in the urban areas. There is a certain degree of 
capital mobility between agriculture and the rural industry. It is commonly observed, for 
instance, that farmers buy tractors for ploughing during planting seasons and for 
transportation throughout the rest of the year. 
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The limited mobility of capital and land is not so significant in this study since a short-run 
analytical framework is applied. Capital and land are assumed to be fixed in this 
framework. The more important factor is labour. Labour mobility has improved 
alongside increasing economic integration but is limited by two kinds of restrictions or 
constraints: one on labour flows between rural and urban areas, and the other on labour 
flow between agriculture and rural non-agricultural industries. 
Labour flows from rural to urban areas are still discouraged by the government as it 
attempts to regulate the scale and stability of cities (White 1988; Meng 1993 ). Regional 
labour flows are rare, not only because the movements between rural and urban areas are 
largely restricted, but because most of the rural industries aimed at absorbing local 
agricultural surplus labour. According to a sample survey on labour force, in 222 
surveyed villages, only about 3 per cent of the total labour force migrated permanently, 
and 11 per cent seasonally to the urban areas and other rural areas (Table 2.6). 22 Labour 
inflows are even smaller. Within the rural areas, about 80 per cent of township and 
village enterprises employees are from the same township and only about 5.0 per cent of 
employees are from the other counties and provinces (Meng 1993). 
Even within the local rural areas, labour is not perfectly mobile. Earnings of agricultural 
farmers are still significantly lower than those employed by the rural industry. In 1985, 
the average wage of agricultural production was 4. 7 yuan per day, while that of non-
agricultural production was 10. 7 yuan per day (Huang 1992). Even in 1990, the av~rage 
yearly income of total farmers, including agricultural farmers and rural industry 
employees, was 630 yuan, and that of rural industry employees was 655 yuan. 23 This 
suggests that there are still many farmers who failed to find jobs in industry even though 
they wanted to.24 Most rural industrial employees are assigned administratively rather 
22 This data derives from a nation-wide labour force survey of a hundred villages (Meng 1993). 
23 State Statistics Bureau, Chi11a Statistical Yearbook 1991:377-379; Chi11a Agricultural Statistical 
yearbook 1991:206. 
. 24 In development economics, the existence of a gap between agricultural and non-agricultural 
wages could be an equilibrium result when farmers' risk factors. such as unemployment in the urban 
sector, are incorporated (Harris and Todaro 1970). This argument might be applied to analysis of labour 
movements between urban and rural areas in China. incorporating some modifications (Anderson 1990). 
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than through markets, and wage determination in rural industry is influenced by local 
government (Meng 1993). 
Table 2.6 Labour outflow and inflow in 222 sample "illages, 1986 
Amount Proportion 
(1,000 person) (o/c) 
Total labour 189,006 100.00 
Total outflow 26,993 14.30 
permanent 5,596 2.96 
seasonal 21,397 11.32 
To urban areas 12,394 6.56 
permanent 3,303 1.75 
seasonal 9,091 4.80 
To other rural areas 14,599 7.72 
pennanent 2,293 1.20 
seasonal 12,306 6.51 
Total inflow 7,793 4.10 
permanent 4,086 2.20 
seasonal 3,707 2.00 
from urban areasa 733 0.40 
from other rural areas 7,060 3.70 
Note: a Labour moved from the urban areas to the rural areas consists mostly of retirees from urban 
industries and employed by the township and village enterprises as technicians or technical consultants. 
Source: Meng (1993), !11dividual wage de1ermi11a1io11 in township, village a11d private e111erprises i11 
China, unpublished PhD dissertation, Australian National University, Canberra. 
Policy Intervention 
Asynunetric price control is another important characteristic of the current Chinese 
economy, particularly agriculture. While most direct intervention in product markets has 
been gradually eliminated, interventionist policies continue to effect some agricultural 
products. As discussed above, during the pre-reform period, the state directly controlled 
the pricing and exchange of most agricultural products. Demand and supply were pre-
determined in detail by economic plans, though this approach was hardly successful. 
Through the process of economic reform, direct intervention in the regulation of demand 
and supply was gradually replaced by market mechanisms. 
However, it is. hardly true for the case of labour movements from the agricultural sector to local rural 
industry. 
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The effects of continuing intervention in Chinese ag1iculture are visible at two levels. 
First, some domestic product markets remain insulated from the international market -
for example, the grain markets. 25 Second, the state prices are substantially biased away 
from the market equilibrium for some agricultural products such as wool and cotton. 
The insulation of the domef;tic agricultural product markets from the international market 
has two causes: trade barriers and exchange rate controls. Barriers to trade employed by 
the Chinese government not only prevent foreigners from freely entering the domestic 
market, they also make it very difficult for home producers and consumers to access !he 
international market. Because the exchange rate is artificially set by the government and 
not as a result of free interaction between market forces, any change in one market 
cannot be transmitted to the other sensitively. In paiticular, when monetary movements 
occur in the domestic economy, such as an increase in money supply, one possible 
consequence is an inflationary effect. Market prices for all non-price controlled 
commodities will increase. Under a free exchange rate regime, this would not affect the 
relative price of Chinese commodities in the international market as the exchange rate 
would adjust accordingly. When the exchange rate is rigid, Chinese exports in ~he 
international market tend to become more expensive. 
Distortion of agricultural product prices away from domestic market equilibrium prices 
occurs in two major forms. One is the so-called two-tier price system. For grain, a 
fraction of commodity output must be transacted at the state-determined price. Output 
above this amount can be freely exchanged in the market. The other involves strict 
prohibition of free market transactions: all output must be purchased and allocated by the 
state according to economic planning. This second form of distortion currently applies to 
cotton and wool. At first glance, one would gain the impression that this form of 
distortion is exactly the same as the pre-reform 'unified purchase and marketing 
25 In some regions of China. such as in Guangdong province. grain imports started to be managed 
by local governments. The Chinese grain market as a whole, however, is still insulated from lhe 
international market. 
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system' .26 As this study shows later, however, after ten years of reform the 
implementation and consequences of this interventionist policy are rather different. 
The two forms of intervention have quite different effects on agriculture and other 
economic activities. For grain, there was a two-tier price system.27 Some economists 
argue that, because a free market exists alongside government intervention, the 
distortions created by grain incentives do not directly affect consumption and production 
behaviour (Sicular 1988). The only effects are second-round income effects. These are 
minor according to some economists (Martin 1990). Lin (1993), on the hand, argues that 
state prices do have important effects on farmers' production decision if state purchase 
quotas are endogenously determined. For wool and cotton, although only one state price 
exists, the operation of the demand and supply sides of the market is differs significantly 
from the pre-reform regime. On the supply side, wool and cotton are produced by 
millions of farm households. However. because wool and cotton are, in principle, not 
directly consumable, fanners are less able to sell their products at higher prices outside 
governmental channels. It is easier to detect and penalize non-government organizations 
transacting wool and cotton with small-scale farmers. Therefore, farmers, in general, are 
still subject to the state price. On the demand side, however, second market transactions 
occur frequently, explaining how many township and village enterprises are able to 
continue producing textile products. The hypothesis to the wool and cotton exchange is 
the separation of the producer and user prices. Because state prices are set too low, 
farmers do not have an incentive to produce higher output. Surplus demand exists for 
wool and cotton. User prices are pushed up (due to rent-seeking) until demand and 
supply are equal. 
State intervention in grain and natural fibre production can be measured at two levels, 
according to the references used (Table 2.7). There are also some other measures of the 
26 The unified purchase and marketing system was adopted in 1952 in China for most agricultural 
products, under which the free market is closed and the state is the only agent involved in exchange 
transactions. 
27 'This study does not discuss the situation after April 1992, from which the two-tier price system 
was officially abolished. 
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effects of intervention on agriculture. Anderson and Tyers ( 1987) present ratios of 
domestic producer prices to border prices for a few grain commodities. The ratio for rice 
was unstable over the period 1955-83. For wheat and corn, the ratios rose over the same 
period. Webb (1989) estimated producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs) for the period 
1982-87. It was found that PS Es due to procurement policy for grain products declined 
dramatically during this period. PSEs due to border policy vary over time. While the 
PSEs for rice were quite stable (around -60 per cent), wheat producers switched from 
being net beneficiaries to net losers (Webb 1989). 
Table 2.7 Intervention in grain and natural fibre markets, 1979-90 
Due to procurement policya Due to border policyb 
Woold Grain Cotton Wool Grain Cotton WooJC 
1979 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.83 
1980 0.68 0.00 0.00 1.99 0.77 0.49 
1981 0.67 0.(,0 0.00 0.94 0.62 0.86 
1982 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.90 1.31 0.63 0.90 
1983 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.99 1.31 0.68 0.94 
1984 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.84 1.00 0.58 0.77 
1985 0.78 0.00 0.00 1.17 0.95 0.68 0.85 
1986 0.85 0.00 0.00 1.18 1.17 0.69 0.81 
1987 0.85 0.00 0.00 1.54 0.96 0.50 0.57 
1988 0.85 0.00 0.00 1.54 0.43 0.66 
1989 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.65 
1990 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.50 
Notes: a Data on distortions due to procurement policy measure the ratio of procurement to free 
market prices; 
b Data on distortions due to border policy measure the ratio of domestic to international 
prices. Two measures are presented in the table for the distortions in wool price due to border policy; 
c This colwnn uses Australian auction prices as the international price: and 
d The last column uses New Zealand's auction prices. 
Sources: The distortion indexes are calculated from State Statistics Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, 
various issues; China Price Statistics Yearbook. various issues; China Statistics Press, Beijing; 
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Commodity Statistics Bulletin 1992, 
Canberra. 
A New Scene 
The Chinese agricultural sector has been semi-marketized in the past decade of reform 
bringing important new dimensions to its development perfonnance. Agriculture in China 
is now integrated, to a certain degree, with the rest of the Chinese economy and the 
world economy. This provides the motivations and possibilities for farmers to adjust their 
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resource allocation behaviour and production structure as a means to maximize their 
profits. 
Profit-maximizing resource allocation is, however, restricted by the limited factor 
mobility. Furthermore, some agricultural activities are still subject to direct government 
intervention, such as the state purchase prices and procurement quotas for grain, cotton 
and wool. These would prevent farmers from maximizing profits. 
Therefore, these two characteristics are important in analysing agricultural policies in 
China and are significant in formulating the methodology for policy analysis. Not only 
should they be carefully examined, they must also be appropriately accommodated in 
analytical framework. These require theoretical developments as well as empirical 
investigation. 
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3 
Farmers~ Production Decisions: A Theoretical Analysis 
Two characteristics - the limited feasible choice set of f anners and price distortion -
were important mechanisms for agricultural and economic changes in China. This chapter 
develops a more detailed and consistent framework for understanding the ways in which, 
and the extent to which, these two characteristics have distorted economic equilibrium 
and production/consumption decisions. A perfect competition model is first used as a 
reference point in the argument. This necessitates a set of simplified and stringent 
assumptions. Economic equilibrium and production decisions are analyzed by introducing 
price distortion and a limited feasible choice set. The results are compared with those in 
the case of perfect competition. The response of the economy to changes in economy-
wide policies is then examined. 
A Perfect Competition Model 
Assume an economy comprising two consumers, one urban and one rural, and two 
producers, one industrial and one agricultural. Both the urban and rural consumer have 
an initial factor endowment, labour for instance (Xu for urban consumer and X R for rural 
consumer). Consumers sell their labour at market wages and buy commodities for 
consumption. Producers, on the other hand, buy labour as the only input to production 
and sell their products on product markets. 
Optimization Behaviour of Consumers and Producers 
Assumption 1: Consumers and producers are assumed to be rational agents. 
Consumers maximize their utility levels, subject to market prices and the 
budget constraint. Producers maximize their profits, given technology and 
market prices. 
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The two producers are distinguishable in the sense that they produce different products 
using different technologies. The industrial producer produces an industrial product (y1) 
and the agricultural producer produces an agricultural product (y A). Production of both 
goods uses labour (x) as the only input and there are no intermediate goods. Production 
technologies are defined as 
(3.1) 
where i =A is for agricultural production, i =I for industrial production, and Ji (xi) 
satisfies all normal conditions of a production function. Marginal product is always 
greater than zero and decreases with respect to ~nput levels. 
of; a2 f; 
f;(O)=O, -' >0 and-~' <0 
ax. ox:-/ I 
(3.2) 
Industrial producers make optimal input demand and output supply decisions by solving 
the following profit maximization problem 
Max P1y1 -Wix, 
st y1 = f, (x1 ) 
(3.3) 
where P1 is the market price for industrial product, y1 is output of the industrial product, 
and W1 and x1 are the market price for, and the amount of labour used by, the industrial 
producer. Maximum profit is achieved when marginal revenue equals marginal cost, 
which implies 
(3.4) 
The solution to the problem or the optimal choices of labour demand (x;) and output 
supply (y;) can be expressed as 
x; ==x;(P1,W1 ) 
y; =y;(P,,W1 ) 
which have the properties 
(3.5) 
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ax; 0 ax; 0 oy; 0 oyl· 
-> ·--< ·-> ·--<0 
o?i ' aw, ' aP1 ' aw, (3.6) 
Similarly, the agricultural producer's profit maximization problem can be described as 
Max PAYA -WAxA 
st YA= !A (xA) 
(3.7) 
where PA is the market price for agricultural product, y A is the agricultural output, WA 
and xA are the market price for, and the amount of labour used by, the agricultural 
producer, and !A (x A) is the production function for agricultural activity. Again, the 
condition for profit maximization is 
(3.8) 
Optimal choices of input demand (x;) and output supply (y;) can be solved and 
expressed as 
x: = x: (PA' WA) y: = y: (PA, WA) 
(3.9) 
These optimal labour demand and output supply relationships have the same properties 
as those derived for industrial producers' optimal choices (Equation (5.6)). 
Consumers derive utility from consumption of the two goods and their utility functions 
are defined byl 
(5.10) 
where j = U,R refers to urban and rural consumers, respectively, ciA ,cj1 are amounts of 
goods A and I consumed by j, and the utility function Uj satisfies normal conditions 
I In this study, consumers' utility does not involve consumption of leisure time. Because the supply 
of labour is assumed to be fixed, the level of the wage rate does not affect factor supply and, so, the 
leisure-labour decision. 
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U/0)=0; :;--1->0;--;-f<O; a al >0 (i;th); j=R,U; i,h=A,J (3.11) 
ocji ocF cji cj,, 
The utility maximization problem for consumers can be formulated as 
Max uj = uj (cjA 'cjl) (3.12) 
st PAcjA + Plcjl = wjxj 
where w; is the wage rate paid to consumer j. Neither consumer receives income from 
any source other than wage payments. Maximum utility is achieved when the following 
condition is satisfied 
(3.13) 
and optimal consumption demands are functions of prices and income 
(3.14) 
which have the properties 
ac. OC- ac.} 
-
1
' < O· - 1' > <' (i ;eh)·, - 1-' > 0 
aP 'aP aw 
J " j 
(j = R,U; i,h =A,!) (3.15) 
Perfect Factor Mobility 
Decisions by individual producers and consumers are inter-related. In particular, they 
depend on how market prices and wage rates are determined and how the fixed supply, 
say of labour, is allocated between different production activities. 
Assumption 2: There is one unified factor market in the economy. Both 
producers can buy factors from rural and urban consumers. There will be one 
market equilibrium price (yV) for factors der .. ending on input demand in the two 
production activities, that is W =WR= Wu =WA = W1 • Further, we assume full 
employment of the production factor (X =Xu +XR). 
40 
Perfect factor mobility within the econorn·,· implies that both (urban and rural) consumers 
can be employed ir1 either agricultural or industrial sectors. Denoting the feasible choice 
sets of rural and urban consumers by FR and Fu , respectively, 
(3.16) 
A simple diagram can be used to illustrate how a unique wage rate is achieved and how 
labour is allocated between agriculture and industry (Figure 3.1). The left vertical axis 
represents real wages in agriculture and the right vertical axis, real wages in industry. 
The horizontal axis represents X, the fixed supply of labour in the economy. Of the total 
quantity of labour in the ecoriomy (OAO, ), OAR is the labour endowment of the rural 
consumer and R01 is the labour endowment of the urban consumer. Demand for labour 
in agriculture is captured by the schedule MPLA, the graphic representation of equation 
(3.8). Schedule MPL1 illustrates the corresponding labour demand relationship for 
industry, equation (3.4). Labour employed in agriculture is measured to the right from 
0 A along the horizontal axis and in industry, to the left from 0 1• 
Agricultural 
real wage 
w* 
Figure 3.1 Market equilibrium in the unified factor market 
Q R 
Total number of workers 
Industrial 
real wage 
Equilibrium between labour allocation demand and the wage rate is detennined by the 
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intersection of the two marginal product schedules (point E). At this point, the marginal 
product of labour in both sectors is equalized 
(3.17) 
and the equilibrium wage rate is w· (equilibrium real wage rate w • ). 
Mathematically, the equilibrium wage rate is solved by equating labour demand to supply 
The equilibrium wage rate is therefore a function of the two output prices 
The above equilibrium wage function has the properties 
Thus, the supply functions in equations (3.5) and (3.9) can be rewritten as 
Y.: = Y: (PA, fi) 
y; = y; (PA' pl) 
with properties 
(3.18) 
(3.19) 
(3.20) 
(3.21) 
(3.22) 
At the equilibrium, OAQ of total Jabour is employed in agriculture and Q01 is employed 
in industry (all urban labour (R01) is employed in the industrial sector, of total rural 
labour OAR, OAQ is employed in the agricultural sector and QR in industrial sector).2 
2 Abandoning the assumption that urban labour is not employed in the agricultural sector does not 
alter the equilibrium point. As long as no transaction costs are involved, it does not matter who is 
employed in \Yhich sector. Given fixed factor supply and marginal products of labour in the two sector~. 
each labourer always gets the same wage rate wherever he/she works. 
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Proposition 1: In a two-sector economy with perfect mobility of factors of 
production, the equilibrium wage rate and factor allocation are uniquely 
detennined given fixed factor supply, production technology and product 
pnces. 
Proof of Proposition 1 is provided in Appendix 3A. 
Open Economy 
In this model, both prodncts are tractable. They can either be imported when there is 
excess demar.d in the domestic marKet or exported when there is excess supply. Non~ 
tradables are not considered in this model. The economy is assumed to be small and 
open, with a free trade regime. The potential impact of trade and current account 
imbalances is ignored. Furthermore, government budget constraints are not incorporated. 
Assumption 3: The country, a small and open economy, is a price-taker in the 
world market. Domestic prices of commodities are therefore not affected by 
changes in domestic supply and demand. Consumers thus face an inelastic 
supply curve while producers face an inelastic demand curve. 
The essence of this assumption is that prices are determined in the internationa 1 market. 
This allows focus on the impact of any exogenous changes on production decisions, 
without analysing in detail the demand side of the economy. 
To solve for the general equilibrium of the economy, it is essential to combine the 
optimal choices of producers and consumers. In ar. autarky, demand must equal supply 
for each factor and commodity. 
Y~ = c;A +c~A (3.23) y; = c;, +c~1 
x~+x;=xR+Xu=X 
For an open economy, however, the first two conditions of (3.23) are not necessary. 
Differences in commodity demand and supply can be balanced by international trade. 
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The differences between autarky equilibrium and free trade equilibrium can be illustrated 
using Figure 3.2. The vertical axis in the diagram represents agricultural production, and 
the horizontal axis represents industrial production. Given fixed factor supply (X) and 
prevailing production technologies, a production possibility frontier, FF, is detennined. 
The area under curve FF, above the horizontal axis and to the right of the vertical axis is 
the production possibility set. With no inefficiency in production, the economy thus 
always operates on the frontier. 1· I* and ID ID represents consumers' aggregate 
indifference curves: the higher the curve, the higher the aggregate utility level. 
Figure 3.2 Production and consumption in autarky and free trade 
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Industry 
In autarky, all consumed goods are domestically produced. Equilibrium would only 
occur when the indifference curve is tangential to the production possibility frontier, at 
which point domestic demand equals domestic supply for each commodity (point A). At 
this autarky equilibrium, demand for and supply of, the agricultural good are yf and 
those of the industrial good are yf. The aggregate utility level is ID ID and the domestic 
relative price is PD· The equilibrium for this economy is determined by both the shape of 
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the production possibility frontier, FF, and the indifference curve, I* I*. Whenever there 
is a change in consumer preferences, both domestic relative price and production 
decisions will be affected. 
In an open economy, however, the relative price (Pw) is determined in the international 
market, exogenous to the domestic economy. Both producers and consumers will make 
their decisions according to this pre-determined relative price. Production will be at point 
B(y;' y:) and consumption at point ccc;' c:) ( c; = c;I + c;I and c: = c;A + c;A). The 
economy now will import agricultural goods ( c: - y:) and export industrial goods 
(y; -c;). The new aggregate utility level is at f*f*. The welfare improvement from ID ID 
to I. I* is known as the gains from trade. Production decisions are relatively independent 
of consumer preferences. Given technology and product prices, the economy achieves 
full employment through adjustment of the wage rate in the factor market (Appendix 3B 
discusses this equilibrium mechanism). Consumers, on the other hand, use this wage 
income for consumption given relative prices and their own preferences. 
Limited Feasible Choice Set of Farmers 
The perfect competition model does not capture the real story of the Chinese economy. 
To investigate what the actual equilibrium is in the presence of the two characteristics of 
the Chinese agriculture, some of the crucial assumptions of the perfect competition 
model must be relaxed. 
Impact of Factor Market Segmentation 
The first assumption that does not apply in the Chinese economy is perfect factor 
mobility. Significant restrictions still exist on factor (labour) flows between rural and 
urban areas (Chapter 2). Urban industrialization therefore does not absorb surplus rural 
labour due to factor market segmentation. This immobility was one of the main reasons 
for the growth of rural industrialization from the early 1980s. The government has not 
officially lifted the embargo on labour movement between rural and urban areas. 
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Continuing restrictions on factor movements call for revision to the factor mobility 
assumption of the perfect competition model. 
Assumption 4: Labour is not only immobile between different countries, it also 
cannot move between rural and urban areas within the economy. There are two 
segmented labour markets, one rural and one urban. Within each market, 
however, labour is assumed to be perfectly mobile between different regions 
and different industries. 
This revision to the previous assumption (Assumption 2) may not be entirely appropriate 
to modelling in the Chinese economy. First, labour flows from rural to urban areas, 
particularly temporary movements, have occurred occasionally. Second, labour 
movement between different regions and different industries within rural and urban areas 
is still largely restricted. The analysis behind Assumption 4, however, provides 
indications of the impact of factor market segmentation. The consequences of further 
restrictions within rural and urban areas can be inferred from this analysis. Labour market 
segmentation has resulted in the development of a rural industry alongside the urban 
industry. 
Assumption 5: The industrial sector is separated into two parts, urban (I u) and 
rural (IR) industries, which produce an identical industrial product using the 
same technology. 
Technically, urban and rural industrial products can be differentiated and the two 
industries assumed to use different production technologies, as is more likely the case in 
China. But this does not improve the analytical results significantly. 3 
3 As discussed previously, goods prices are detennined by the world market. lf it is assumed that 
different products are produced by urban and rural industries using different technologies. the market 
condition for one product is only affected by another when the situation in the world market changes. 
Domestically, it does not matter whether the two industrial products are identical or different. changes in 
domestic demand for or supply of one good would not have any influence on the other. Furthermore. 
identical or different technologies used by the two industries do not affect the results as long as they can 
adjust the wage rate in the segmented market to achieve maximum profits (for the marginal revenue 
equalling marginal cost condition to hold). 
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To extend the analysis, three producers (agricultural, rural and urban industrial), two 
consumers and two commodities can be considered. Urban consumers can only be 
employed in urban industry, and rural consumers can only be employed in agriculture and 
rural industry. 
(3.24) 
Not only is the fanners' feasible choice set limited, but the feasible choice set of urban 
residents is also restricted, to urban indust:Iies. In other words, given labour market 
segmentation, urban workers can only be employed in urban industry, while rural 
workers can only be employed by rural industry or agriculture. Although equilibrium still 
occurs in each of the urban and rural labour markets under the assumption of full 
employment, the two wage rates do not necessarily equalize 
(3.25) 
Assumption 6: The number of rural workers exceeds the optimal demands by 
agriculture and rural industry in the perfectly competit:I.ve case, 
XR > x: (W*)+x;R cw·). And the number of urban workers is less than the 
optimal demand by urban industry in the competitive case, Xu > x ;u (W*). 
Assumption 6 seems to be arbitrary, but it captures the reality of the Chinese economy. 
Before industrialization, China was an agricultural economy and most labour worked in 
agriculture, a situation similar to that experienced by most developing economies. 
Because urban industrialization in China was unable to draw on surplus agricultural 
labour, rural labour was in excess supply. The relationship between the relevant wages is 
w:· > W*> w· U R (3.26) 
where W* is the equilibrium wage rate with perfect mobility, and W~,, W~ are equilibrium 
wage rates in the segmented urban and rural labour markets. The allocation of labour and 
the detennination of wage rates is illustrated in Figure 3.3, which is slightly different 
from Figure 3.1. In Figure 3.3, the vertical axis on the left represents the real rural wage 
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rate (instead of the agricultural real wage in Figure 3.1) and the axis on the right 
represents the urban real wage (instead of the industrial real wage). The upward sloping 
schedule on the right in the diagram now represents the marginal product of labour in 
urban industry (MPL1) (note that MPL1u locates lower than the original MPL1).4 The 
two dotted downward sloping lines are marginal products of labour in agriculture 
(MPLA) and rural industry (MPL1R ). The solid downward sloping line MPLR is the 
aggregate marginal product of the rural economy (the horizontal sum of agriculture and 
rural industry). If there are no restrictions on the movement of labour between urban and 
rural areas, equilibrium should be at A, when the equilibrium wage rate (W*) and labour 
allocation between agriculture and industry (rural plus urban industries) remain the same 
as in the perfect competition model. 
Rural 
real wage 
Figure 3.3 Segmented urban and rural factor markets 
MPLA 
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real wage 
Because of labour market segmentation, rural consumers have to be employed by either 
agriculture or rural industry. Through adjustment of the rural wage rate to W~ full 
4 The reru;on for a lower schedule of marginal product of labour in urban industry is that the original 
marginal product of Jabour in industry is the horizontal sum of schedules for urban and rural industries. 
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employment is achieved in rural areas (the mechanism is discussed in Appendix 3B). At 
the same time, the urban wage rate is pushed up to W~. 5 Relative to the competitive 
case, agriculture employs more of the production factor (QQ') because 
OX;(P,W)<O '=A I I aw , z , v· R (3.27) 
In terms of wage income, rural consumers lose a total income of w • w~DC and urban 
workers get an excess payment of Bw~GD, compared to the competitive case. Urban 
industrial production is reduced by ABRQ" due to the decrease in employment (Q"R). 
Rural production is increased by ACRQ". The shaded area ABC is the net loss of total 
output, which is the deadweight loss created by labour market segmentation. 
Proposition 2: Given labour market segmentation between urban and rural 
areas, if labour is restricted to the rural areas, as in China, the rural wage rate 
will be pushed down. The agricultural sector expands, compared to the case of 
perlect competition, but rural workers incur a wage income loss. The 
restriction also results in a loss of output (or inefficiency). 
Proposition 2 is supported by the empirical evidence. Although the share of industry in 
the Chinese economy rose from 55 per cent in the early 1950s to 80 per cent at the end 
of the 1970s in the process of urban industrialization, the share ofrural labour in the total 
labour force fluctuated around 80 per cent (Table 5.1 ). During 1952-90, the average 
annual growth rate of the rural labour force was 2.2 per cent, only slightly lower than 
that for the total labour force (2.7 per cent) (China Statistical Yearbook 1991:95). 
Agricultural and other rural industries employed too many workers, and the marginal 
product of labour and wage rates were depressed. Net income per worker in rural areas 
has been lower than in the urban areas (Table 3.2). 
5 This does not contradict the impression that China implemented a low wage policy in urban 
industry, because the low wage policy is accompanied by a complete set of subsidy policies, such as those 
for housing, food and medical care, to which rural residents were not entitled. The actual payments 
received by urban workers are much higher than the nominal wage. 
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Table 3.1 Changes in industrial output and the rural labour force, 1952-90 
Industrial share Total and rural labour force in China 
in gro~s output Total Rural Rural/total 
(%) (million) (million) (%) 
1952 54.6 207 182 88.0 
1955 59.4 223 195 87.5 
1960 82.9 259 198 76.4 
1965 69.1 287 235 82.1 
1970 73.1 344 281 81.7 
1975 76.6 382 299 78.5 
1978 79.6 402 306 76.3 
1980 77.5 424 318 75.2 
1985 78.2 499 371 74.3 
1990 79.8 567 420 74.0 
Note: Industry includes industry, construction, transportation and commerce in both rural and urban 
areas. Rural industries only developed rapidly after the mid-1980s. Before tha! time most industries in 
China were concentrated in urban areas. 
Source: China Statistical Bureau, China Siaristica/ Yearbook 1991, China Statistical Press, Beijing:50; 
95. 
Table 3.2 Average yearly wage rates of urban and rural workers in China (yuan) 
Urban worker Rural worker Rural/urban 
(yuan per labour) (yuan per labour) (%) 
1978 615 344 56 
1980 762 477 63 
1985 1148 866 75 
1986 1329 905 68 
1987 1459 964 66 
1988 1747 1120 64 
1989 1935 1222 63 
1990 2140 1261 59 
Note: Wage rates for rural workers are calculated from average net income per capita according to the 
infonnation on rural population and rural labour. This calculated wag~ rate is probably higher than the 
actual wage rate since net income could also include returns to capital and labour in rural production. 
Source: China Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook 1991, Beijing, China Statistical Press: 79; 
95; 130; 295. 
Should Restrictions on Labour Movement Be Maintained? 
The above analysis suggests that restricted labour movement between urban and rural 
areas causes inefficiencies. According to the theorem of factor price equalization in the 
theory of international trade, as long as the output market is well developed, restrictions 
on factor mobility between different countries do not cause any inefficiency. Under a free 
trade regime, each part of the world economy develops according to its comparative 
advantage. Factor prices finally equalize across countries, and movement of the 
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production factors is not necessary. The practical implication concerns whether or not 
China could eliminate current inefficiencies by concentrating on the development of the 
product market but retaining current restrictions on factor flows. 
Assuming no change in production technologies and product demand, the output market 
structure would change due to wage differentials so long as the product market was well 
developed. If rural and urban industries produce the same or differentiated products, 
rural industry can expect a continuous expansion due to competitiveness resulting from 
low production costs. The rural aggregate marginal product curve would. therefore shift 
to the right. Urban industry may contract due to its high production costs, and so shift 
the marginal product curve for urban industry to the right. Equilibrium would occur 
when the two new marginal product curves intersect at point D (Figure 3.3). Real wage 
rates are thus equalized across the two sectors without relocating labour between urban 
and rural areas. This is standard international trade theory and partly reflects changes in 
China in the past decade. 
Economic reform in China since 1979 has not removed restrictions on labour movement 
between urban and rural areas. The rapid development of rural industry is a passive 
response to these restrictions. Before economic refonn, there was little rural industry. 
The rural aggregate marginal product curve sat far to the left of the position illustrated in 
Figure 3.3. Rural wage rates were therefore much lower than the current distorted rural 
wage rates. The development of rural industry, taking advantage of cheap labour in rural 
areas, gradually shifted the marginal product curve to the right and raised the rural wage 
rate. 
Theoretically, therefore, there is a path which will lead the Chinese economy to an 
efficient equilibrium even with constrained factor movements. In other words, even 
under the current restrictions, there is room for China to reduce inefficiency. 
In practice, however, there are several qualifications to this conclusion. The theory of 
factor price equalization relies on a set of restrictive assumptions, including identical 
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technology (or free access to technology information), free trade and no transportation 
and transaction costs. These assumptions are too restrictive and factor price equalization 
never occurs in the real world. Efficiency improvement with rural-urban factor 
segmentation can only be achieved in the longer term in China. Because rural firms locate 
in villages around the country, their cost of access to new technology and economic 
information will not be the same as that for urban enterprises, even when all rural and 
urban firms face the same competitive market (all firms are therefore price-takers). The 
revenue received by rural firms is less than that by urban firms because of higher 
transportation costs. Marginal returns to labour and the wage rate in rural firms are 
lower. If these workers were able to find the same jobs in urban areas, they would 
receive higher wage rates. Realization of perfect factor mobility (particularly labour 
mobility) is the best means of achieving global efficiency. 
Price Distortions 
The other assumption that does not apply to the Chinese economy is the competitiveness 
of the product market. Agricultural prices, in some cases, are distorted by government 
policy. There are two important forms of price distortion - state controlled prices (the 
cases of wool and cotton) and the two-tier price system (the cases of rice and wheat) 
(see Chapter 2). 
Government Monopoly 
First, the controlled price for an agricultural product without secondary a free market is 
considered. 
Assumption 7: While free trade applies for most products, the government 
controls the price of one agricultural product (wool as the example in this case) 
(Pw) set lower than its market equilibrium price. Any secondary market for this 
product is strictly prohibited. 
To explore the effects of this price control, wool must be separated from other 
agricultural products. 
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Assumption 8: Agricultural producers produce two products: wool (W) and 
other agricultural produce (-W). 
Because a secondary market for wool is assumed away and the government insulates the 
domestic market for wool from international markets, the marginal price for the producer 
is the state price Pw. If the consumer price is also set at the state price, there will be 
excess demand in the insulated domestic market because the state price is set lower than 
the market equilibrium price. The government has two methods available to deal with 
supply shortage while maintaining the state price. One is to import wool at world prices 
and sell it to domestic consumers at the state price, thus providing a price subsidy. The 
other is to ration consumption. Whichever method is adopted by the government, there 
will be no significant effects on production because the model does not specify the 
government budget. 
On the producer's side, a lower price for wool implies a fall in the price of \vool relative 
to other products. The agricultural producer would then produce relatively more non-
wool agricultural products and less wool, compared to the perfectly competitive case. 
The effect of a lower state price for wool on the structure of output is shown in Figure 
3.4. 6 The diagram illustrates the agri..::ultural producer's decision on supply. The 
horizontal axis represents the amount of wool produced and the vertical axis indicates 
the amount of non-wool agricultural products produced. Given technology an J 
production resources, the production possibility frontier is FF. The relative price, PP, is 
given by non-distortion market prices Pw and P_w. Optimal supply will be at A(y~,,Y:w) 
(at the tangency between FF and the relative price line PP) given relative price PP. 
The introduction of the lower state price (Pw) changes the relative price as P_w is fixed. 
The relative price line therefore becomes flatter (from PP to P' P' ). The new level of 
optimal supply is at B(y~,, Y~w). Compared to the case of perfect competition, wool 
6 This can also be shown using properties of supply function (Equation (3.21)) 
ayw (Pw ,P_w, P,,) > 0. A lower Stale wool price therefore generates a fall in wool output. 
'dPw 
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output decreases by y~ - y~ and output of the other agricultural product increases by 
Y~w - Y~w· This is easy to understand because the equilibrium condition for profit 
maximization requires equalization of the value of marginal products of all outputs 
produced. A drop m one product price will push down its value of marginal product at a 
given output level. At the original equilibrium point A, the value of the marginal product 
of wool is now lower than that of non-wool production. The way to re-establish 
equilibrium of the two marginal products (or to achieve maximwn profit) is to reduce 
wool output and increase non-wool output.7 
Figure 3.4 Lower state price and changes in supply 
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The impact of a lower state price for wool, however, goes beyond agriculture because 
le.hour is mobile within the rural economy. Rural industrial production is also affected by 
changes in wool prices through adjustments in the rural labour market. A lower state 
price for wool, ceteris paribus, results in a fall in wool output and an increase in both 
non-wool agricultural and rural industrial outputs. This can be clearly illustrated in a 
7 This is b.ecause we have azYw < Q. 
ax~. 
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factor relocation diagram. In Figure 3.5 agricultural production is further decomposed 
into wool and non-wool agricultural production. Under the assumption of labour market 
segmentation and no price distortion, the marginal product curves for wool and non-
wool agricultural products are MP4,, and MPL_w, respectively. Tneir sum gives the 
marginal product curve for agriculture (MPLA in Figure 3.3). The equilibrium rural wage 
is W~, labour employed in wool production equals OA W', in non-wool agricultural 
production GAN', and employed by rural industry is OAR' (OAW' +OAN' +OAR'= OAR). 
Figure 3.5 Effects of a low state price for wool on labour market 
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The lower state price for wool implies a downward shift of the marginal product curve 
for wool production (from the solid line to the dotted line) because 
P. ofw P. dfw w < w 
OXw dXw 
(3.28) 
Consequently, the aggregate marginal product curve for the rural economy also moves 
dowr.ward. The equilibrium rural wage rate is pushed down from WR to W~'. At this new 
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wage, the labour employed in wool, non-wool agricultural and rural industrial production 
would be OA W'', OAN'' and OAR'', respectively, that is 
'.:\ . . '.:\ . '.:\ . 
oXw Q dX w 0X1 o:X1 
--> ,---<o, __ R <0,--u =0 
C1Pw C1Pw C1Pw C1Pw (3.29) 
The share of wool production in total production falls while the shares of other 
agricultural and rural industrial production rise. The net change to agriculture's share in 
the rural economy is ambiguous depending on the magnitudes of changes in wool and 
non-wool production, 
ay~ 0 ay" w 0 ayA· ay1•1, ay: ... --> ---< and --=--+--" 
C1Pw 'C1Pw C1Pw C1Pw C1Pw 
(3.30) 
Urban industry is insulated from the rural shocks because of labour segmentation. There 
is no change to its output level, employment or wage rate. Looking at the economy as a 
whole, however, dead weight loss increases from ABC to A' BC'. 
Proposition 4: Given labour market segmentation between rural and urban 
areas, the introduction of a lower state price for wool '.'ltill depress rural wage 
rates, decrease the share of wool production in employment and total output in 
the rural economy, and increase the shares of other agricultural and rural 
industrial production. The price distortion (the low state price for wool) would 
enlarge the deadweight loss from the labour segmentation policy but net 
changes to the share of agriculture as a whole are uncertain. The urban industry 
does not enter this adjustment story. 
The Two-Tier Price System 
The other important price distortion is the dual-price system where prices are determined 
both officially and unofficially. In a centrally planned economy, such as the case of China 
before economic reform, the government controls almost all economic activities. Markets 
may still occur or exist at the margin. As Panagariya ( 1990) demonstrates, if private 
producers can operate more efficiently than state enterprises, a parallel market will 
emerge in centrally planned economies. The effect of the parallel market will be to 
expand consumption and, hence, to raise welfare. This analysis reveals the impact of the 
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appearance of a secondary market in a centrally planned economy. During the reform 
period in China, markets were introduced into most areas of the economy and the market 
mechanism now works nearly everywhere. The government, however, maintains 
interventionist policies in some of the markets, such as for grain. 
Analyr:is of China's dual-price system was first tackled by Byrd (1987) in a study of the 
market mechanism and economic reform in Chinese industry. A sin1ple general 
equilibrium model was constructed to analyse static resource allocation and efficiency 
properties of the state-owned industrial sector. The model involves a set of important 
assumptions. & 
Byrd distinguishes theoretically unconstrained and constrained equilibria in the Chinese 
economy. An unconstrained equilibrium is one in which no agent is plan-constrained. 
Each agent is pruticipating in the market, at least at the margin, for all inputs and outputs 
that it actually purchases or produces. This inlplies that the model is characterized by 
complete rnarkets. A constrained equilibrium is one in which at least one agent is pla.n-
constrained for some goods, but there are still active markets for all goods with non-zero 
plan targets and allocations. It can be shown that unconstrained equilibria are always at 
least potentially Pareto-superior to constrained equilibria (Byrd 1987, 1989). 
The most interesting application to the current study concerns the irrelevance of 
planning. Changes in output plan targets, input allocations and prices have no effect on 
production or usage of intermediate inputs by any enterprise. Changes in plan parameters 
have an impact on the unconstrained equilibrium solution of investment only if they affect 
the distribution of the 'real value' of total net profits among different investors.9 If there 
are no distributional effects within or between the two components of final demand 
(consumption and investment), then changes in plan parameters for any goods will not 
8 Byrd assumes that factors of production (including labour) are exogenously fixed. At th<' same 
time, wage rates are assumed to be set exogenously in nominal tenns. 
9 The reason for this, as argued by Byrd (1987), is that changes in plan parameters for inver.tment 
goods do chaJ18e the cost of purchasing a given package of investment goods, but at the same time they 
generate an equal change in total net enterprise profits. 
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affect production 0r demand by any agent, and hence the equilibrium outcome in terms 
of production and use of all commodities \-,ill remain the same and market prices will be 
unchanged. 
Sicular (1988a), in a study on planning and markets in China's agricultural commerce, 
deals with the same issue. Applying a general equilibrium-type approach, she presents a 
model of the Chinese economy. State commerce is introduced as well as market 
exchange, and the plan is specified exogenously. For any set of planned prices and 
quotas, the model yields equilibrium market-clear:ng prices, levels of production, income 
and consumption, and levels of state stockpiles and net budgetary revenues. The 
government sets prices for each of the goods and fixes ration quotas and procurement 
quotas. 10 
Maximization conditions are applied to each of the agents, the aggregate rural 
household, the urban producer and the urban consumer. The results show that if all state 
prices are less than market prices, then state-planned prices and quotas will not directly 
affect levels of production and consumption. They can have indirect effects on these 
variables, however, because they change incomes by lump-sum transfers and so alter 
equilib1ium market prices. Quotas will affect each agent's level of trade with the state 
and the market. Levels of trade with the state will exactly equal quota levels, and market 
trade for each agent will equal its excess demand minus the ration quota, or plus the 
procurement quota. 
The above theoretical result, however, contradicts practical experience in China. It is 
well-known that whenever the state price was too low, grain production stagnated, and 
whenever the state price was raised grain output would be raised, given the operation of 
the free market alongside the state plan system. 
10 The state does not sell manufactured goods to the urban producer, agricultural goods to the rural 
household, or labour to either the urban consumer or rural household. 
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Lin (1993) recently argued that the Byrd-Sicular thesis only holds when the procurement 
quota and state price are set exogenously. In China, however, Lin (1993) shows that 
procurement quotas for grain are endogenous. Two cases of endogenous quotas are 
modelled: (1) as a function of output and (2) as a function of the quota in the previous 
period. It is demonstrated that, in both cases, the marginal prices received by farmers are 
affected by the state price and that production decisions will change accordingly. 
The difference between the analysis of Byrd-Sicular and Lin can be shown using the 
framework suggested earlier in this study. Another product, grain (G), is separated from 
other agricultural products. The economy now produces four products: wool, grain, 
other agricultural (-WG) products and industrial products. To introduce the dual-price 
system for grain, the third assumption of the model has to be further revised. 
Assumption 9: Transactions in grain are subject to a dual-price system. The 
government purchases a quota ( q c) forcefully from the agricultural producer at 
a low state price (Pc)· Production beyond that quota for grain is traded at 
market prices (Pc). 
Production decisions are made according to the condition that marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost. To investigate the impact of the state grain price, grain is separated from 
other agricultural produce. 
Assumption 7: The agricultural producer now produces three different 
products, grain (G), wool (W) and another agricultural product (-GW). The 
producer sells all other agricultural products in the market and all wool output 
to the state. A part of grain is sold to the state while the rest is sold on the 
market. 
Agricultural producer's total revenue (Re) and total cost (Cc) of grain production are 
Re== PcCYc -qc)+PcqG 
Cc== WRxG 
(3.31) 
where Pc <Pc according to assumption. The marginal revenue and marginal cost are 
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(3.32) 
The marginal cost function does not change compared to the non-distorted case. 
Whether or not the marginal revenue function remains unchanged depends on the way 
the quota is set. If the procurement quota is set exogenously, as assumed by Byrd (1987) 
and Sicular (1988a), 
Oqc =0 
oyc 
The above marginal revenue function, therefore, becomes 
(3.33) 
(3.34) 
which is exactly the same as in the non-distorted case. Production decisions are thus not 
affected by the state price. This conclusion has been widely accepted (Martin 1990). 
If, however, the procurement quota is endogenousiy assigned, as noted by Lin (1993) in 
the case of grain in China, 
(3.35) 
because Pc> Pc and 1>oqc/oyc>0. And 
(3.36) 
that is, the higher the state price for grain, the higher the marginal revenue farmers 
receive from grain production. 
This implies that a lower state price reduces marginal revenue. The marginal product 
curve of grain production with a dual-price system therefore locates lower than that in 
the competitive case (given by Pc) but higher than in the strictly controlled case (given 
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by Pc) (as in the case of wool). The dual-price system of grain would therefore have a 
similar impact to the case analysed above for wool, but with small magnitudes. 
Proposition 5: \Vnether or not the state price in the dual-price system affects 
production decisions depends on the way that the quota is set. If the quota is 
exogenously set, there would be no direct impact. If the quota is endogenously 
assigned (for example, as a function of output), marginal revenue would be 
altered. A lower state price for grain would result in a contraction of grain 
production, an expansion of other rural production activities and a fall in rural 
wages. 
In the case of an exogenous quota (Byrd 1987, 1989; Sicular 1988a), the function of the 
state price and quota is the same as that of a lump-sum tax, while in the case of an 
endogenous quota (Lin 1993), the function of the state price and quota is the same as 
that of a proportional tax. 
Sectoral Impact of Economy-Wide Policies 
The above analysis shows how the two special characteristics of Chinese agriculture can 
distort fanners' production decisions and the country's economic structure. The 
peculiarities of these two characteristics lie not only in the fact that they change 
economic equilibrium (disequilibrium), but also in the fact that they alter the way an 
economy responds to exogenous shocks, including changes in economy-\vide policies. 
The latter is particularly important when a general equilibrium perspective is applied in 
analysis with special interests in interactions between different parts of the economy. 
Government subsidies, import tariffs and the money supply are economy-wide policies 
considered here. 
Marketization of State Industry 
In the Chinese economy, urban industry consists mainly of state enterprises, and rural 
industry comprises mainly township, village and private finns. The two industries are 
different not only in tenns of fum location and ownership, but also in the different roles 
that the market and the plan play in input and output decisions. State industry is given 
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preferential treatment, including subsidized bank loans, soft budget constraints and cheap 
raw materials. At the same time, the output of state enterprises is also more strictly 
controlled. Product of state enterprises, or at least a part of their product, has to be sold 
to the state at state prices usually lower than the market price. Rural industrial fll111s, on 
the other hand, are mostly set up by farmers. They are usually unable to enjoy the 
preferential policies extended to state enterprises. But production decisions and product 
selling are also less constrained by the state plan. 
Assumption 10: Before economic reform, the state bought all output produced 
by urban industry (like the previous case of wool) at a low state price but 
allowed rural industry to sell its product at the market price. Economic refonn 
is assumed to liberalize sales procedures for urban industry output. Urban 
industry thus also receives the market price for its product after reform. 
The effect of intervention is the same if the enterprise is subject to a strictly controlled 
system (as in the case of wool) or a dual-price system (as in the case of grain). There is, 
however, a difference in magnitudes. I I 
Let the solid upward sloping line MPL1t, in Figure 3.6, be the marginal product of the 
urban (state) industry at the state price for industrial product (P1 ), and line MPL1R be the 
marginal product of rural industry at market price for the industrial product (P1 ) before 
economic reform. Point A is the equilibrium point in a purely competitive labour market 
model. Given restrictions on labour flows between rural and urban areas, labour 
employment in rural and urban economies is fixed (and equals fixed supplies). The 
equilibrium urban wage rate is W~ (W~, > w·) and the rural wage rate is w; cw;< w·). 
There is a gap between rural and urban wage rates (W~ - w;) because of the 
segmentation of the labour market. 
11 The above assumption implies that rural and urban industrial products receive a different price. 
although the products are identical. To understand the possibility of such a system. imagine that the 
economy has a market for industrial products. The state sector, however, is prohibited from selling into 
this product market. The government buys all outputs frmn the state enterprises at a state price and sells 
directly to consumers. Rural industrial firm>· a.re not regulated by the government. and therefore sell 
their products' in the market at market prices. 
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During the reform period, especially after the mid-1980s, the state industrial sector has 
become gradually liberalized. It is of great interest to see how one or two of these 
changes in state industries affect agricultural and rural industry. One example of the 
changes is marketization. Although the introduction of market prices and the abolition of 
the state price is in reality a gradual process, an analysis of a once-for-all change (holding 
all other conditions constant) provides an indication of possible effects. 
Figure 3.6 Effects of marketization of the state industry 
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After the abolition of state prices for products of state industries, state enterprises also 
receive market prices for their output (as do rural enterprises). A higher price (P1u) 
impli~s an upward shift of the marginal product curve (MPL1). The marginal product 
curves for rural industry and agriculture remain unchanged. 
In the case of free labour movement, the upward movement of the marginal product 
curve for state industry would shift the equilibrium point from A to H. No output loss or 
inefficiency occurs, in the labour market, both before and after the liberalization of state 
industry. If the equilibrium wage rate rises from w• to w5•, some labour moves from the 
rural indusi.:iy and agriculture to urban industry. Urban (state) industry expands as a 
63 
result of liberalization, while rural industry and agriculture contract. Economic structure 
changes and, in particular, agriculture's share of output falls. 
In the case of labour market segmentation between rural and urban areas, liberalization 
of state industrial product again causes an upward shift in the marginal product curve for 
state industry. Labour relocation does not occur because of the segmentation. Urban 
industry still "'mploys the same amount of labour (Q' R) under the full employment 
assumption. The urban wage rate is pushed up from W~ to wJ. The marginal product 
curve for the rural economy remains unchanged, but the deadweight loss increases from 
ABC to HJC. 
Proposition 6: The rural economy is insulated from urban changes because of 
labour market segmentation. The liberalization of urban industrial products not 
only increases the gap between rural and urban wage rates, but also increases 
the deadweight loss. Economic structure is not affected by this liberalization, 
given the assumption of full employment. 
Reduction of the Tariff on Industrial Product 
China was a closed economy before the 1980s. One important component of economic 
reform was to open up the Chinese economy to the outside world. Recently, China has 
been seeking membership of GA TT. To qualify China has to introduce more refonn 
measures, including reduction of import tariffs for a set of co:-.-1modities including textiles 
and automobile products. Further reforms will significantly change China's economic 
structure. Trade policies for agricultural products and grain in particular also have to be 
refonned. The question here is how import tar ff reform for an industrial product would 
affect agricultural production. 
Assumption 11: Assume a tariff on an industrial product. The domestic market 
price (P1) therefore contains a component of tariff, t. The supposed tariff 
reform abolishes this tariff on industrial imports. 
The abolition of the import tariff implies a fall in the domestic market price. The 
peculiarity 6f this reform is that it affects rural, as well as urban, industry. The 
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competitive case is considered first. A reduction in the truiff rate for industrial product or 
a decrease in its domestic market price pushes down the marginal product curves for 
both urban and rural industries (Figure 3.7). The new equilibrium point for labour 
allocation would therefore move from A to K. The equilinrium wage rate falls from W* 
to w; as a result of tariff reform for an industrial product. Labour employed by both 
urban and rural industry drops, and thus a certain amount of labour would flow from 
urban to rural areas (Q" Qr) (or from industries to agriculture). The agricultural sector 
expands because it becomes relatively more profitable. 
Changes discussed here indicate that industrial protection distorts the equilibrium wage. 
Reduction in the tariff rate for an industrial product would allow the Chinese economy to 
take advantage of its comparative advantage in cheap labour. The economy may have to 
reduce output of this protected product. But it will become clearer, in a further detailed 
multiple-product framework, that the sectors producing and exporting other labour-
intensive commodities are expanding rapidly. 
If the labour market is segmented, a reduction in the tariff rate would cause labour 
relocation, and structural change would still occur between rural industry and agriculture 
but by smaller magnitudes because the urban and rural labour markets are separated. 
After a reduction in the industrial tariff rate and downward shifts of the marginal product 
curves for rural and urban industries, the urban industrial wage would drop from W~ to 
wJ, with the urban employment levels and total sectoral output unchanged. In the rural 
sector, however, labour would be reallocated from rural industry to agriculture because 
, T 
of changes in relative prices. Rural wages would also drop from WR to WR . Rural 
industry would reduce its employment and output levels, while agriculture would 
expand. 
Proposition 7: In an economy with labour market segmentation between urban 
and rural areas, reduction of the tariff rate for an industrial product would 
result in falls in both urban and rural wage rates, expansion of agricultural 
production and contraction of industry. The effects are smaLler in magnitude 
compared to the perfectly competitive case. 
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Figure 3. 7 Effects of tariff reduction for industrial products on wages 
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The consequences in the distorted economy are similar to those in .he case of perfect 
competition. Total output of the protected product would decrease following the 
reduction of the protection rate. Wage rates would drop, creating favourable conditions 
for labour-intensive production. Outputs and exports of labour-intensive commodities 
will increase in line with China's comparative advantage. Structural adjustment in the 
distorted economy is likely to be smaller because the effects on urban industry are not 
transmitted to the rural sector. In the purely competitive case, the resulting fall in 
equilibrium wage is w· - w;. In the case of labour market segmentation, the urban wage 
drops from W~ to WJ (the magnitude of the drop is greater than w· - w; ). The fall in 
rural wage is less than w· - w;, weakening labour relocation between rural industry and 
agriculture. Change in the deadweight loss on the labour market is expected to be 
negative because of the greater fall in the urban wage (SKJL < SA8 c). 
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Increase in the Money Supply 
Macroeconomists usually agree that money is neutral, at least in the longer term. This 
argument may not be true in an economy with distorted prices, and the consequences 
may differ even further with a segmented labour market. 
In an economy with price distortion but perfect labour mobility, an increase in money 
supply will cause all market-determined prices to rise by the same margin except for the 
controlled prices. retaining the neutrality assumption of money. Suppose that market 
prices increase by a, the new equilibrium price, P;M (i=W,G,-WG,JR,Ju), would 
change at the same rate 
(3.37) 
If the economy is perfectly competitive, every price will rise by the same margin, 
including the equilibrium wage rate. Relative prices would therefore remain unchanged 
and there would b~ no effect on the real variables such as input demands and output 
supply. The first case discussed here, however, involves price distortions to wool and 
grain. State prices for wool and grain are controlled by the government and, adjustment 
usually occurs with a delay of one or two periods. Because, it is assumed that there is no 
market price for wool, the relative price of wool would decrease by a, shifting the 
marginal product curve for wool downward (by a) (Figure 3.7). The story for grain is 
complicated as there is also a market price. If Lin (1993) story holds, changes in the state 
price will affect the marginal product curve. 
The nominal marginal product for grain is 
(3.38) 
Following the monetary expansion, the market price of grain P8 increases by a per cent 
and the state price P~ remains unchanged. Therefore, change of the marginal revenue is 
greater than zero but smaller than a, implying that the real marginal product curve for 
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grain would move downward (but less than a). Movements of the curves for wool and 
grain thus push down the rural aggregate marginal product curve to the dotted line, 
MPLR, as shown in Figure 3.8. 
In the case of labour mobility between rural and urban areas, the new equilibrium would 
move from A to A', leading to labour relocation from the rural to the urban sector. 
Because some agricultural prices are fixed, the marginal product of the urban sector is 
relatively greater following the monetary expansion. Real wage rates increase from w• 
to w;. In other words, nominal wages increase by less than aggregate price level (a). 
For similar reasons, employment in rural industry will rise, while labour employed in 
grain and wool production will decrease because of lower profitability. 
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Figure 3.8 Effects of an increase in money supply 
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The case of labour market segmentation between urban and rural areas is now 
considered. The only difference is that labour allocation between rural and urban 
economies (at point R) will not change. Therefore, employment and real wage rates in 
urban industry are not affected by an increase in money supply because the marginal 
product curve for urban industry has not moved. In the rural sector, however, the 
aggregate marginal product curve moves downward. Given the fixed labour supply 
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(OAR), real wages drop significantly from W~ to WRM. Rural industry expands and wool 
production contracts, while changes to grain production are ambiguous, depending on 
changes in real wage rates and the price elasticities of demand for labour. Considering 
that wool production is a very small sub-sector in Chinese agriculture, grain production 
would normally contract as a result of monetary expansion. 
Proposition 8: Given price controls for some agricultural products, an increase 
in the money supply has structural effects on the economy. Nominal wage rates 
increase but real wages fall. Production of controlled agricultural products 
contracts, while production of other agricultural and industrial products 
expands. In the case of labour market segmentation, structural change would 
still occur within the rural economy but leave the urban economy unaffected in 
real terms. 
Some Qualifications 
The analysis in this chapter reveals many important influences that price distortion and 
the limited feasible choice set of Chinese farmers have on production decisions. A lower 
state price, in both the strictly controlled case or the dual-price system, tends to reduce 
production and decrease the share of this product in total output. The restriction on 
labour movement between urban and rural areas insulates one from shocks to the other. 
The structure of the whole economy turns out to be more rigid because the scale of 
economic adjustment is largely limited by this restriction. The two characteristics further 
alter the response of the economy to changes in economy-wide policies. 
These conclusions are based on the model assumptions. Some assumptions are, in fact, 
very restrictive. 
The model assumes one production factor (labour) and full employment of this labour. In 
reality, production activities usually also use intermediate inputs as well as at least two 
production factors (such as labour and capital). Using only one factor in the model 
simplifies analysis but also sacrifices some interactions between changes in different 
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factors. Similarly, the full employment assumption ignores changes in labour application 
and total output levels. 
The assumption of price-taking for the Chinese economy may be correct for some 
products, but not for others such as wool. As China now imports about one-sixth of total 
world imports of wool, it is a large country in this particular market. In other words, 
changes in its import demand affect world prices. If non-tradables are ignored in the 
model, very important linkages are missed between consumer and producer behaviour, 
leading to misinterpretation of changes in production and consumption of tradables. 
While the theoretical model in this chapter provides very important indicators of 
economic equilibrium and production decisions in China, a more sophisticated 
quantitative framework is needed to capture more accurate and detailed results. 
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Appendix 3A 
Proof of Proposition 1 
The uniqueness of the equilibrium wage rate and labour alfotation in a 
perfect competition model. 
Proof: Suppose another equilibrium real wage rate, ttl, which is higher than w* (nominal 
wage rate Ws) for instance (Figure 3Al). The optimal demands of producers for labour 
inputs are determined by the condition that marginal product equals marginal cost. Given 
this new wage rate, labour demanded by agriculture would be OAS1 and by industry S20 1 , 
which is smaller than their optimal demands at wage rate W*. 
o A s1 = x: c PA , w s ) < x: c PA , w · ) 
s201 =x;u~,Ws)<x;u~.w·) 
ax~ . because-' < 0 (i:::; A,!) and ws > W . 
aw 
But this creates unemployment of S1S2 
S1S2 = x -x: (PA' ws)-x; (Pl' ws) = OAOI -OAS! -S20/ 
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This contradicts the assumption of full employment. Therefore, to eliminate the 
unemployment, the equilibrium wage rate has to fall. As the wage rate falls, points S1 and 
S2 both move towards Q, indicating increases in employment in both agriculture and 
industry. Unemployment will only be completely eliminated when 51 and 52 converge at 
point Q with equilibrium wage rate w· (or real wage rate w·). The above analysis shows 
that an equilibrium wage could not be higher than w·. Similarly, it can be proved that an 
equilibrium wage rate lower than w· is not possible. Therefore, w· is unique. 
To prove the uniqueness of equilibrium labour allocation at point Q, suppose that there is 
another equilibrium allocation point, S2 , for instance. At this point the agricultural sector 
employs more labour than the original equilibrium (OAS2 > OAQ) while the industrial 
sector employs less (520 1 < Q01 ). At this new allocation point, industry is willing to pay 
a higher wage because of the higher marginal product of labour, whereas the agricultural 
sector is only willing to pay a lower wage rate because of the lower marginal product of 
labour. Yet this generates a discrepa!i1icy between the industrial wage ( w' for 52 0 1) and 
the agricultural wage (w1 for OAS.:;). 
This allocation cannot be maintained m the economy if the government places no 
embargo on labour movement between the two sectors. Under the assumption of perfect 
labour mobility, some labour employed in agriculture would move to industry in pursuit 
of hiJher income. This movement is also beneficial to society because econornic output 
would increase by w' - -y/ for each labourer who moved from agriculture to industry. 
This movemerit would continue until the marginal products in the two sectors were 
equalized. In other words, any further movement of labour would not produce any 
benefit. This occurs when 51 moves to Q. It can also be proved that equilibrium labour 
allocation cannot be at a position to the left of Q. 
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Appendix 3B 
The Economic Mechanism of Full Employment 
The assumption of fixed labour supply simplifies the analysis in the sense that the 
relationships between labour supply, wage rates and consumer preferences do not have 
to be discussed. 
For producers, output prices and production technologies are given. In commodiry 
markets, they face an inelastic demand curve, DD (Figure 3A.2). 
Figure 3A.2 Full employment and wage rate adjustment 
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The above diagram shows aggregate labour markets in the economy. There is a fixed 
supply of labour (X) and a downward sloping demand curve X(W) which is the sum of 
labour demands from the two sectors (xA(W)+x1(W)). Assume that the wage rate is 
W'. From the demand curve it can be seen that the two sectors will only employ OX'. 
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There will be unemployment of X' X. To achieve full employment, the wage rate has to 
fall from W' to W*. 
In the product market, as shown in the lower diagram, the horizontal line DD is the 
inelastic aggregate demand curve faced by the economy. The average and marginal cost 
curves derived from the total cost function (TC= W * X) are AC= TC/Y = WX/Y and 
MC= CJTC/?iY = W CJXj(JY. Both me positive functions of the wage rate. AC(W') and 
AC(W*) are the average cost curves, and MC(W') and MC(W*) are the marginal cost 
curves when the wage rates are W' and W*, respectively. 
Theoretically, there are two adjustment mechanisms available to the economy. If the 
wage rate is fixed, the employment level has to adjust. There will be unemployment (as 
long as W'>W*) and output will be below the full employment level (Y;x ). 
To achieve full employment the wage rate has to adjust downward. From the marginal 
cost function, the lower the \vage rate, the lower the rnc:t curve. There will be an 
equilibrium wage rate (W*) at which not cnly; · t....qt the supply curve 
just cuts the intersection between thf' '1e vertical full 
employment output line. 
This mechanism is important, pr 
labour market. Given technology 
any part of the economy can ali 
revenue equals marginal cost) b::,· 
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Farmers' Feasible Choice Set and Agricultural Performance 
Among the two distinguishing characteristics of Chinese agriculture, policy intervention 
in agricultural markets and price distortion for agricultural products in particular, and 
their impact on economic development, are easily observed. Effects of dramatic changes 
in the feasible choice set, however, are not so strai12:htforward. The literature on 
economic development does not discuss this issue in detail, since dramatic changes in the 
feasible choice set, such as occurred in the post reform period in China, are not comJT1on 
phenomena in other economies where the feasible choice set is usually stable within a 
certain period and changes slowly. This study coins the term 'the feasible choice set of 
farmers' as an important economic concept in analysis of agricultural policy in China. It 
is necessary to establish its significance empirically as well as theoretically. The following 
analysis applies the concept to show the impact that changes in the feasible choice set of 
farmers have had on agricultural development in China in the past decade. 
China's agricultural development in the past decade has been remarkable. The growth 
rate and output share of agriculture increased significantly bel:\veen 1978 and 1984 
(Figure 4.1). 1 However, both dropped, sw-prisingly, from 1985. Then, in 1990, 
agriculture began to recover. Debate continues about what influenced resource 
movements during this period. 
Various explanations of agricultural performance in '.J...,, ,econd half of the 1980s have 
been advanced: 
1 In Chinese statistics, agriculture includes fanning, animal husbandry, forestry, fishing and some 
small-scale side-line production. 
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• \Vorsening agricultural terms of trade (Niu and Calkins 1986; Gunasekera et al. 
1991)~ 
• completion of the household responsibility system (HRS) reform in 1983 (Gunasekera 
et al. 1991; Lin l 992a); 
• adverse weather (Chai 1991; Gunasekera et al. 1991); and 
• differential changes in technologies in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, and 
changes in relative factor endowments (Ma and Garnaut 1992). 
Figure 4.1 Agricultural growth rates and agriculture's share in the national 
economy, 1979-91 
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Source: State Statistics Bureau, China S1a1is1ical Yearbook 1992, China Statistics Press. Beijing: 49-50. 
While some of these factors may have contributed in part to variations in agricultural 
growth, they do not appear to be dominant causes of the dramatic resource re-allocation 
behind agricultural performance. The sharp change in the farmers· feasible choice s~t 
after 1985 was the most important influence on the sudden decline and growth of 
agriculture in China. Economic reforms significantly changed the farmers' feasible choice 
set, which in turn redefined the area within wJiich farmers could relocate their resources 
to maximize profits. Apart from changes in the price structure, a higher degree of 
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economic integration and limited factor mobility also contributed to the pattern of 
agricultural development during this period. 
The alternative feasible set hypothesis is presented in a simplified two-sector model. 
Agricultural growth in the second half of the 1980s is revisited. Changes in marginal 
productivities of agricultural and non-agricultural activities are examined empirically in 
support of the feasible set hypothesis. 
Explanations of the Agricultural Stagnation after 1985 
During the period from the early 1950s to the late 1970s, two agricultural policies -
low agricultural prices and collectivization - were consistently implemented to facilitate 
national development through the expansion of heavy industrial production. 2 Pre-reform 
agricultural policies were largely unsuccessful in promoting development. 3 The long 
period of sluggish growth turned agriculture into a 'bottleneck' for economic 
development necessitating revision of development policies.4 From the late 1970s, 
agricultural reform was geared towards higher growth. 
Agricultural reform in the past decade is usefully divided into two stages: the first being 
1979-84, and the second 1985-90. In the first stage of reform, agriculture grew at 7 .6 
per cent annually. This achievement is generally viewed as an economic 'miracle' 
(Longworth 1988). There is little controversy, among economists, about what 
contributed to this rapid agricultural growth. The explanation lies in the success of the 
HRS reform (Johnson 1988; McMillan et al. 1989; Lin l 992a). Increases in the purchase 
2 For detailed discussion of how agricultural policies were set to accommodate the heavy-industry-
oriented development strategy. see Lin (1991), and Lin, Cai and Shen (1989). 
3 In the early stage of compulsory collectivization, during 1959-61, the agricultural crisis resulted in 
30 million extra deaths (Lin 1990). In the period 1959-78, the average annual growth rate of agriculture 
was only 2.6 per cent. The period 1976-77 was seen as another agricultural crisis. when real agricultural 
output decreased by 0.4 per cent in both years. 
4 For a chronology of the evolution of agricultural policy, see Ash (1988). For a detailed chronology 
of the price reforms after 1979, see Sicular (1988a). Discussion of reform measures also appears in many 
papers, such as Lin (l 992a), Anderson (1989) and Perkins (1988). 
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prices of agricultural products and in the use of inputs are also regarded as important 
contributing causes (McMillan et al. 1989; Fan 1991; Lin l 992a). 
The reforms adopted in the second period, starting from 1985, accelerated the growth of 
the rural economy even more. The average annual growth rate in real tenns was I 0. 9 per 
cent. Within the rural economy, however, the growth of agriculture slowed to an annual 
growth rate of 4.5 per cent. Grain output, for instance, dropped from the peak in 1984 
and did not recover to its 1984 level until 1989. The relative stagnation of the 
agricultural sector was accompanied by significant decreases in inputs to agricultural 
production. Lin (1992a) found that the growth rate of chemical fertilizer inputs dropped 
from 8.9 per cent per year in 1978-84 to 3.7 per cent in 1984-87 and the annual growth 
rate of the agriculturnl labour force declined from 2.3 per cent to -8.6 per cent in the 
same period. Niu and Calkins (1986) also pointed out that the availability of physical 
inputs did not increase and that some were even cut back. This decline in the relative 
growth of agriculture in the second stage has been the subject of much discussion. 
Worsening Agricultural Terms of Trade 
Changes in relative prices are generally used to explain agricultural stagnation in China 
after 1985 (Niu and Calkins 1986; Gunasekera et al. 1991; and Chai 1991 ). Of five 
reasons for agricultural stagnation given in Niu and Calkins' analysis, three are related to 
the worsening agricultural tem1s of trade (Niu and Calkins 1986). Their argument has 
been echoed by some other economists (Chai 1991; Gunasekera et al. 1991 ). 
The statistics, however, suggest a different story. Figure 4.2 plots agriculture's market 
prices relative to the prices of rural industrial products and agricultural inputs.5 Before 
1989, both ratios were increasing except for a small drop in l 984. Agriculture's share in 
the national economy and its growth rate, howeve:::-, dropped dramatically from 1985 
until 1989 (see Figure 4.1 ). As farmers usually take the market prices of the previous 
5 Market .prices of agricultural products are calculated following Lin (1992a). For a detailed 
explanation, see Lin (1992a). 
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year as a guide to expected prices for production decisions in the following year, the fall 
in relative prices of agriculture in 1984 is a possible reason for agricultural contraction in 
1985. However, the agricultural growth rate dropped significantly from 12.3 per cent in 
1984 to 3.4 per cent in 1985, while agricultural market prices fell only 3 per cent, relative 
to prices of rural inrlustrial product and 8 per cent, relative to prices of agricultural 
inputs. In particular, changes in relative prices cannot explain the opposite movements 
between relative prices and agricultural growth rates and between the relative prices and 
the share of agriculture in the national economy during 1985-90 (see Figures 4.1 and 
4.2). 6 
Figure 4.2. Relative market agricultural prices, 1979-91 
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Source: State Statistics Bureau, China Sraristical Yearbook, 1992, China Statistics Press. Beijing. Lin, 
J.Y., 1992, "Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China", American Economic Review, vol. 82, 
no. 1, March 1992:34-51. 
The Completion of HRS 
Many economists noted that the more immediate productivity-increasing effects of the 
HRS are likely to have been fully exploited after the completion of the HRS reform in 
6 By simply regressing agriculture's share on its relative price to industry, the relationship is shown 
to be significantly positive in 1978-84 and significantly negative in 1985-90. 
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1983 (Lin 1992a; Gunasekera et al. 1991 ). Studies by Lin (1992a) and McMillan et al. 
(1989) reveal significant contributions by HRS reform to rising agricultural output and 
productivity during 1979-84. The completion of the HRS reform in 1983 would have 
also contributed to the stagnation of agriculture after 1985. (Table 4.1). However, if 
technologies for agricultural and industrial production were relatively stable, the 
completion of the HRS reform might have slowed down the growth rate of agriculture 
but should not have dramatically changed agriculture's share in the rural economy. 7 In 
fact, outputs of many agricultural products, including grain and cotton dropped in 1985. 
In particular, this hypothesis cannot explain why in 1985-88 the labour force shifted from 
agriculture to industry while agriculture's relative price was increasing and in 1989-90 
the labour force moved from the industrial sector to agricultural sector when 
agriculture's relative price was declining (see column 4 in Table 4.1 ). 
Table 4.1 Some important variables affecting agricultural performance: 1978-90 
HRS adoption Fertilizer application Non-TVP Deviation from mean 
rate by production growth rate rural labour affected by natural disaster 
Year team(%) (%) (m person) (1978-90 mean=l) 
1978 0 9.0 278.1 1.2 
1979 1 22.9 281.7 0.9 
1980 14 16.9 288.4 1.1 
1981 45 5.2 297.0 1.0 
1982 80 13.4 307.5 0.8 
1983 98 9.7 314.6 0.8 
1984 99 4.8 307.6 0.8 
1985 99 2.1 300.9 1.1 
1986 99 8.7 300.5 1.1 
1987 99 3.6 302.0 1.0 
1988 99 7.1 305.2 1.2 
1989 99 IO.I 315.7 1.1 
1990 99 9.9 327.5 0.9 
Source: State Statistics Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook 1991, China Statistics Press, Beijing; Justin 
Yifu Lin, 1992, "Rural refonns and agricultural growth in China", The American Economic Review, 
82(1), March 1992:34-51. 
7 Differential changes in productivities of non-agriculture to agriculture could explain the outflow of 
agricultural resources being induced by the completion of the HRS reform. Suppose that the completion 
of the HRS reform stopped agricultural productivity improvement and that industrial productivity 
continued to increase rapidly, the ratio of marginal products of the two sector would thus change 
dramatically. Factors would move quickly from agriculture to industry to achieve a new economy-wide 
equilibrium. This possibility, however. can be ruled out for this case. 
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Adverse Weather 
A run of unfavourable seasons has also been frequently cited as a contributing factor to 
the slowdown of agricultural development. Weather conditions were significantly 
correlated with agricultural performance in the past decade in China (Gunasekera et al. 
1991; Chai 1991). Except for 1980, the period of 1979-84 was reported to be one of 
gooa weather, this time was also a period of rapid agricultural growth. During the period 
of agricultural stagnation in 1985-1988, the weather was reported to remain 
unfavourable for agricultural production. The deviations from the mean in arable land 
areas affected by natural disaster, for the period 1978-90, followed the pattern of 
agricultural growth (Table 4.1 ). 
In agricultural production, however, the weather only affects immediate actual output 
levels. Since weather is an on-going process, significant resource re-allocation can not be 
explained by changes in weather conditions. For cross-sectional data, this kind of linkage 
might be detected, since the weather pattern may impact on the optimal mix of inputs. 
For instance, because of rich rainfall, Southeast China may use more labour and fertilizer 
inputs than the dry Northwest region of China. Over years, however, a strong 
relationship between contraction or expansion of the agricultural sector and temporary 
weather change has not been evident. Lin (1990) found that weather is often used by 
Chinese authorities as an excuse for crop failures caused by other reasons. 
The Relative Rates of Technological Change and the Rybczynski Effect 
In the long-run, changes in relative factor endowments of an economy or differential 
changes in production technologies can result in the re-allocation of resources between 
sectors regardless of the changes in the relative prices. Suppose there is much faster 
improvement in non-agricultural technology than in agricultural technology, marginal 
productivities in the non-agricultural sectors would therefore be higher than in the 
agricultural sector. Even if there is no change in (or there is a small increase in) the 
relative price of agricultural to non-agricultural products, factors would move from 
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agriculture to non-agricultural sectors (Ma and Garnaut 1992). In the period 1985-90, 
however, there is no evidence supporting the hypothesis of dramatic technology changes 
in the Chinese economy. The Rybczynski theorem, on the other hand, describes the 
relationship between changes in output structure and relative factor endowments 
regardless of changes in relative prices. It is suggested that a rise in the endowment of 
one factor to the other will increase the output of the good using that factor intensively 
relative to output of the other good (Rybczynski 1955; Jones 1956). There are two 
qualifications to this application of the Rybczynski theorem to the Chinese rural economy 
First, while the Rybczynski theorem refers to a long-term changes, what is relevant here 
is a short-term phenomenon. Second, the dramatic increase in investment and capital 
stock in the rural industries around the mid-198Us and the increase in industrial output in 
the rural economy in 1984-88 was consistent with the Rybczynski hypothesis. However, 
the hypothesis fails to explain the increase in agriculture's share in 1990, when the 
capital-labour ratio was still rising. 
Policy-Truncated Production Frontier and Farmer's Resource 
Allocation 
The efficient functioning of any price structure in guiding an agricultural household's 
resource allocation depends on two assumptions apart from rationality. First, global 
equilibrium exists before relative price changes; and second, production activities are not 
constrained by non-economic forces, such as government policies. and resources can 
freely move between different sectors. The argument is best demonstrated by the 
following model. Suppose, with given quantities of endowments X. a household can 
produce either agricultural products (good 1) or industrial products (good 2). The prices 
for agricultural products and industrial products, Pi and P2, are given to the household. 
The optimal resource allocation bet\veen these two sectors can be obtained by solving 
the following equation: 
(4.1) 
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where J; is the production function for good i and X; refers to the resources allocated to 
the production of good i. The production functions are assumed to be well-behaved. The 
first order condition for optimality requires 
(4.2) 
That is, resources are allocated to the production of good 1 and good 2 to the point 
where the values of marginal product of good 1 equals the value of marginal product of 
good 2. Expression (2) can also be expressed in the following way 
(4.2') 
This condition can be shown diagrammatically at A, where the production possibility 
frontier is at a tangent to the relative price line (Figure 4.3). 
Figure 4.3 Relative price and production decisions 
Iridustry 
p P' 
0 Agriculture 
If no restriction exists on the production of good 1 and good 2, then changes in relative 
prices will result in the re-allocation of resources from the good with declining relative 
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prices to the good with increasing relative prices along the curve of the production 
frontier. For example, the change of relative price from line P to P' will result ;., the shift 
of the equilibrium production point from Ji to B. Therefore, the changes in the relative 
prices will indicate both the direction of resource movements and the relative growth of 
these two goods. 
However, under the traditional heavy industry-oriented development strategy, production 
in rural areas was largely confined to agriculture, especially grain (Lardy 1983; Lin, Cai, 
and Shen 1989). Production activity in the industrial sector was limited by government 
policies. In other words, the production frontier the farmers faced was truncated (Figme 
4.4). 
Figure 4.4 Policy restriction and truncated prodm i )n possibility frontier 
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0 Agriculture 
Industry production is restricted to a level no larger than I,. With relative prices 
represented by line P, production will locate at C, a corner solution.8 At this point, the 
8 For a de.tailed discussion of the truncated production frontier model. see Appendix 4A. The actual 
production may locate at some point within the frontier, such as D, due to incentive issues, which arc 
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necessary condition for optimality will not hold. Instead of the equality of Equation 2, 
the following condition may exist 
(4.3) 
That is, the agricultural product's value of marginal product is lower than that of the 
industrial product. A re-allocation of resources from agricultural to industrial production 
will increase the agricultural household's income. However, such a re-allocation is 
prohibited by the policy restriction on industrial production. As Jong as the changes in 
the relative prices do not upset the inequality in Equation (4.3), the changes in the 
relative prices will not cause the re-allocation of resource between these two 
productions. Moreover, if the production constraint was shifted, some abnonnal re-
allocation of resource and sectoral growth may be accompanied by changes in relative 
prices. For example, consider the case where the relative prices are chC1.nged from P to P' 
(see Figure 4.4). If there are no constraints on the movement of resources, the change in 
relative prices will signal the growth of the agricultural sector and the decline of the 
industrial sector with resources flowing from the industrial sector to the agricultural 
sector. Nevertheless, under the truncated production frontier case, if the constraint on 
w!i!dustrial production is shifted from line /, to /~, the production point will change from 
point C to E. The result is opposite to what one would expect for relative price changes. 
Th~ opposite scenario, the expansion of a ,ricultural production with a worsening of 
agricultural term of trade, can be derived easily from the shift of policy constraint from 
I,' back to/,. 
Change in the policy constraints on industrial production in the truncate.cl production 
frontier is the main cause for the puzzling p.attern of agricultural growth after 1984. The 
trend of agriculture's relative prices and the trend of agriculture's relative share are 
negatively correlated (Figure 4.4 ). This policy constraints hypothesis is further confirmed 
di&.::ussed in I,..in (1988). However, we will ignore this t;Omplication and assume that the production 
locates on the frontier. 
SS 
by the employment of labour in the rural township and village enterprises. In 1989 and 
1990, the relative price of industrial to agricultural products was increasing, but 
employment in rural industry declined absolutely (see column 3 in Table 4.3). There are 
two implications of this hypothesis; 
First, if the hypothesis is valid, the marginal productivity of labour in 
the agricultural sector must be lower than that in the industrial sector. 
The same is true for other inputs. 
Second, the re-allocation of labour from the agricultural to the 
industrial sector will reduce the gap of labour's value in marginal 
product :in these two sectors, whereas the re-allocation of labour from 
the industrial sector back to the agricultural sector will enlarge the gap. 
The same is true for other ;nputs. 
China's Agricultural Performance in the 1980s Revisited 
Farmers' feasible production choice in the truncated production frontier was changed 
dramatically by the prJcess of economic refonn (Table 4.2). 
Before economic reform started at the end of 1978, Chinese farmers were largely 
restricted to growing a small number of crops, such as grain and cotton. Production of 
cash crops and livestock products was not allowed except :in areas allowed in the state 
plan. Non-agricultural production activities were prohibited, in general, at that time.9 
The initial refonns were mainly aimed at raising agricultural output. The experimentation 
with and, later on, the nation-wide implementation of the HRS gave households 
9 There were a few commune and brigade industrial enterprises which received encouragement 
under pillticular policies for short periods. During the second half of the 1950s, to achieve the national 
steel output target (which had been set far too higlt), small steel plants were set up .ul over the 
countryside. Labour was diverted to very inefficient steel production. Later, in the mid-1970s, for the 
purpose of realising agricultural mechanisation, small factories producing and repairing farm machines 
were again established everywhere. Since both targets were inappropriate and inefficient, most these 
small enterprises were shut d0wn shortly after establishment. 
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relatively more freedom to make production decisions within agriculture. Fanners• 
feasible production choice set expanded. Production of cash crops and livestock 
increasingly became an important part of the agricultural economy. However, 
government restrictions on rural industries, in general, remained unchanged. The relative 
price of agriculture to industry was therefore irrelevant to the allocation of resources 
between the agricultural and industrial sectors. 10 The energies released and created by 
reform could only be allocated to agriculture. 
Table 4.2 The feasible choice set for a typical Chinese farmer, 1978-90 
Government Feasible choice set: economic activities 
policy and Grain Cash Animal Rural 
objectives crops crops husbandry industrya 
Before 1978 To facilitate industrialization compulsoryb restricted restricted no 
.md to pursue grain self-sufficiency 
1979-80 To raise the purchase price for yes restricted restricted no 
agricultural products and to (loosened) (loosened) 
increase agricultural invesunent 
1981-84 HRS and price refonn to induce yes yes yes restriction 
agricultural development Joosenedc 
1985-88 Marketization and encouragement of yes yes yes encouraged 
rural industrial development 
1988-90 Monetary contraction and yes yes yes yes (pardy 
policies favouring agriculture restricted) 
Notes: a The classification of rural industry here does not include some industries that provide necessary 
support to daily life and production. such as grain mills. 
b Economic activities are defined by several classifications according to accessibility by farmers. 
'Compulsory' implies that the production activity was assigned by the govenunent; 'yes' means farmers 
can freely decide whether or not to be involved in that production activity; 'restricted" means that 
farmers can sometimes produce those products subject to various policy restricrions; 'no· implies that 
farmers cannot enter that production area; and 'encouraged' for rural industry in 1985-88 refers to a 
period when different policies favouring rural industry were implemented to facilitate rural 
industrialization. 
c In some areas at a later stage this was actually encouraged by (local) government. 
1° For a fanner with only one feasible economic opportunity, such as grain production. he may 
choose to consume leisure if profitability of grain production was too low. So that, the increase of 
purchase price may induce more time to be converted from leisure to Jabour input over time. 
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Mid-l980s was the time when the Chinese economy expeiienced dramatic policy 
changes and expanding farmer's production possibility frontier through 
• the adoption of the fiscal responsibility system (Blejer et al. 1991 ); 
• banking system reform at the end of 1984 (Wulf and Goldbrough 1986; Peeble 1990); 
• liberalization of rural product and factor markets at the beginning of 1985; and 
• encouragement of the development of rural industries through the introduction of low 
taxes and subsidized bank loans. 
The adoption of the fiscal responsibility system gave local governments strong incentives 
to find ways to increase their tax base. Because of the distorted price structure, industry 
enjoyed much higher profit margins than agriculture. Therefore, instead of suppressing 
industrial production, many local governments adopted low taxes and subsidized bank 
loan policies, to encourage the development of rural industries. Restrictions on industrial 
production was removed. The expansion of rural industry was also facilitated by banking 
system reform and the tiberalization of factor and product markets. One direct result of 
the banking system reform was the explosion of bank loans in the fourth quarter of 1984 
and at the beginning of 1985 (Wulf and Goldsbrough 1986; Kojima 1989; Blejer et al. 
1991). A large part of this extra credit went to rural industries. Bank loans for township, 
village and private enterprises (TVP) rose by 97.9 per cent in 1985. The TVP's share in 
total state capital application increased from 2.2 per cent in 1983 to 3.5 per cent if' 1987 
(Table 4.4). A large number of TVPs was established from the second half of 1984 and 
at the beginrung of 1985. The number of TVP enterprises increased by 38.4 per cent in 
1984, and doubled in 1985 (State Statistics Bureau China Statistical Yearbook 1991). 11 
At the same time, employment in TVP enterprises increased by 23.1 per cent in 1984 and 
34.0 per cent in 1985 (Table 4.3). Finally, the liberalization of factor markets and 
11 In China Statistical Yearbook 1991, the numbers before 1983 are enterprises at the township and 
village levels while the numbers from 1984 are all township and village enterprises. The latter, apart 
from the enterprises at the township and village levels, also include rural cooperative and private 
enterprises. 
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product markets facilitated the re-allocation of resources between different sectors and 
between different regions. 
Table 4.3 Development of the TVP sector in China, 1984-90 
Number of Number of Rural industry Real value of Growth of 
enterprises employees price index total output output value 
(million) (million) (1985=100) (1985 price) (%) 
1984 6.1 52.1 92.3 185.3 
1985 12.2 69.8 100.0 272.8 47.2 
1986 15.2 79.4 106.0 334.1 22.5 
1987 17.5 88.1 113.7 419.0 25.4 
1988 18.9 95.5 134.8 481.9 15.0 
1989 18.7 93.7 158.8 467.8 -2.9 
1990 18.5 92.7 162.l 522.0 11.6 
Source: State Statistics Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook 1991, China Statistics Press, Beijing:230, 
377-78. 
Experiences of 1989 and 1990 in China led to a different story of changes in policy 
constraints and farmers' production possibility frontier. To overcome the overheating of 
the economy, a package of adjustment policies was implemented from October 1988 and, 
most effectively, in 1989. A credit squeeze was one of the important measures, and was 
targeted, in particular, at the rural industries (World Bank 1990). The growth rate in 
bank loans to the TVP sector dropped from 17.7 per cent in 1988 to 3.2 per cent in 1989 
and 14.5 per cent in 1990, compared to 97.9 in 1984 and 52.2 in 1986 (Table 4.4). 
Inflation was 18.5 per cent in 1988 and 17.8 per cent in 1989, so the real growth of loans 
to the TVP sector was negative, particularly in 1989. Though the government did not 
restore administrative restrictions on farmers' economic opportunities in rural industries, 
the farmer's production possibility frontier, at least for some farmers, contracted. Both 
the numbers of enterprises and employees in the TVP sector decreased in 1989 and 1990 
(see Table 4.3). Real output of the TVP sector declined in 1989 by 2.9 per cent. At the 
same ti.me, total profits of the TVP sector in nominal terms dropped from 25.9 billion 
yuan in 1988 to 24.0 billion yuan in 1989, and to 23.3 billion yuan in 1990. 
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Tabie 4.4 State bank loans to TVP and agricultural sectors, 1978-90 
TVP loans agricultural loans total capital application 
bn yuan growth(%) bn yuan growth(%) bn yuan growth(%) 
1978 2.1 9.4 187.7 
1979 3.8 79.3 9.9 4.6 216.3 15.3 
1980 5.3 39.5 12.3 24.5 262.4 21.4 
1981 6.2 17.4 12.8 3.7 307.5 17.2 
1982 7.3 18.0 13.9 9.1 361.8 14.1 
1983 8.0 9.0 15.1 8.7 412.5 14.0 
1984 15.8 97.9 20.9 38.2 537.0 30.2 
1985 18.9 19.4 22.8 8.9 637.5 18.7 
1986 28.8 52.2 28.3 24.2 811.1 27.3 
1987 34.9 21.1 33.7 19.1 987.0 21.7 
1988 41.1 17.7 40.3 19.9 1148.5 16.4 
1989 42.4 3.2 47.1 16.8 1356.2 18.1 
1990e 48.8 14.5 55.0 16.8 1683.8 24.2 
Note: e Numbers for 1990 are estimates. 
Source: State Statistics Bureau, China Srarisrical Yearbook 1991, China Statistics Press, Beijing:52-53. 
This contraction in the TVP sector forced some farmers to retreat to the agricultural 
sector. Given that there was a minimum scale of investment, 12 monetary contraction 
resulted in a loss of the job opportunities in the TVP sector. As a result, resources 
moved back to the agricultural sector. The number of employees in the TVP sector 
dropped by 1.9 per cent in 1989, and declined further by 1.1 per cent in 1990. At the 
same time, the total rnral labour force increased by 2.2 per cent in 1989, and 2.6 per cent 
in 1990 (China Statistical Yearbook 1991:95). Therefore, there was a substantial 
increase in agriculture's labour force in the two years. Furthermore, starting from 1988, 
more investment was directed to agricultural production. Investment in non-agricultural 
production dropped in 1989, in particular. 13 
12 This minimum scale could vary across sectors and regions. However, as the TVP sector grows 
and technology develops, the likely trend is that the minimum scale will rise. 
13 Since mosLural investment is realised in the short term, newly increased capital stock can proxy 
the investment in a particular year. The newly fanned capital stock per farm household for agricultural 
production, from 1986 to 1990, was 7 .0, 32.9, 63.4, 55.7 and 65.0 (yuan), respectively; while that for 
non-agricultural production were 42.5, 44.2, 60.6, 37.3 and 66.4 (yuan), respectively (China Statistical 
Yearbook 1991). More investment was directed to the agricultural sector by farm households at the end 
of the 1980s because of the minimum scale of industrial investment. The possibility of obtaining bank 
loans decreas~ significantly, and fanners' own funds could not reach the minimum scale for industrial 
investment. As an alternative, they had to invest their own funds in agriculture. 
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In short, the mcmetary and other contractionary policies of the austerity program at the 
end of 1988 once again aimed to restrict the expansion of rural industry. The fanner' s 
production possibility frontier was truncated again. The relative increase in factor 
supplies for agricultural production eventually led to the recovery of agricultural growth 
and agriculture's share in the national economy in 1990. 
Changes in Marginal Productivity: A Test 
The analysis so far has shovm that the variations in the farmers' feasible choice set and 
the movement of resources during 1985-90 were consistent with predictions from the 
hypothesis set out above. Changes in the values of marginal product in agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors also throw light on developments in this period. In the following 
empirical case study, the agricultural sector and TVP sectors are chosen since, for 
Chinese farmers, they best illustrate resource movements and changes in the feasible 
choice set. One of the weaknesses in choosing the TVP sector is the dramatic change it 
was undergoing during 1985-90. The marginal productivity of the TVP sector might 
therefore overvalue that for the whole non-agricultural sector of the economy. The 
marginal productivities of labour in the two sectors are considered, but capital is not.14 
The following production functional form is adopted for both secwrs: 
5 
ln (fj) =a;+ L~ik ill (X;k) + Y;T + L,8ilD1 + E; (3.5) 
k l=l 
Estimations were run separately for the agricultural and the TVP sectors using a panel 
data set consisting of 28 provinces and 6 years from 1985 to 1990 (for a discussion of 
this exercise see Appendix 4B). 
14 There are two reasons for ignoring marginal productivities of capital. First. in the data set, capital 
stock in the two sectors is measured differently. While for agriculture it is the amount of Watt. the 
measure for the TVP is yuan, thus making it difficult to compare their marginal productivities. Second, 
capital stock, in the case of rural China, is relatively less mobile than Jabour. 
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Estimation results are reported in Table 4.5 and values for the marginal product of labour 
can be derived from these production functions. 
Ta bk 4.5 Estimation results of production functions for agriculture and TVP 
Agriculture TVP sector 
Constant -0.70 -0.72 
(-3.37) (-1.48) 
Labour 0.26 0.45 
(4.82) (2.11) 
Capital 0.62 0.47 
(10.58) (2.16) 
Land 0.03 
(0.50) 
Time trend 0.02 -0.04 
(1.50) (-0.95) 
Regional Durrunies 
North -0.07 0.01 
(-1.01) (0.02) 
Northeast 0.37 -0.20 
(4.92) (-0.71) 
Southeast 0.47 -0.026 
(5.83) (-0.09) 
Central 0.50 0.07 
(5.76) (0.25) 
Southweat 0.50 -0.08 
(5.30) (-0.29) 
_, 
K 0.94 0.62 
Note: Nurn1-1ers in pru-entheses under coefficient estimates are related t-ratios. 
The estimated ratio of marginal products of the two sectors during 1985-90 confinn two 
of the working hypotheses developed earlier in this chapter (Figure 4.5). First, the 
marginal product of labour in the agricultural sector was signillcantly lower than in the 
TVP sector, reinforci.ng the dramatic movement of resources across sectors in the second 
half of the 1980s. Even in 1990, the marginal product of labour in agriculture was less 
than half that in the TVP sector. Further flows of labour can be expected. Second, 
regardless of the big gap, the marginal products of labour in the two sectors are 
converging. This supports the hypothesis derived from the theoretical model. IS 
15 According to the theoretical results derived in this study, the ratio of marginal productivities of 
labour in agriculture and the TVP sector should continue to fall in 1990 since labour flew back to 
agriculture. The actual rise of relative marginal productivity in agriculture is a result of the sharp rise of 
agricultural prices in that year (see Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.5 Ratio of marginal productivities of labour in agriculture ,and the TVP 
sector, 1985-90 (TVP=l.0) 
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Source: The ratios are calculated from the estimations results presented in Table 3.B 1 of Appendix B. 
This estimation is consistent with wage and income data. In 1985, the average wage in 
agriculture was 4.7 yuan per day, while that in non-agricultural production was 10.7 
yuan per day.16 These figures suggest that the agricultural wage was only about 40 per 
cent of non-agricultural wage, while the ratio estimated by our analysis for the marginal 
productivities is more than 30 per cent.1 7 Furthermore, while the average per capita 
income of all farmers was 545 yuan, 602 yuan and 630 yuan in 1988, 1989 and 1990 per 
capita wage income in the TVP sector was 567 yuan, 620 yuan and 655 yuan, 
respectively, for the same years (China Statistical Yearbook 1991:377-379; China 
Agricultural Statistical Yearbook 1991 :206). 18 Though income data cannot reflect 
changes in marginal productivities of labour, these <iata reveal that not only was income 
16 These average wage rates are calculated according to the data provided in footnote 19. 
17 The two possible reasons for the gap between the suggested ratios are: (1) the average wage 
calculated as the simple mathematical average rather than the weighted average: and (2), as the capital 
in the agricultural sector is not appropriately priced, labour might be priced at average productivity 
instead of marginal productivity. 
18 The average per capita income of farmers also includes farmers who worked in TVP enterprises. 
....... 
in the agricultural sector still lower than in the non··agricultural sector, but the gap 
between the sectors was gradually narrowing. 
Combining marginal productivity and income information with the resource flows during 
1985-90, it can ~ concluded that the relocation of resources from agriculture to non-
agriculture during 1985-88 was largely a result of the farmers' profit (income) 
maxirnizing behaviour following the marketization of the rural economy and the 
expansion of farmers' feasible choice set. Again, in 1989-90, factors of production 
moved towards the agricultural sector where both marginal productivities and returns to 
factors were low. The relative contraction of the agricultural sector during 1985-88 
actually stemmed from the success of marketi:zation reflecting a more optimal allocation 
of limited resources and higher income of farmers. On the other hand, the boom in the 
agricultural sector in 1989-90 was a forced result. Fanners' economic opportunities in 
the non-agricultural sector contracted and the agricultural boom occurred at the cost of 
recesdon in industry, at least in rural industry. 
This conclusion is further supported by the evidence of changes in farmers' real income 
throughout the period. In 1985 farmers' real per capita income increased dramatically in 
1985 by 4.6 per cent, when the agricultural sector stagnated. Real income continued to 
increase in 1986 and 1987 with growth rates at 1. 7 per cent and 2. 7 per cent, 
respectively. In 1989, real income dropped by 6.8 per cent, and although it increased 
slightly in 1990, it was still 5.4 per cent lower than that in 1988 (China Statistical 
Yearbook 1991:295; Jiang and Luo 1988). 
Reappraisal of Agricultural Policies 
This analysis has sought to explain changes in the pattern of agricultural growth during 
1985-90 in China. It argues that changes in relative prices of agricultural products 
explain some of the changes but fail to provide convincing explanations for the dramatic 
contraction and expansion of the agricultural sector in the second half of the 1980s. 
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Other explanations such as the impact of completion of the HRS and adverse weather, 
may have contributed in part. But none can be seen as dominant explanations. 
In the mid-1980s, due to marketization and monetary expansion, the fanners' feasible 
choice set expanded suddenly. Market expansion led to more optimal factor allocation 
and higher total income. Farmers reallocated resources from agriculture to non-
agriculture in the pursuit of higher income. At the end of the 1980s, because the rural 
industries were seriously hit by contractionary policies, the feasible choice set of fanners 
outside agriculture was affected. Some production factors flowed back to agriculture. 
The two turning points of agricultural performance in 1985-90 can be explained by the 
feasible choice set hypothesis. The hypothesis was further supported by the changes in 
the relative marginal productivities of labour in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. 
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Appendix 4A 
Resource Allocatio11 in a Two-Sector Model 
Assume an economy with two sectors, sector 1, agricult~e and sector 2, industry, with 
perfect factor mobility across sectors. Each sector produces one product using the 
common factors in production, while the endowment of factors in the economy is fixed. 
Profit maximization can be achieved by solving 
Max PiYi + P2Y~ - w;xl - W2X2 
st Yi = J; (X1) 
Y2 = !2 CX2) 
X =X1 +X2 
(4.Al) 
where Y, and X, are quantity vectors of outputs and inputs for the two sectors, P, and W, 
are price vectors of outputs and inputs, X is the vector representing the total endowment 
of production factors, and fJ.) is the production function with f;' > 0, f;'' < 0 and 
f; (0) = 0. Solving problem (1) leads to the condition for profit maximization 
P, at, _ w. = P a12 _ w 
i ax 1 2 ax 2 
1 2 
(4.A2) 
For perfect factor mobility, w; = W2, so that 
(4.A3) 
or 
(4.A4) 
which implies that the value of marginal product in the two sectors should be the same in 
equilibrium. For further simplicity, we can assume that both activities use only one 
factor, labour, in production. 
If the relative price of product 1 to product 2 increases given the production 
technologies, disequilibrium would occur if there were no factor relocation 
(4.A5) 
To retain equilibrium, the marginal product of sector 2 has to rise relative to that of 
sector 1. According to the properties of the production technologies, this requires that 
more factors are allocated to sector 1 and less to sector 2. 
To apply this framework to Chinese farmers, some assumptions must be relaxed. Before 
marketization, the agricultru al and the industrial sectors were highly segmented. The 
above profit maximization problem is broken down into two separate problems. In each 
sector, profit maximization requires that marginal product equals marginal cost 
96 
t f d 
, I 
. ' 
P. 'CJJ; = w. 
1 ax 1 
1 
(4.A6) 
P, of2 = W: 
~ax 2 
2 
(4.A 7) 
For further simplicity, we now only consider the case of one input, labour. As the flow of 
labour from agriculture to industry is restricted, it is possible that 
(4.A8) 
from which it is clear that 
P. ~ti << P a1, 
1 ax 2 ax I 2 
(4.A9) 
or 
(4.AlO) 
In other words, because agriculture employs too much labour ~ompared to the no-
restriction case, the marginal product of labour is lower in agriculture than in industry 
according to the properties of the technologies. 
The administrative restrictions on labour flows, however, were gradually relaxed along 
with economic reform, particularly in the period after 1985. In the second half of the 
1980s, both the relative price of agricultural products and the feasible choice set of 
farmers underwent a process of change. 
The expansion of fanners' feasible choice set ~auses factor relocation and convergence 
of factor prices. There are five possible movements given different changes in the relative 
price. 
(1) The feasible choice set expands while the relative price remains unchanged; in this 
case, the ratio of marginal products in the two sectors would move towards the relative 
price. To obtain this, the marginal product in industry must be reduced while that in 
agriculture must be increased. This requires a relocation of factors from sector 1 to 
sector 2. Assuming that (X;, x;) is the factor allocation set for the two sectors after the 
factor movements, thjs relocation gives 
(4.All) 
(2) The feasible set expands and the relative prices of the agricultural product increases 
by a small margin. In this case, the increased relative price would still not alter the 
previous disequilibrium condition, that is 
(4.A12) 
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Thus, further factor movements from agriculture to industry would still be required to 
achieve the equilibrium 
(4.A13) 
{3) The feasible set expands :411d the relative price of the agricultural product increases by 
a sufficient margin, so that 
(4.A14) 
In this case, factors should be relocated in the opposite direction, from sector 2 to sector 
1, to reach an equilibrium. 
( 4) The feasible set expands and the relative price of the agricultural product increases at 
the exact rate, so that 
(4.A15) 
Then no factor movement wr:mld occur. This, of course, is a very unusual case. 
(5) The feasible set expands and the relative price of agriculture declines, which results in 
(4.AI6) 
In this case, a large flow of factors from agriculture to industry would be required. 
Case (2) is the situation directly related to the feasible choice set hypothesis discussed in 
th1e text. 
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Appendix 4B 
Data and Estimation for the Values of Marginal Productivities 
The simple translog production functional form adopted for agriculture and rural industry 
(TVP) is 
5 
ln(YJ = ai + LPik ln(X;k)+Yl + 2:SaD1 +c:; (4.B1) 
k l=l 
where Yi (i=l: agricuiture and i=2: TVP) represents the net revenues of agriculture and 
TVP, X,k are the production factors (labour and ca.pita} for both sectors and arable land 
for agriculture), T is the time trend, and D1 (l=l, 2, 3, 4, 5) are regional dummies 
representing the North, Northeast, Southeast, Central and Southwest regions, 
respectively. A dummy for South region is omitted from the regression equation. The 
data used are a panel data set consisting of 28 provinces and 6 years from 1985 to 1990. 
The regression results are presented in Table 4.5 in the text. 
The value of marginal product (MPL;) of labour (L;) can be represented as 
MPL. =Par; =P ()ln(Y;) Y; 
I I ()L. I a ln (L. ) L. 
I I I 
which can be rewritten as 
y 
MPL. =~.LP-' 
I 1-'1 IL. 
' 
(4.B2) 
(4.B3) 
ain er:) _ 
since ()ln(L;) -PiL according to Equation (4.Bl). The ratios of marginal products 
between agriculture and rural industry are shown in Figure 4.5. 
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State-Farmer Policy Game and China's Grain Policy 
Government intervention in agricultural markets is a common phenomenon (Schultz 
1978; Anderson 1989). Rich countries tend to subsidize agricultural production more 
than industrial production effectively taxing food consumption, while poor countries 
tend to protect industrial pr.Jducers and food consumers at the expense of farmers 
(Timmer 1988; Tyers and Anderson 1992). China had been a centrally-planned and 
developing economy since the early 1950s. Both a heavy industry-oriented development 
strategy and socialist ideology shaped policy towards agriculture (Lin 199lc). State 
grain prices have been substantially depressed in the post-reform period, as they were 
during the pre-reform period (Lardy 1983a and 1983b; Webb 1989; Tyers and 
Anderson 1992). The significance of these distortions for the performance of the 
agricultural sector and the economy as a whole has been analyzed in several studies 
(Sicular 1988b; Tyers and Anderson 1992). 
In most studies of agricultural distortions, government intervention is taken for granted 
(Houck and Ryan 1972; Kehoe and Serra-Puche 1986; Sicular 1988b). Distortions are 
often explained by the distinction between private and social valuation of economic 
activities (Stenvens and Jabara 1988; Schultz 1978).1 Yet another branch of literature 
has been developed on endogenous government behaviour (Downs 1957; Stigler 1970, 
1971; Jessop 1977; O'Connor 1973; Peltzman 1976). Policy decisions resuJt from the 
lob'bymg activities of different interest groups, politicians' optimization behaviour in 
1 As argued by Stenvens and Jabara (1988), divergence between private and social valuation may 
occur if market-detennined prices do not reflect scarcity values, because the markets for products, 
inputs, or financial services do not function well (market failure); or market prices do not reflect scarcity 
values that are consistent with a society's or a government's development objectives and social goals. 
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maximizing political support, or a bargaining outcome between interest groups and 
bureaucrats (Rausser, Lichenberg and Lattimore 1982). 
The mechanism of endogenous government behaviour in the case of agricultural policy in 
China has not been investigated in the literature. This chapter explores the question of 
why agricultural policies evolved as they did in China or what were the determinants of 
the policy scenarios. Important assumptions about the democratic process lie behind 
analysis in the literature of distortions in the agricultural economy. Either the political 
leaders are elected by voters or democratic bargaining channels between different 
interest groups are well established. These assumptions may not be satisfied in many 
developing and socialist countries, including China. Hence, a new formulation, that of 
the state-farmer framework, is developed as an appropriate framework within which to 
analyze Chinese grain policy formulation. This formulation focuses on the relationship 
between the government and farmers. A cooperative game-theoretic model can be 
applied and the empirical results of this exercise should contribute to an understanding 
of past and future policy changes. 
The Evolution of Grain Policy in China 
Grain policy was one of the most important agricultural policies in pre-reform China. 
There were three acknowledged objectives for grain policy. First, grain policy was 
instituted to facilitate industrialization. Lin (1991 c) argues that many agricultural 
problems in both pre- and post-reform China had their roots in the development strategy 
adopted in the early 1950s. China at that time was largely an agricultural economy. 
According to Lin (1991b), in 1949, 89.4 per cent of the population resided in rural areas 
and industry accounted for only 12.6 per cent of national income. Heavy industry was 
seen as a key to economic modernization. Developing heavy industry, howev,~r, requires 
tremendous amounts of capital investment. The only source that could contribute to 
industrialization in its early stages was agriculture (Timmer 1988). The Chinese 
government, therefore, implemented low agricultural (including grain) prices to transfer 
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resources from agriculture to industry (Lin 1991 b; Ji and Lu 1980). 2 Prices, in this set of 
policies, were expected to fulfil many of the functions that government tax and 
expenditure policy perform in mo~t market economies (Lardy 1983a and 1983b). Prices 
in China in the pre-reform period were set largely with a view to determining the 
allocation of resources between individuals and the state, betv,1een industry and 
agriculture, and among different regions. 3 
The second purpose was for the government to preserve price stability. While stability is 
a common reason for governmental intervention, it is critical in China. The high priority 
attached to this objective in China reflected China's very unhappy experience with hyper-
inflation in the late-1940s. P<ice stability had been an important component of the 
Communist Party's claim for popular support in the revolutionary period (Lardy l 983a; 
Chui 1988). 
The third objective of grain policy was to secure grain self-sufficiency. A growing 
industrial sector and increasing population dramatically raised domestic demand for 
grain. This placed great pressure on domestic grain production since China's limited 
foreign exchange reserves could not be used for importing grain. 
To achieve these objectives, a set of agricultural policies included three main policy 
measures: abolition of the free markets for most agricultural products and the 
introduction of a unified procurement and sale system; detennination of a state price for 
every product usually lower than the corresponding free market or shadow price; and 
collectivization of agricultural production in the 1950s and implementation of the 
2 There are two simple ways through which agricultural surpluses are channelled to the industrial 
sector. One is through high rates of agricultural t<iXes (such as were used in Japan in the early stages of 
modernizatkm) and the other is through depressed agricultural prices. The difference between these two 
simple methods lies in the fact that high (lump-sum) taxes do not distort farmers· marginal revenue or 
significantly affect agricultural output, while low price policy does. 
3 According to one calculation, if farmers' contribution through low state prices is measured as a 
share of budget revenue, the share was 44.5 per cent in 1957, 54.4 per cent in 1965, 33.9 per cent in 
1971 and 27.5 per cent in 1978. (These figures are calculated by the Department of Policy Research, the 
Ministry of Agriculture in China. Data was personally provided by Guo Shutian.) 
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conunune system. All non-official factor flows across regions and industries were 
prorubited. 
For the purchase and marketing of grain and other agricultural products, a three-category 
system was established according to each conunodity's importance (Lardy 1983a; Sicular 
1988b). The first category included grain, edible vegetable oils, oil crops and cotton, 
which were thought to be crucial to national welfare. The procurement quotas and prices 
for these products were set at the central level within the unified procurement and sale 
system, and non-official transactions of these products was strictly prohibited. Most of 
the other products, such as pigs, cattle, eggs, fish, tea, tobacco, sugar crops and 
medicinal herbs fell into the second category. The procurement quotas and prices were 
also determined by the state, but more independence and flexibility was granted to the 
local government. In some cases, produce above state quotas would be sold freely. The 
third category included other minor agricultural products not subject to state 
procurement plans. These could be exchanged on the market. According to Lardy 
(1983a), there were over a hundred products in category two and hundreds of distinct 
subsidiary and native products in category three. 
The government, in each year, purchased grain from production teams according to 
procurement quotas and state prices, and then sold it to urbaT'c consumers according to a 
ration system. State purchase prices for grain were significantly lower than free market 
prices, even during the reform period (Figure 5.1). Grain production W".s discouraged 
because of the lack of price incentive. During 1952-78, grain production increased by 2.4 
per cent per year, only 0.4 per cent above the population growth rate for the same period 
(Lin 1991c). As a result, the ratiu Jf state purchases to total output dropped from 24-31 
per cent in 1953-57 to 20 per cent in 1976-78 (China Statistics Yearbook 1991:589).4 
4 There was no non-state purchase of grain from farmers before 1978. 
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State grain prices were adjusted upward several ti111es even before economic reform, but 
this did not prevent agriculture from becoming a bottleneck to economic development 
in the 1970s (Lin 199lc).s 
Figure 5.1 State and market prices of grain in China, 1952-90 (yuan/ton) 
900-r-------------------~---------------------------~----. 
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Note: Rural retail prices are only proxies. Grains are measured by tractable units (maoyi liang) and all 
prices are mixed average prices. 
Source: China State Statistics Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, various issues; China Price 
Statistical Yearbook, various issues, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
An important characteristic of grain transactions in China involves the 'dual market 
system'. On the one hand, the state controls a certain amount of grain through 
compulsory procurement at state prices. On the other hand, a parallel free market exists 
for grains. This system was in operation for some years before economic reform. Price 
distortions to grain, therefore, can be decomposed into two parts: divergence between 
the state and the domestic market prices and between the domestic and international 
prices (Table 5.1).6 Distortions due to procurement policies which more closely reflect 
5 Purchase prices for paddy rice were adjusted upward nine times during 1950-79; wheat prices were 
adjusted thirteen times, nine of which were upward and four, downward (Chinese Agricultural Yearbook 
1980:379-380). Mao and Hare (1989) argued that distorted prices in China not only resulted in 
inefficient decisions. but also impeded lhe market mechanism. even when economic choices were made 
correctly. 
6 There are other measures of the incentive distortion to agriculture. Anderson and Tyers (1987) 
present ratios of domestic producer prices to border prices for a few grain commodities. For rice, the 
ratio rose from 0.49 in 1955-59 to 1.06 in 1970-74 and then dropped to 0.76 in 1975-79. The ratio was 
0.92 in 1980-83. For wheat. the ratio rose from 0.72 in 1955-59 to 1.51 in 1980-83, and the ratio for 
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the changes in government policy making are the focus of this study. This type of 
distortion has been eliminated since reform started, particularly since 1985. In 1990, the 
gap between the average state purchase price and the free market price was very small (7 
per cent). State procurement quotas have been decreasing steadily. But until 1992, the 
government had not significantly adjusted retail prices to urban consumers since the early 
1950s. This created an increasing gap between state and market retail prices. This gap 
was balanced either by farmers (through low state purchase price) or by the government 
budget (through price subsidy). 
Table 5.1 Grain price distortions due to policy intervention in China, 1971-90 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1974 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Ratio of the state price to 
the domestic market 
0.67 
0.64 
0.58 
0.55 
0.54 
0.53 
0.56 
0.59 
0.64 
0.68 
0.67 
0.68 
0.68 
0.70 
0.78 
0.85 
0.85 
0.85 
0.89 
0.93 
Ratio of the domestic market 
rice to the international price 
1.00 
0.81 
0.46 
0.71 
0.91 
1.11 
0.75 
0.93 
0.94 
0.80 
0.89 
0.90 
0.81 
0.70 
1.03 
1.27 
0.74 
1.09 
1.18 
1.05 
Note: Distortions in the table are measured by ratios of the price concerned to the reference prices. For 
instance, distortions due to procurement prices are the ratios of average state purchase prices to free 
market prices, and distortions due to border prices are the ratios of domestic market prices to 
international grain prices (given the official exchange rates). 
Sources: Data are from State Statistics Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, various issues, China Price 
Statistics Yearbook, various issues, Beijing: China Statistics Press. Australian Bureau of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics, Comnwdity Statistics Bulletin 1992. Canberra. 
com rose from 0.50 to 1.31 during the same period. Webb (1989) estimates producer subsidy equivalents 
(PSEs) for the period 1982-87. It was found that PSEs due to procurement policy for grain products 
declined dramatically during this period (from -19.93 per cent to -5.26 per cent for rice, from -21.63 to -
2.35 for wheat, and from -24.54 to -4.59 for com). PSEs due to border policy vary over time. While the 
PSEs for rice .were quite stahle (and remained at around -60 per cent), wheat producers switched from 
being net beneficiaries to net losers (Webb 1989). 
105 
. , 
[ 
It is important, both theoretically and practically, not only to know the policy impact, but 
also to investigate the mechanism determining changes in policy variables. 
Explanations of Government Intervention in Agriculture 
Government intervention in agriculture is often treated as an exogenous variable in 
economic studies (Houck and Ryan 1972; Sicular 1988b). A set of explanations for these 
interventions can be found in the current literature. The predominant argument lies in the 
distinction between private and social valuation of economic activities (Stenvens and 
Jabara 1988). Economic efficiency in agricultural production is, in many respects, 
inconsistent with welfare maximization (Schultz 1978). Divergence between private and 
social valuations may occur in various ways (Abel 1978) . 
This exogenous treatment of government policy is, however, inappropriate in the sense 
that it neglects interactions between the government and the private sector, particularly 
in the long run.7 Interactions between government and private sectors exist even in the 
short run (Rausser, Lichenberg and Lattimore 1982). Endogenous government 
intervention in agriculture has been one persistent interest in economic studies in the past 
decades. 
Paradigms of Endogenous Government Behaviour 
A number of alternative paradigms which address the fundamentals of endogenous 
government behaviour have been developed by economists. 
The first formulation is the liberal-pluralist framework which identifies the relationship 
between policy-makers and voters as central. Several classes of models have been 
developed within this group. Many of these models assume that individuals have a 
potential demand for redistribution of income towards themselves (Stigler 1970). The 
self-interest coalition models argue that politicians are motivated by votes and thus 
7 By tre~ting intervention as given, the results obtained from these analyses represent only the 
conditional response of the private sector. 
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attempt to satisfy such demand in order to increase their probability of re-election 
(Downs 1957; Buchanan and Tullock 1962). The prediction made by this type of model 
is that, over the long run, society continually moves in the directim of greater equality of 
income distribution. The median model of self-interest, however, argues that, presuming 
that preferences for distribution towards oneself are single-peaked with respect to 
income, the median voter predominates and preferences for such redistribution are 
satisfied through the political process. This model predicts income redistribution from 
high-income and low-income families towards middle-income families (Stigler 1970). 
The Pareto-optin1al income redistribution formulation transforms issues of distribution 
into a question of efficiency (Hochman and Rodgers 1969). One variant of this 
formulation specifies that donors of taxes derive utility from the income levels of transfer 
recipients. This framework predicts redistribution of income from high-income to low-
income individuals. 
The second paradigm is the theory of the state. It challenges the liberal-pluralist 
formulation by arguing that government institutions emerge because one dominant : 
interest group has significant monopoly power (Jessop 1977; O'Connor 1973; Roemer 
1978). This theory is based on groups of agents called classes rather than individual 
economic agents. The dominant class, usually the capitalist class, makes use of its 
monopoly power to direct or control the resources of the state. Over time, income 
become~ increasingly concentrated and as the observed income distribution becomes 
more unequal, the non-dominant classes, usually the working class, the unemployed and 
farmers, threaten to remove their support of the state and to delegitin1atize the 
government. In the face of extreme social discontent, vocal opposition to the state and 
the threat of possible revolution, the government is presumed to respond by providing a 
range of social services and income supplements. 
The third paradigm is the theory of economic regulation. Political leaders adopt policies 
with the aim of maximizing their chances of remaining in office (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 
1976; Tyers and Anderson ~992). The regulator, therefore, desires to maximize the 
'majority', defined as the number of potential voters in the beneficiary group times the 
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probability that a beneficiary will grant support less the number of potential voters in 
opposing groups times the probability those whose are 'taxed' will oppose. Interest 
groups that expect to gain from a potential policy change seek its adoption by investing 
in lobbying, while those opposed to the po.licy lobby against it. Both parties invest until 
the expected marginal return is zero (Tyers and Anderson 1992). 
Anderson (1989) outlines three reasons why the government in a poor country is unlikely 
to raise the incomes of the farm majority by taxing the non-farm minority. First, the fiscal 
problems of collecting tax revenue from the non-farm minority to pay even a smc:iJl 
subsidy to each farmer would be enormous given the high costs of tax collection and 
revenue dispersion. Second, the often better-educated, politically more articulate 
minority is located in urban areas and so is likely to be able to lobby the government at a 
much lower cost than could farmers. Third, the non-farm minority includes employers of 
unskilled labour, the wages for whom depend both directly and indirectly on food prices. 
These ideas have been developed and rationalized through application of computable 
general equilibrium models incorporating representative parameters to demonstrate the 
income distribution effects of different patterns of price distortions. The results show 
that, on a per capita basis, the losers lose little relative to benefits to gainers (Anderson 
1989; Tyers and Anderson 1992}.8 
The fomth paradigm is known as the theory of rent-seeking interest groups and conflict 
resolution. This forn1ulation explicitly incorporates both economic and political markets, 
and a process for resolving conflicting goals (Krueger 1974; Zusman 1976, 1977). Brock 
and Magee (1978, 1979) present a general equilibrium framework which assumes an 
economy consisting of individual agents, politicians, firms and goods which are produced 
and either consumed or used as inputs. In this framework, government intervention 
generates losses for some agents who would be willing to pay up to a certain amount to 
prevent the intervention, while the gainers would be willing to offer a certain amount in 
8 This idea was first demonstrated by Peltzman's result that losers must be taxed less than the 
interest of the winners would dictate (Peltzman 1976). 
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order to secure the intervention. Brock and Magee (1978, 1979) employed a non-
cooperative game theoretic framework with politicians acting as Stackelberg leaders. 
Competing politicians attempt to maximize their probability of re-election. These 
probabilities are functions of campaign contributions from lobby groups and the 
politician's intervention position. 9 
Empirical Studies of Agricultural Policy 
The setting of policy and its instruments can be divided into two stages: the first involves 
the legislative choice process and the second, the bureaucratic choice process. Although 
the concept of an interest group is extremely important in analyzing agricultural policy, 
few studies have empirically investigated the legislative choice process of government 
intervention in agriculture. Agricultural interests are too specialized to affect the election 
of all politicians and are probably insufficient to make most electoral frameworks 
coherent with respect to agricultural policy (Rausser, Lichenberg and Lattimore 1982).10 
While the general objectives of agricultural policy might be determined by the legislative 
choice process (Brock and Magee 1978, 1979; Tyers and Anderson 1992), the 
bureaucratic choice process is more important in determining the particular policy 
instruments adopted and the ways in which they are implemented (Zusman 1976; Zusman 
and Amiad 1977; Beghin 1990; Beghin and Karp 1991). 
A cooperative game theoretic framework is employed by Zusman (1977) and Zusman 
and Amiad (1977) in their studies of Israeli sugar and dairy policies, respectively, and by 
Beghin (1990) and Beghin and Karp (1991) in examining Senegalese agricultural price 
policy. 
Zusman ( 197 6) assumes an additive utility function for each interest group: the 
government; the Israeli labour federation (representing consumers); and sugar producers. 
9 In Brock and Magee's analysis, tariffs are used throughout as the exemplary redistribution policy 
(Brock and Magee 1978, 1979). 
10 There are some exceptions, though, in the world such as the cases in Japan and France. 
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Each of these three groups are assumed to have a utility function \\hi.ch is separable in 
the benefits and costs imposed by the sugar subsidy and in the cost of exerting effort to 
influence the level of this subsidy. The concept of equilibrium employed in this game is 
Harsanyi's generalization of the Nash cooperative game solution to an n-person game 
(Harsanyi 1963). The solution concept implies that the entire cooperative game is broken 
down into two distinct components. The first is a non-cooperative subgame in which 
agents bargain to arrive at a division of the final payoff. The division anived at is 
determined by the relative bargaining strengths of the agents and the coalitions they 
form. These, in turn, arise out of the pressure which can then potentially be brought to 
bear on competing agents and coalitions. In the second cooperative subgame, all agents 
jointly strive to maximize the size of the total payoff as this will maximize each agent's 
and/or coalition's share. At equilibrium, the payoff is divided according to the results of 
the first subgame.11 
Beghin (1990) and Beghin and Karp (1991 ), in examining Senegalese agricultural price 
policy, also apply an n-person cooperative game framework by using a reference point 
solution (Thomson 1981 ). Reference points are pay-offs which players refer to when 
they evaluate pay-off proposals. 12 The Nash conflict point (d) and the point of minimum 
expectation (mex) are examples of reference pay-offs. 
For a two-player game, u; and u:.x are two corresponding solutions on the frontier (H) 
of the pay-off set (P). Any convex combination of these two reference points can be 
another reference point, the solution of which lies on the frontier bet\.veen u; and u:.x. 
Once the conflict point is known, the original Nash solution is unique, whereas many 
reference point solutions are possible. This approach avoids the imposition of 
unnecessary rigidity of the model. It is also assumed that the pay-off set and its frontier 
change with the economic er.vironment. Hence players' pay-offs, their bargaining power 
11 For a sununary of the approach employed by Zusman (1976) and other frameworks, see Ra.usser, 
Lichenberg and Lattimore (1982). 
12 The reference point, however, is not explicitly identified in the empirical work by Beghin (1990) 
and Beghin and Karp (1991). 
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and equilibrium strategies are influenced by exogenous shocks (for instance, changes in 
world prices and exchange rates) (Beghin 1990). 
State-Farmer Framework For Grain Policy 
The State Grain Market 
The paradigms reviewed above are inappropriate to analysis of grain policy issues in 
China for two reasons. First. mechanisms within which different parties bargain with 
each other on policy measures have not yet been well developed in China. Second, state 
retail policies for grain changed little over the past forty years. Policy measures on the 
consumption side are fixed, introducing difficulties for both theoretical and empirical 
analysis. 
Grain transactions in China operate in a dual market system (Figure 5.2). This system 
existed before economic reform and was officially recognized at the beginning of 1985 as 
a part of the rural marketization scheme. Within the state plan, government agents - the 
State Grain Department - purchase grain from farmers according to state purchase 
prices and procurement quotas, and then sell grain to urban consumers and industries 
according to state retail prices and retail rationing. The state budget subsidizes the Grain 
Department if losses occur due to price differences, processing and transportation cost or 
inefficient management A limited volume of exports (of rice and coarse grain) and 
imports (of wheat) is incorporated within the economic plan. On the free market, farmers 
may sell their surpluses at market prices to either the State Grain Department or other 
agents. 
As a counterpart of the free market, grain transactions managed by the state are defined 
as the state market in this study. Sicular (1988b) argued that, in a dual market system, 
the policies implemented in the state market do not directly affect production and 
consumption decisions but do have an income effect. The significance of this income 
effect depends on levels of quotas and gaps between the state prices and market prices. 
Lin (1993), on the other hand, argues that state prices may directly affect production and 
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consumption decisions if the state procurement quotas are endogenously set (either as a 
function of the output level or as a function of the quota in the previous period). 
Figure 5.2 The dual-market system for grain in China 
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Note: In the diagram, market exchange of grain between farmers is ignored for simplicity. Other agents 
refers tu newly emerged non-state organizations doing bushiess on grain. It also covers the case when 
farmers sell grain directly to urban consumers or industrial enterprises. 
To analyze the reasons for grain policy changes ir1 China a realistic framework is 
required. The state-farmer framework, developed ir1 this study, focuses on the 
interactions between farmers and the government. Because the retail policies for grain 
were unchanged in the past decades (until 1992), we leave consumers out of this game 
framework. As the government has to finance the gap between purchase and retail prices, 
the higher the purchase price, the heavier the pressure on the state budget, given a retail 
price level. The government thus has an incentive to depress procurement prices or to 
minimize the total cost of grain purchases. This objective is, however, constrained by 
another policy goal- grain self-sufficiency. The farmers' objective, on the other hand, is 
to maximize total revenue from grain production or to minimize losses from state grain 
purchasing. 
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Demand, Supply and Government Monopsony on the State Market 
Grain transactions on the state marLt can also be characterized by demand and supply 
behaviour (Figure 5.3). The demand curve reflects the government's marginal valuation 
of grain purchases (DD). In the extreme case, if the constraint that the government faces 
in grain procurement is complete grain self-sufficiency, the demand curve is vertical. In 
other words, whatever the price, the government has to buy a fixed amount of grain 
which equals (a part of) the estimated domestic demand by urban consumers and 
industries. 13 In the case of China, however, the demand curve is downward sloping. 
Though estimated domestic demand is fixed, government's demand for grain in the state 
market is price elastic as China also trades in the international grain market. The Chinese 
government pursues 'basic self-sufficiency' which requires that a dominant part of 
domestic demand be met by domestic supply. However, it also has some limited 
flexibility to switch between domestic and international supply sources. \Vhen dome::;tic 
supply is severely short or the domestic purchase price becomes too high because 
domestic demand becomes fully reliant on domr;stic sources, the government may 
substitute international trade for domestic procurement. The demand curve on the state 
market is therefore downward sloping but very steep (Figure 5.3). 
The farmers' supply curve of grain is given by the segment of the marginal cost curve 
above its intersection with the average cost curve (SM in Figure 5.3). The supply curve 
for the state market, however, is slightly different from the definition for free market. 
The special characteristics of the buyer - in other words, the government - must be 
taken into account. There are two ways for the government to push down the farmers' 
grain supply curve in the state market. The first is to restrict the farmers' non-grain 
production opportunities (or to narrow the farmers' feasible choice set). By controlling 
all the farmers' production factors (labour, capital and land) in grain production, the 
government is able to depress factor prices. The marginal cost of grain production can 
13 How big a part of urban grain demand is satisfied by the government thrmigh the state system is 
another polic)! issue which is implicitly incorporated in the deter·· ·1ation of the 4emand curve on the 
state market. 
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thus be lowered. This was one of the policies adopted by the Chinese government to 
enforce low prices for agricultural products. 
Figure S.3 Government monopsony in the state grain transaction 
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On the other hand, the government :i.s able to impose penalties on farmers who fail or 
refuse to fulfil the state procurement quotas (at low state prices). It can close down the 
free markets for grain and other products (as it did many times) whenever there is 
difficulty in fulfilling the state purchase quota. The government can also create 
clifficulties for 'troublesome' farmers with their children's education, purchase of 
agricultural inputs, access to other public ~cods and employment opportunities in 
township anci village enterprises, and in other ways. Through levying these penalties, the 
government is able to sufficiently reduce all or some of farm households' income and 
welfare. From the farmers' point of view, these penalties can be converted into a 
monetary value, m, for each unit of grain supplied to the state. 14 
facilitated by these potential penalties, the government is able to push down the farmers' 
grain supply curve in the state market. Suppose that the marginal cost to produce one 
Ullit of grain is c, a farmer will only be happy to supply this unit of grain if the market 
14 For instance, if the government restricts 'troublesome' farmers from employment by the township 
and village en.terprises, the money measure of this penalty (m) is defmed as the difference between the 
fanners' potential wage rates in the rural industry and their current income levels. 
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price P is as high as the marginal cost (P = c ). Further assume that the government 
assigns this fanner a quota of one unit of grain, the fanner has two choices: either to sell 
the unit of grain to the state at a low state price (P5 ) or to sell it to the market instead at 
the market price \Pm, Pm > ?,) but incur penalties of m. The two choices are equivalent if 
Pm - m = Ps. In other words, fanners would be happy to supply grain to the state as long 
as the state price is at least as high as (Pm - m ). The supply curve in the state market (SS) 
is therefore normally lower than its counterpart in free markets (SM). 
Given supply (SS) and demand (DD) curves, equilibrium would occur at their 
intersection (B) in a competitive market, with price P2 and quantity Q1 (Figure 5.3). 
In the state market, however, the State Grain Department is the only grain buyer as other 
agents are prohibited. The government therefore possesses monopsony power. The more 
the state buys the higher the price it has to pay. Curve MOS is the government's marginal 
outlay schedule (Carlton and Perloff 1990). The amount the government buys is 
determined by the supply curve and MOS. The new equilibrium is at C(P,Q). Compared 
with the equilibrium point B, the introduction of monopsony power into the market 
reduces both equilibrium quantity and price. The area P1PCA represents rent the 
government captures from its monopsony power and the shaded area ABC is the 
deadweight loss. 
Dynamics of the State-Farmer Game 
The essence of this game between the state and farmers relates to how the two parties 
share the gaps of grain prices (between market and state retail prices), as a low grain 
supply price to urban cmsumers and industries was a pre-set policy condition (Lin 
1991c). The state-farmer formulation presented in this study is obviously a state-
dominant framework. Nonetheless, the extent to which the government can distort the 
farmers' supply curve and how much rent it can extract depends on the relative strengths 
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of both parties in the game. 15 The relative strengths, in turn, are determined by the 
destructive powers both parties possess and the costs to each in implementing these 
powers. The government punishes farmers who refuse to deliver grain to the state by 
reducing their income and welfare. To impose these punishments, however, involves a 
cost. Farmers, for their part, are not purely passive in this framework. They can choose 
not to plant grain at all, thus they will not be greatly affected if the government closes 
down the grain market as long as they themselves can survive. This, however, is an 
extremely serious strategy for the government, particularly if farmers adopt it 
collectively. 
In early stages of economic development under a repressive and vindictive central state 
system, farmers tend to be weak in the state-farmer policy game, particularly when 
infrastructure is poorly developed. As agriculture is the major industry of the economy 
and farmers are the dominant group of the population, farmers cannot be subsidized in 
any transactions with the government. Any small marginal benefit to farmers could entail 
a very significant lo.,s to the other members of society and a severe burden on the state 
budget (Brock and Magee 1980). 16 The government therefore is willing to give up 
relatively large amounts of resources to implement its policies as the opportunity benefit 
tends to be large. Farmers, however, are unable to exercise any significant desrructive 
strategy on the government collectively because of the distances of their residences and 
poor communication and transportation conditions. It is impossible to inform every 
farmer about new policy developments and lobbying. The destructive power of a few 
farmers refusing to deliver grain is very limited. Such a strategy could cause significant 
negative consequences for the farmers involved. 
As the economy develops, however, these relationships would change. Economic 
development is sometimes characterized by diversification in the structure of economic 
15 The rent that the government extracts from grain purchases can also be negative; farmers are thus 
subsidized, as is the case in Western Europe and the United States. 
16 What u.sually t:.appens is that the minority of the population is able to demand a policy favourable 
to it as the larger benefit to this minority only imposes a small loss on other groups in the economy. 
116 
activity and a fall in the population involved in agriculture (Timmer 1988; Tyers and 
Anderson 1992). Sources of government revenue are diversified and revenue from grain 
production becomes a very small part of total revenue collected. The government, 
therefore, has less interest than before in agricultural revenue, or in other words, it is 
only willing to incur a smaller cost to prevent the rise of state purchase prices or the fall 
of budget revenue from agriculture. 17 Even if the government contemplates punitive 
action, the significance of its destructive power has decreased dramatically and the costs 
of implementation have risen sharply. In a grain dominant rural economy, the 
government only had to close the free market for grain as one penalty, but it now has to 
close hundreds of free markets. 
As the number of farmers falls and rural infrastructure (transportation and 
communication conditions) improves, it becomes easier and less costly for farmers to 
organize to lobby for a favoured policy. Their destructive power rises accordingly, 
particularly if the government is still stuck with a grain self-sufficiency constraint. The 
negative consequences of the government's potential penalties are reduced significantly. 
If farmers are unhappy wit!"! the state purchase policy, they can choose to quit grain 
production as many more non-grain and non-agricultural opportunities are available to 
them. If farmers are restricted from entering the township and village enterprises, they 
still have the choice of joining rural private firms or establishing one themselves. 
All these factors cause the relative bargaining strec1gths of players in the state-farmer 
game to change. Farmers may become relatively stronger and the state relatively weaker 
as economic development progresses. These have two types of consequences for the 
state grain market. 
The first type of effect is that the potential penalty consequences (m) will decrease. 
Farmers thus tend not to accept even small gaps between the state price and the marginal 
cost of grain production (as m ~ 0 ). This change results in an upward shift in the supply 
17 Titls does not necessarily mean that the cost the govenunent is willing to incur is smaller than 
before in absolute terms. It is. however, always true to a relative measure. 
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curve in the state market and this continues during the process of economic development 
until state and free market supply curves coincide (farmers operate on their actual 
marginal cost schedule) (Figure 5.4).18 
Figure 5.4 The state and free markets for grain 
Price DD 
Pl MOS' 
SM 
SS P*l------------.,----~"'""~~.i-.--,.--~--1~::._--P* 
P2 
p 
0 Q' 
I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
QQ" Q2 Quantity 
The second type of effect is that the government finds it increasingly difficult to exercise 
monop::,,)ny power in the procurement of grain. Lower state prices encounter stronger 
resistance from farmers who demand a market price for the grain they deliver to the 
state. Due to the loss of the monopsony power in the state market, the government 
gradually becomes a common buyer in the free grain market. As a competitive buyer, it 
can no longer affect the market equilibrium price. In Figure 5.4, this is captured by the 
clock:v.Jise rotation of the MOS curve to a horizontal position (MOS', which is the same 
line as the market equilibrium price P*P*). The government will now purchase an 
amount of OQ" grain and pay the market price P*. 
18 In the extreme, the supply curve in the state market may move above the actual marginal cost 
schedule. This study will not consider this situation. 
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A Cooperative Game-Theoretic Model 
Deriving the Model 
As both parties in the state-farmer formulation have destructive powers over their 
counterparts' welfare or income and these relative powers change over time, state 
purchase policy for grain has to be adjusted frequently. This formulation can be well 
acconunodated by a cooperative game-theoretic model. Actual policy can thus be 
thought of as an equilibrium outcome from a bargaining process between the government 
and farmers. 
There are two players, the government and the representative farmer, and two policy 
• i 
instruments, state purchase price and procurement quotas. Both players bargain on the \, 
r 
r 
policy instrument setting to maximize their own utility. As discussed above, the r 
government tries to minimize total expenditure on state grain purchases constrained by 
the 'basic self-sufficiency' condition. The farmer tries to maximize total revenue or 
minimize total losses from selling grains to the state. 
From the possible solutior. concepts, the reference point solution is chosen for use in this · ~ ·· 
study (Thomson 1981) following Beghin (1990), and Beghin and Karp (1991). Reference 
points are pay-offs players refer to when they evaluate pay-off proposals. The Nash 
conflict point, d, is an example of a reference pay-off, which is on the frontier (H) of the 
pay-off set (P). This approach avoids imposing unnecessary rigidity on the model. It is 
also assumed that the pay-off set and its frontier change with the economic environment. 
Hence players' pay-offs, their bargaining powers, and equilibrium strategies are 
influenced by exogenous shocks (Beghin 1990). 
Thomason (1981) and Friedman (1986) present the four axioms underlying the game. 
These are analogous to the axioms underlying the Nash game (Nash 1953) but are 
defined with respect to a reference point rather than conflict point. The axiom of joint 
efficiency, or strong rationality, requires that the solution to the game, 
u* =(U;, u;, ... , u;), lies on the upper boundary, H, of the pay-off space, P; Vi* is 
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defined as the utility of player i in equilibrium. The axiom of linear invariance states that 
the solution to the game obtained by a positive affine transformation of players' utility 
functions is the positive affine transformation of the solution to the original game. The 
axiom of symmetry insures that indistinguishable players receive the same pay-off. The 
last axiom, the independence of irrelevant alternatives, says that excluding a point from P 
other than the solution or the reference point, does not alter the solution to the game. 
If the reference point, g(P,d), satisfies certain regularity conditions (Thomson 1981), 
the solution to the cooperative game maximizes the modified Nash product 
(5.1) 
~ 
where U =(Uc, UF) is an element of the set P(z); footnotes G and F represent the ~ 
government and the farmer, respectively. If Pis compact and convex, the solution, u*, is 11 
on the frontier, H, and satisfies 
a(z)c (U~ - g(P, d)c) = a(z)F (U; - g(P, d) F) (5.2) 
where a(z)i = "dH(U*, z)/aui. The functions a(z); denote the bargaining-power ·- ·-
coefficients of the players. They are usually normalized to sum to one. 
If the pay-off set, P, is convex, maximizing the Nash product is equivalent to maximizing 
the weighted sum of utilities, W, 
(5.3) 
First-order conditions in the strategy space can be derived by maximizing either the 
welfare function (5.3) or the Nash product (5.1). Defining sk as the kth strategy available 
to the players, then the necessary conditions for a solution are 
"'"' au. L.. a(z)i-1 =0 
i=G.F dSk 
(5.4) 
for all k (k=l, state price, and k=2, procurement quota). 
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In the grain policy game, both the government and the farmer seek to maximize their 
utility. The indirect utility function of the representative farmer is 
(5.5) 
where, q is the procurement quota and Ps is the state purchase price. The restricted 
income function, mF[q,ps,zF], minus the cost of implementing conflict strategies, Cp, 
constitutes the net income of the farmer. At the cooperative solution, Cp is equal to zero 
since conflict strategies are not used (Beghin and Karp 1991 ). The coor~rative strategy 
involves political support but no monetary reward is given to the policy-maker. The 
vector zF, a subset of z, contains exogenous variables affecting income function. 
Similarly, the indirect utility function for the government is 
(5.6) 
Measuring the welfare effects of policy changes on the government and the farmer is the 
difficult part of empirical study. To avoid specifying the utility function explicitly, this 
study adopts shares of the gains or losses resulting from state grain purchases, in total 
revenue of the government and the farmer, as approximations to changes of their 
welfare. This measure, as an approximation, appropriately captures welfare change, and 
has the additional advantage of ease of use. 19 This gain or loss is calculated from the 
state and market prices. The underlying rationale is that the governr · would have to 
buy grain at the market price if there were no state market. The gap , ··~.veen the market 
and state price is the gain that the government can extract from the policy game, which, 
on the other side of the coin, is the loss incurred by the farmer. The frontier, H, 
represents the welfare trades between the two players. A lower state price, for instance, 
increases the welfare of the government but leaves the farmer worse off. 
l9 Income is sometimes used as the simplest measure of welfare (Tyers and Anderson 1992). The 
share of gains or losses more accurately reflects welfare change, since people with different income 
levels would of course value a certain amount of gain or loss quite differently. 
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Empirical Results 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for a solution can be empirically estimated. As 
the pay-off functions and their derivatives are endogenous variables, and both are 
determined by the equilibrium outcome of the game, they are simultaneously estimated 
using an instrumental variable technique. 
The bargaining coefficients are, in turn, determined by many exogenous variables, such 
as the share of agricultural population, share of agricultural output, economic growth 
and market prices. A linear functional form is adopted for the relationship between 
exogenous variables and the ratio of bargaining coefficients 
(5.7) 
where SA is the share of income from agriculture in farmers' total income, SL is the 
proportion of the population reliant on agriculture, Pm is market price of grain and M, is 
income per capita. The bargaining coefficients are first normalized to sum to one. 
Combining Equations (5.7) and (5.8), we have 
1 
a(z)F = ------------
1 + a0 +a1SA +a2SL +a3pm +a4M 
(5.8) 
(5.9) 
Equations (5.9) are substituted into Equations (5.2) and (5.4) to form the estimated 
system (Equations 5.10 and 5.11) 
(5.10) 
(5.11) 
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The intercept term a0b0 includes the reference pay-offs which are not explicitly identified. 
We are primarily interested in Le bargaining-power structure (the bargaining 
coefficients) which can be recovered without the reference point 
Equations ( 4.10) and ( 4.11) are empirically estimated for the case of grain policy in 
China The data used are for the period 1971-90. Market prices for grain are derived 
from the price index for grain in the rural free market. The price levels are calculated by 
setting the market price in 1952 equal to the purchase price in the same year. 
Estimation results derived using the iterative two-stage least squares method are 
presented in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 A game-theoretic model of grain policy in China 
Estimation of the game (iterative two-stage least square regression) 
Parameter Estimate Standard error Asymptotic t ratio 
a0 (constant) 0.6756 0.0683 9.89 
a1(SA) -0.0001 0.00003 3.42 
a2 (SL) -0.4846 0.0910 -5.32 
a'3(M) 0.00005 0.00002 2.68 
G4 <Pm) 0.0016 0.00008 19.16 
bo -0.0080 0.0079 -1.01 
Predicted bargaining coefficien~1; and their derivatives 
Variable Mean 
oa1 joSA -0.0002023 
oatfoSL -0.2318226 
oa1 /oM 0.0000220 
aa1/opm 0.0007668 
oa)dSA 0.0002023 
oa)oSL 0.2318226 
oa)oM -0.0000220 
oac/oHm ·0.0007668 
at 0.3040321 
ac 0.6959679 
There are some interesting findings. First, there is no strong evidence of a relationship 
between harvests and the farmers' bargaining power, although it is a common argument 
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that policy favours farmers relatively when grain is in short supply. From the time-series 
data analysis, there is no statistically significant relationship. 
Second, the higher the farmers' bargaining power, the lower the share of income from 
agriculture in total income. This income share, on the other hand, portraits negatively 
changes in the feasible choice set of farmers. The larger the farmers' feasible choice set, 
the higher the part of income earned from non-agricultural productivity. The negative 
relationship here is consistent with the theoretical analysis. When the farmers' non-
agricultural production opportunities expand, punitive measures by the government have 
less impact on them. 
Third, the share of the agricultural population in total population has a significant but 
negative impact on farmer's bargaining power. This empirical result for China is 
consistent with the theory of economic size ~n the political market. When farmer numbers 
are smaller, it is easier for them to demand a favot::able policy regime since the gain they 
obtain requires a much smaller loss to consumer. The variable of agriculture's share in 
national income is, however, not significant in the model, probabiy because this share 
increased markedly during the mid to late 1980s while its trend was declining in the 
longer term. 
Fourth, per capita income has a significant positive influence on the farmers' bargaining 
power. This empirical finding is related to Engel's theorem. In the early stage of 
economic development, income level is 1ow and a large part is spent on food. Consumers 
have strong concerns about changes to grain policy. Along with increases in per capita 
income, however, this share of expenditure on grain will decline. Thus the government 
becomes less concerned with grain policy. 
Fifth, changes in market prices for grain had a positive effect on the farmer's bargaining 
power. When the market price is higher, the government tends to be willing to offer a 
higher price for grain. 
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Sixth, fanners were relatively weak in the period under study compared to consumers. 
The fanners' power coefficient is only 0.3 while that for consumers is 0.7. The big 
difference in the coefficients reflects the farmers' relative weakness in the process of 
bargaining for grain policy settings. This is further evidenced by the unfavourable grain 
policy faced by farmers throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. The farmer's bargaining 
power., however, was increasing over time. In particular, a big jump was detected at the 
begiMing of the 1980s when the household responsibility system was introduced. 
Findings and Implications 
Incentive distortions in agriculture are one of the main policy issues in China. A state-
farmer policy game framework is used here to investigate empirically grain policy 
changes in the Chinese economy. A cooperative game-theoretic model is formulated and 
estimated. The results suggest that the fi amework of cooperative game theory is 
applicable to the post-reform Chinese economy. Consistent with theoretical predictions, 
a large agricultural population plays a negative, while income level plays a positive, role 
in the farmers' bargaining power relative to that of the government. Chinese farn:ers are 
still relatively weak in grain policy brirgaining. Their power, however, has increased 1 
throughout the period under study. It is expected that the farmers' bargaining power will 
further increase as income rises and the share of agricultural population declines. 
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Estimating Supply Elasticities of the Farming Sector 
Qualitative analysis of price distortion provides indication of the likely direction of its 
impact on economic structure and the efficiency with which resources are allocated. This 
study seeks to supply quantitative estimates of its effects as well as the effects of the 
limited feasible choice set of farmers. A starting point is the estimation of elasticities of 
farmers' production decisions with respect to prices and the establishment of an 
appropriate analytical framework. 
There are two essential steps in providi11g elasticity estimates. First, it is necessary to 
decide whether or not to apply the usual profit maximization framework to Chinese 
farmers. This step is closely related to the choice of assumptions and functional forms for 
modellmg. Second, it has to be decided whether or not data from Chinese statistical 
sources are appropriate for the estimation process. 
Quantifying Farmers' Supply Behaviour in China 
Choice of specific functional form is usually based on different sets of assumptions and 
can lead to different elasticity estimates (Alston et al 1990; Huang and Lu 1992). The 
traclitional approach to production behaviour was pioneered by Cobb and Douglas 
(1928) usmg the assumption that the production function is additive and homogeneous. 
The disadvantage of the Cobb-Douglas production function is that restrictions on 
patterns of substitution among inputs must be imposed (Arrow et al. 1961 ). This 
frustrates the objective of determining patterns empirically in econometric models. The 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, introduced by Arrow et al. 
(1961) improves the unity elasticity of substitution and treats the elasticity as an 
unknown parameter. However, it retams the assumption of additivity and homogeneity 
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and imposes a stringent restriction on patterns of substitution (McFadden 1963; Uzawa 
1962). 
Most models of supply response in agriculture focus on aggregate (across commodities) 
supply or own-price response for a single commodity (Ball 1988). Models that do 
recognize multiple outputs tjpically specify a priori restrictions on the structure of 
production (Vincent, Dixon and Powell 1980). The advantage of the recently developed 
flexible functional forms in empirical studies is that they require no prior restrictions on 
the parameters. Some elasticities, unlike those estimated by the Cobb-Douglas or CES 
functions, can vary from observation to observation. There a:re several flexible forms of 
profit or cost developed for analysis of nmlti ~;le products and multiple inputs production 
issues, such as translog, quadratic and generaliz.ed McFadden ft:ncti.ons (McKay, 
Lawrence and Valstuin 1982; Weaver 1983). 
The generalized McFadden profit function is applied in this study. The existence of 
extensive government intervention in agriculture, however, raises questions about the 
applicability of this methodology to the Chinese economy. This study also attempts to 
find a way of applying the usual approach to the Chinese agricultural sector, through 
appropriate data adjustments. 
The application first involves data adjustment to eliminate information on activity which 
did not result from profit maximization behaviour. Having established the quantities of 
resources and outputs that are determined by the farmers' objective of profit 
maximization and prices at the margin, an estimation is carried out by applying a 
restricted profit function to examine production interactions in the Chinese fa1mfog 
sector. 
ls the Profit Maximization Framework Applicable to China? 
There is a debate among economists on the appropriateness of applying !he standard 
profit function approach to agriculture in developing economies (Junankar 1989, Sevilla-
Siero 1991). The necessary condition for the application of the profit maximization 
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framework is that farmers make their production decisions in accordance with marginal 
prices. The debate has focused on aspects of the developing economies where some 
assumptions of profit function approach might be violated. Since various problems afflict 
this approach including the existence of non-competitive market structures, zero-valued 
observations, exclusion of relevant variables, lack of participation in output and/or input 
markets, and endogeneity of input and/output prices (Sevilla-Siem 1991 ). Junankar 
(1989) concludes that this analytical approach should be abandoned in favour of an 
alternative paradigm reflecting market imperfections typical of developing economies and 
including the role of social and institutional factors as well as concepts of class, power 
and interlinkages between all of these factors. In a comment on Junankar's criticism, 
Sevilla-Siem (1991) argues that the impact of these problems on estimation results can 
be minimised through modifications and adaptations of the standard approach, better 
specification of the underlying technology, and the use of selected functional forms. 
This debate has particular implications for the study of Chinese agriculture because most 
of the problems discussed by Junankar apply to the Chinese economy. Extra caution is 
needed :in applying an economic approach involving stringent assumptions to explore 
price responsiveness of Chinese farmers. 
What requires further attention for estimation in this study is the fact that China has 
experienced more than thirty years of central planning, but it has been semi-marketized 
during the decade of reform. Farmers' economic decision-making is still more or less 
conditioned by government policy. This peculiarity implies difficulties for any direct 
application of the dual approach to the Chinese economy. 
On a \lvide range of products, the Chinese government still intervenes in production 
through quantity and price restrictions. In the case of grair.., a tw':'l-tier price system 
applies. Farmers have to fulfil state purchase quotas at state determined prices and only 
output surplus to this quota can be sold on the free market. The purchase of cotton is 
monopolized by state agents. Farmers have no alternative in selling their cotton output 
other than to accept the state price. 
128 
---- ,l:J 
I 
I 
, I 
·1 
i 
Fanners' decision-making in China is influenced by a combination of government policy 
and market conditions. The former includes a series of requirements and regulations set 
out in the economic plan, 1 and the other is the nom1al incentive structure (relative prices 
at the margin). Farmers have to fulfil policy requirements regardless of the 
consequences. 2 Having done so, they then try to utilize all remairung resources and 
market information to maximize their profits. The assumption proposed by this study is 
that, in a semi-marketized economy like China, the farmers' production activities are 
guided by a dual system. On one hand, farmers have to fulfil the quantity and price 
requirements set by the govem!Tient. On the other hand, they, like any other farmers in 
the world, respond to changes in marginal prices. Any inefficiencies should be attributed 
to inappropriate policy intervention rather than to irrationality on the part of the farmers. 
In this study, an attempt has been made to separate data arising from highly distorted 
activity from the data set used and to model farmers' decision-making behaviour by 1; I 
\ 
c 
applying the dual approach. I' 
Since the program of economic reform was introduced at the end of the 1970s the farm 
household has become an independent unit managing production and consL.nption 
activities. The reform policies implemented have created both necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the farmers' successful pursuit of maximum profit from production. In 
sor,1e studies of Chinese agriculture, an implicit assumption is that farmers are rational 
profit maximizers (McMillan et al. 1989; Lin 1992a). 
Schultz has hypothesized that farmers in developing economies are no less rational than 
their counterparts in industrial economies in terms of seeking maximum profit (Schultz 
1964). This Schultz hypothesis has been criticized because inefficiencies are often 
1 Economic plans take various fonns in China. In the mediwn tenn, the government has a Five-
Year Plan. Plan indicators related to farm households are made more explicit in the annual plan. 
Economic plans can also be divided into two types, one set by the central government (such as for grain 
and cotton) and the other set by various local govenunent (for instance the purchase plan of tobacco 
announced by some provincial governments each year). 
2 Since the government-set quota and state price are compulsory for farmers. farmers have to folfil 
the requirements even if the policy causes them losses. In actual fact, there are some cases in which 
fanners refuse to fulfil low-price pu::hase quotas. 
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detected in the agricultural sector in developing economies (Ellis 1988). Many causes 
were listed to support the irrational behaviour hypothesis, such as the characteristics of 
small-scale production and the lack of certain markets. For instance, it may be argued 
that for an autarkic farm household, production may focus primarily on self-sufficiency 
instead of profit This argument hardly applies to Chinese farmers, however, since 
markets are fairly well developed quite well and farmers are heavily involved ill market 
exchange. 3 In addition, the validity of the rationality assumption depends solely on the 
behavioural mechanism. Farmers in China react to exogenous changes in exactly the 
same way as farmers would from other countries if they were placed in the same 
situation (Zhou 1992). 
Methodoiogy 
In a multiple product and multiple input framework, the technology is assumed to relate 
N variable inputs and outputs and R fixed inputs. Denote the vector of variable 
commodities by: 
Yi> 0 i = 1.. .... / output 
Y = CYi · · .. · · · Yn )' { 0 Yi < i = l + 1... n input (6.1) 
and the vector of fixed inputs by -X=(-X1 ....... -Xr)<Or,4 and let 
P = CPi ......... Pn) >>On denote a vector of exogenous prices. Then a restricted profit 
function can be defined as 
rr(P;X) = Max{P' Y:(Y;-X) ET} 
y 
(6.2) 
where T is a non-empty, compact and convex set representing all feasible input and 
output combinations. rt(P; X) is homogenous of degree one in variable input and output 
prices and in fixed input quantities, convex in prices and concave in quantities (Diewert 
1973). According to Hotelling's lemma, 
3 For instance, about 36.6 per cent of grain output, 72.4 per cent of edible oil and 90.7 per cent of 
cotton output was sold to the government or on the free markets in 1990 (China Statistics Yearbook 
1991:589). Fru:mers also buy large amounts of consumption goods from markets. 
4 This notation means that each component of the R-dimensional vector Xis non negative. 
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arr,(P;X)/oP; = Yf(P;X) i = l.. ....... n (6.3) 
where Yf (P;X) is the profit-maximising level of output supply (input demand) if i is an 
output (variable input). 
A number of flexible functional forms have been proposed, all locally approximate to an 
arbitrary function. One popular form is the transcendental logarithmic normalized 
variable ('restricted') profit (or cost) function (Cluistensen, Jorgenson and Lau 1973) 
which has the form: 
n-1 1 n-1 n-1 1 n-1 r 
ln(7t) = a0 + Lbi ln(P;*)+- LLcii ln(P;*)ln(P/)+- LLdik In(P;*)ln(Zk) 
i=l 2 i=l j=I 2 i=l k=I 
1 r r r 
+-L Leik ln(Zk)ln(Zm)+ Lfs1 ln(Zs1) 2k~m~ =I 
+terms with dummies 
(6.4) 
where P;* = P; / Pn is the normalized commodity price and Zi fixed input in production. 
Applying the Hotelling-Sheperd Lemma gives: 
n-1 r 
Si= bi+ L,cii ln(P/)+ L,dik ln(Zk)+terms with dwnmies 
j=I k=I 
(6.5) 
where Si is the profit (or revenue) share of output i (positive) or cost share of input i 
(negative). The translog functional forms are widely applied in the study of producer 
behaviour (McKay et al. 1982; Haughton 1986; Ball 1988). 
To derive these elasticities for Chinese agriculture, the flexible functional form applied in 
this study is the generalized McFadden profit function (Diewert and Wales 1987; 
Lawrence and Zeitsch 1989; Albacea and Warr 1991). The McFadden unit profit 
function has the form:S 
5 Tiris unit profit refers to profit per unit of land. 
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(6.6) 
where R(P,N) is profit as a function of prices (P) and fixed land input (N), and p1, .... pn 
are prices of outputs and inputs faced by the producer. Relative prices are adopted for 
the purpose of homogeneity of the unit profit function. Time, t, is usually included as a 
proxy for technological progress (Albacea and Warr 1991) or productivity (Lawrence 
and Zeitch 1989). Since the data used in this study are provincial panel data covering 
only five years (1986-90), the terms containing the variable t are not included in the 
model. 
Because input prices are not available, a unit revenue function similar to (6.6) is 
constructed as follows 
(6.6') 
where F represents the set of inputs (that is, Zv e F which includes labour, capital and 
fertilizer). 
By differentiating this revenue function with respect of the relative prices, we obtain a set 
of supply equations:6 
(6.7) 
In these equations, the X( s are positive and represent quantities of outputs supplied. 
6 Inputs are included in quantity fonn in the function; price responses of demand for inputs are not 
of concern in this study. 
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Chinese agricultural data consists of time-series and cross-section data for five years and 
twenty-eight provinces. The approach used in dealing with regional variation follows that 
developed by Fuss (1977) and applied by Lawrence and Zeitsch (1989) and Albacea and 
Warr (1991). The provinces are grouped into six regions according to the differences in 
agricultural factor endowments and and economic structure: Northeast, North, 
Northwest, South, Southwest and Southeast regions. Provinces classified into one region 
share a common intercept in the model. 7 
Estimates of this multiple product model implicitly assume that the production of these 
products is weakly separable from the rest of the economy. Production decisions about 
these products are only influenced by relative prices, not by absolute level of prices. The 
system equations (6.7) that can be estimated become 
m n-1 r 
Xi/ N = I. cikDk +I. ciiP/ +I. civziv (6.8) 
k=I j=I v=l 
(6.9) 
(for i,j < n) 
where P/ = Pj I Pn is the relative price and Dk are the regional dwnmies, k = NE 
(Notheast), NO (North), NW (Northwest), SO (South), SW (Southwest) and SE 
(Southeast). 
Like other flexible function forms in the dual approach, this profit function (6.6) and the 
derived output supply functions ((6.8) and (6.9)) provide a second order approximation 
in prices to an arbitrary function. In estimation, however, this is not regarded as an 
approximation to an unknown function. Rather, it is assumed to be a true data generating 
7 The Northeast region comprises Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces. The North region 
covers the provinces of Beijing, Tianjing, Hebei, Shandong, Henan. Shanxi and Shaanxi. The Northwest 
region includes the provinces/regions Xinjiang. Qinghai. Gansu. Ningxia and Inner Mongolia. The 
South region comprises Fujian, Guangdong and Guangxi provinces. The Southwest region is compriseG 
of Yunnan, G1,1izhou and Sichuan provinces, and the Southeast region comprises Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, 
Shanghai. Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Anhui. 
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function. To keep the model consistent with the flexible profit function (6.6), the 
following symmetry restrictions have to be satisfied in estin1ating the system equations: 
(6.10) 
One troublesome property of the profit function is the requirement of convexity, as this is 
often not satisfied in empirical studies. The profit function is globally convex in prices 
only if the matrix of estimated quadratic terms C = [cii] (estimated from equation (6.8)) 
is positive semi-definite. Applying the Wiley, Schmidt and Bramble (1973) technique of 
re-parameterization yields a generalized McFadden profit function which is globally 
convex in prices without loss of the function's characteristic flexibility. The technique 
involves the replacement of C by the product of a lower triangular matrix and its 
transposition 
C = AAr A= [aii ]; i = j = 1,. ... n; aii = cii for i?. j; aii = 0 for i < j. (6.11) 
The elasticities of output supply can be derived from equations (6.8) and (6.9) using the 
following formula (Albacea and Warr 1991): 
Eii = i31n ;lain Pj = (DPii )p;< for all i,j (6.12) 
where DP ii is the second-order price derivative of the variable profit function and X; is 
the estimated unit quantity (X; IN) obtained from the system of equations (6.8) and 
(6.9). In the case of the generalized profit function applied in this study, the second-order 
price derivatives are given by (based on equations (6.8) and (6.9)) 
DPij =cii/Pn for i,j=l,2, .... n-1; 
DP;n = -f cij Pj/2 = DPni for i,j = 1,2,. ... n; 
j=l IP~ 
n-ln-1 P·P~ 
DPnn = LLCij 1 1 3 i,j<n 
i=l j=I Pn 
The elasticities are then derived at the mean of the exogenous variables. 
134 
(6.13) 
(6.14) 
(6.15) 
Data Adjustment 
A cross-section and time-series data set at the provincial level is chosen for this study, as 
price information for agricultural outputs is available from 1986 to 1990 at this level. The 
selected period, 1986-90, also has the advantage that there were fewer structural changes 
to the market mechanism after a dramatic reform in 1985. Of the total of thirty provinces 
in China, Tibet is excluded because of its extraordinary natural and economic structure 
and Hainan is included in Guangdong province because it was not established as an 
independent province until 1988. 
The study considers only the farming sub-sector of agriculture. The other sub-sectors are 
excluded by assuming weak separability, which implies that the farmers' decisions on 
farm production are independent of decisions on other production activities. Within the 
multiple input and multiple output framework, five outputs and three variable inputs are 
considered. As the interactions of grain and fibre with other farming production are of 1 
concern in this study, outputs are classified as rice, wheat, other grain, cotton and other 
crops. Variable inputs include labour (number of labourers), capital (including both 
machinery and draft animals) and material inputs (represented by fertilizer utilization). 
Land (arable land plus pasture) is treated as a fixed factor of production. 
As discussed above, government policy places constraints on farmers' decision-making. 
Farmers have to fulfil these quotas before they can take any profit-seeking action. When 
a quota and unique price are set by the state, there are three possibilities for farmers' 
actual production. At the quota point of production, if the marginal revenue of 
production exceeds the marginal cost, farmers may choose to produce more to the point 
where marginal net revenue is zero. If, at the quota point, marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost, farmers may volur;~rily fix their output at the quota level. These two 
cases are consistent with the market case (the only factor that matters is the marginal 
price) and can be captured by the dual approach. However, if marginal revenue is less 
than marginal cost at the quota point, farmers still have to produce the quota, even if this 
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level of production involves losses. In this third case, the marginal condition of output 
detemUnation is violated. 
Two data adjustments are applied in this study in order to make it possible to use the 
generalized McFadden unit profit function. One adjustment is made to price data and the 
other to quantity data. Application of the generalized McFadden profit function requires 
data on the prices and quantities of rice, wheat, other grain, cotton, other crops, labour, 
capital, land and fertilizers. The two most severe problems encountered in collecting 
Chinese data are the lack of price data for inputs and commodity-specific input data. To 
avoid these problems, the generalized McFadden unit profit function is transformed into 
a generalized McFadden unit revenue function. Thus, the factors are treated as fixed 
quantities, avoiding reliance on the availability of the price data for results. 8 Land area is 
treated as a fixed production factor. The existing data in various statistical sources, 
however, are not directly suitable for estimation purposes. The crucial requirement of 
quantity and price data is that prices should be marginal and that quantities should be the 
result of profit-maximizing (or cost-minimizing) behaviour. 
Price data for cotton are provided by the State Statistics Bureau of China (SSB). These 
data are a mixed average of purchase prices. During the period under study, cotton 
purchases were monopolized by state agents and only about 5 per cent of cotton was not 
purchased by the government. State purchase prices of cotton were therefore the 
marginal prices for farmers' production decisions. 
Prices for other crops and other grain are price indices derived from the prices of a large 
variety of products within these aggregate groups. These indices were calculated from 
price and quantity data collected from the SSB publications.9 Some of the price and 
8 Of course, this method also slightly alters the assumption of production. Farmers in reality 
certainly respond to the changes in input prices. Other than the lack of data, there are two reasons why 
this method is accepted. One is that fixed factor inputs are not an unrealistic assumption in terms of 
short-run decision-making. The other reason is that the estimated shadow prices for these inputs did not 
generate convincing estimates. 
9 Sources.used include various issues of China Statistics Yearbook, China Price Sta1istics Yearbook 
and China Agricultural Yearbook. 
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quantity data had to be adjusted. Adjustments to grain price and cotton output are 
presented below as examples of the method used to adjust the data. 
The marketing of grain in rural China involves a two-tier price system. Farmers have to 
sell a certain amount of grain (quota) to the government at the state determined price. 
After the fulfilment of the state purchase quota, grain is exchanged in the free market. 
Usually the market prices are the marginal prices which guide production decisions. The 
prices (Pa) presented in: the price statistical yearbooks (SSB), however, are only mixed 
averages (of both state (P s) and market (Pm) prices): 
(6.16) 
where q is the share of quota purchase in total outputs. There is no information about P s 
and Pm at provincial levels. Fortunately, the SSB provides ratios (b) of market prices for 
grain over the state price: 
(6.17) 
For i..r.1stance, national b was 1.915 in 1987. Combining equations (6.11) and (6.12) and 
given the infonnation on Pa and q, the marginal price of grain in individual provinces and 
in different years (Pm) can be easily derived. 
As cotton transactions were strictly controlled by the government throughout the period 
under study, forced production, when the marginal cost of production is larger than 
marginal revenue, is likely. Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult to identify this output 
from the existing data. Two approaches were adopted to identify forced production. 
Firct, historical changes in cotton output, particularly those in recent years, were 
analyzed. It is most likely that a province has no comparative advantage in producing 
cotton if the output and purchase quota decrease continuously. Second, output and state 
purchase data are compared. If production is consistently close to the state purchase 
quota, or even lower than the quota in some years, production is likely to be forced. 
When both situations are detected for a province, cotton production in that province is 
regarded as. forced. In this data set, forced production was detected in two provinces, 
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Shanghai and Hubei. If forced production is detected, the output quantity of this product 
is set to zero and the resources used for forced production are deducted from the 
existing data (according to the cost survey information provided in the agricultural 
yearbook (SSB)). The point which should be kept in mind is that the forced production 
refers to the province as a whole. It does not necessarily imply that the production of all 
households in the provinces is forced. 
Model Estimates and Comparison with Others 
The model system (6.8)-(6.9) is first estimated by ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
without any restrictions and constraints. The symmetry restriction is then applied by the 
regression method (SUR), by using the SHAZAM on the UNIX mainframe. All the 
prices in the system are deflated by cotton prices. As noted above, the curvature of the 
profit or cost function is usually a problem in empirical studies. Very few studies have 
found the curvature conditions to be satisfied. In this instance, we adopt the Wiley, 
Schmidt and Bramble (1973) technique of reparameterization for the restriction of 
convexity (Table 6.1). 
Using equations (6.9) and (6.10), the supply elasticities were derived at the means of the 
exogenous variables (Table 6.2). Production interactions of China's farming sector are 
revealed by these elasticities. Rice production has limited responses to price change, 
probably beC1use technology and land used for producing rice are relatively product 
specific. The irrigated rice land cannot be easily shifted to wheat or other crop 
production in the short term. Very small effects can be expected to increase rice output 
by raising its price (own-price elasticity being 0.2 -Table 6.2). 
Prod1..~.:tion interactions between wheat, other grain and other crops tend to be 
significant Own-price elasticities of wheat and other grain are higher than unity ( 1.1 and 
1.5 respectively - Table 6.2), while that of other crops is 0.9. Rises in prices for rice or 
other grain may also reduce wheat output dramatically (cross-price elasticities being -1.1 
and -1.2, respectively, Table 6.2). Output of other grains adjusts sharply in the opposite 
138 
direction as changes in prices of wheat (elasticity be'.11g -1.2) and other crops (elasticity 
being -0.9), and in the same direction as changes in prices of rice (elasticity being 1.2). 
Table 6.1 The estimated generalized McFadden unit revenue function with 
;:::;, symmetry and convexity restrictions 
Regression eguations 
Regressors Rice Wheat Other grain Other crops 
Rice price 1.6672 -1.0624 1.3191 -1.5227 
(1.45) (6.62) (11.60) (9.55) 
Wheat price -1.0624 0.6835 -0.8476 0.9896 
(1.37) (0.52) (1.01) (2.03) 
Other grain price 1.3191 -0.8476 1.1788 -1.2439 
(1.80) (0.75) (3.19) (0.43) 
Other crops price -1.5227 0.9896 -1.2439 1.6525 
(3.10) (3.17) (0.91) (3.28) 
Fertiliser 0.8245 0.2140 0.2182 0.0827 
(2.10) (2.63) (3.62) (0.66) 
Labour 1.7852 -0.1240 0.0857 0.1961 
(7.15) (2.47) (2.38) (2.52) 
Capital 1.5445 -0.0387 -0.0301 1.84 
(2.37) (0.30) (0.31) (9.10) 
Northeast -0.6776 0.4718 0.3552 0.2015 
(J (0.84) (2.73) (3.04) (0.98) 
;;" 
North -3.6316 1.3788 0.0128 -0.1640 
(4.18) (7.83) (0.10) (0.7'3) 
Northwest -1.9538 1.0204 -0.1712 0.22 
(2.72) (6.99) (l.62) (1.25) 
South 1.8546 0.4956 -0.4862 0.5895 
(1.53) ( 1.95) (2.66) (1.80) 
Southwest -2.5479 0.8537 0.0671 0.1818 
(2.48) (4.13) (0.43) (0.64) 
Southeast 3.1020 0.7553 -0.3872 -0.1459 
(2.98) (3.54) (2.42) (0.51) 
Ad'usted R2 0.92 0.61 0.53 0.69 
Note: The numbers beneath the coefficient estimates are the related t-ratios (the signs are onUtted for 
simplicity). 
" 
Table 6.2 Supply elasticities in the Chinese farming sector 
With respect to the price of 
Rice Wheat Other grain Other grop Cotton 
Rice 0.1963 -0.1885 0.2138 -0.1366 -0.0850 
Wheat -1.0861 1.0528 -1.1928 0.7709 0.4551 
Other Grain 1.2302 -1.1910 1.5134 -0.8840 -0.6685 
Other Crop -1.0825 1.0600 -1.2173 0.8952 0.3445 
Cotton -0.0417 0.0387 -0.0570 0.0213 0.0386 
Note: The elasticities are estimated, according to the fonnula provided in the text, at the means of the 
exogenous variables and predicted dependent variables. 
Positive cross-price elasticities were found between several pairs of products, for 
instance, between rice and other grains, between wheat and other crops, and between 
cotton and wheat. 
Compared with elasticities used lit other studies for the case of China, the estimates in 
Table 6.2 are relatively high. In this study, most products are price elastic with respect to 
their own and others' prices, with the exception of the elasticities of cotton supply and 
elasticities associated with cotton prices. This, however, partly reflects heavy 
intervention by government and the non-existence of a free market for cotton. 
Price elasticities of grain used in most other studies are significantly lower than the 
estimates derived in this study. Carter and Zhong (1988) estimated an elasticity of 0.15 in 
the winter wheat region and 0.27 in the spring wheat region. The elasticities of grain 
products used in modelling work by Tyers and Anderson (1992), Roningen and Dixit 
(1989) (the SWOPSIM model), and Gunasekera et al. (1991) are summarized in Tables 
6.3 and 6.4. 
In Tyers and Anderson (1992), all the elasticities are small. Most of the elasticities are 
smaller than 0.1 in absolute terms (many a.re in fact zero in both the short and the long-
run) (Table 6.3). For the own-price elasticities of grain production, the elasticity for rice 
is less than half of that from the current estimates. Elasticities for wheat and coarse grain 
are 0.06 and 0.08, respectively, while those from this study are 1.05 and 1.51. Cross-
price elasticities of grain production used by Tyers and Anderson are all set to 0.0 I, 
representing very minor cross-product effects of price change. Elasticities used by 
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c SWOPSIM (Roningen and Dix.it 1989) are all smaller than 0.5 in absolute terms (Table 
6.4). Again, the cross-price elasticities are small for crops, particularly in comparison 
with elasticities derived from this study. The only exception was the own-price elasticity 
of cotton supply, 0.1, or nearly three times as high as the estimate of this study. The 
cross-price elasticity of cotton supply in SWOPSIM is set to zero. Gunasekera et al. 
(1991) adopted a set of relatively higher elasticities. These ow11 and cross-price 
elasticities of rice supply are quh:e close to the estimates in this study. Those of cotton 
supply, however, are much higher. The supply elasticities of other produ.::ts are still 
significantly lower than those in Table 6.2. Generally speaking, elasticities adopted by 
those three studies represent a mechanism of low price effects in economic modelling. 
Table 6.3 Price elasticities applied by Tyers and Anderson 
== 
Short-run supply elasticity with respect of price of 
Rice Whea1: Coarse Suf,lar Dairy Ruminant Non-ruminant 
grain meat meat 
Rice 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 * -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Wheat -0.01 0.06 -0.01 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Coarse grain -0.01 -0.01 0.08* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sugar -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Dairy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 -0.02* 0.00 
Rwninant meat 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03* 0.20 -0.05* 
Non-ruminant meat 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 
Long-run supply elasticity witch respect of price of 
Rice Whe.at Coarse Sugar Dairy Ruminant Non-ruminant 
grain meat meat 
Rice 0.12 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Wheat -0.02 0.10 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Coarse grain -0.02 -0.02 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sugar -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Dairy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 -0.08 0.00 
Rwninant meat 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 -0.20 
Non-ruminant meat 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 
Notes: The elasticities from Tyers and Anderson (1992) include short-run and long-run elasticities of 
agricultural supply. The elasticities in the short-run are with a one-year lag except for those with an 
asterisk which have a two-years' lag. 
Source: R. Tyers, and K. Anderson (1992),Disarray i11 World Food Market: A Quamitative Assessment, 
Cambridge University Press, Sydney. 
There are several possible reasons for the difference between elasticities adopted or 
estimated elsewhere and the estimates in this study, aside from the different data sets 
used or different functional forms applied (Alston et al. 1990; Huang and Lu 1992). 
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Table6.4 Price elasticities applied by SWOPSIM and Gunasekera et al. 
SWOPSIM data set Gunasekera et al. data set 
Own-price Cross price Aggregate Own-price Cross price Aggregate 
Beef 0.21 0.03 0.24 0.35 -0.12 0.23 
Pork 0.50 -0.06 0.44 0.65 -0.21 0.44 
Mutton and Lamb 0.25 -0.09 0.16 0.45 -0.12 0.33 
Poultry meat 0.49 -0.34 0.15 0.65 -0.20 0.45 
Mille 0.30 0.06 0.36 0.55 -0.07 0.48 
Wheat 0.15 -0.05 0.10 0.50 -0.17 0.33 
Com 0.18 -0.05 0.13 0.60 -0.45 0.15 
Other coarse grains 0.15 -0.01 0.14 0.50 -0.39 0.11 
Rice 0.15 -0.02 0.13 0.20 -0.07 0.13 
Soybeans 0.10 -0.01 0.09 0.25 -0.20 0.05 
Soybean meal 0.30 -0.25 0.05 0.30 -0.25 0.05 
Soybean oil 0.08 -0.03 0.05 0.45 -0.40 0.05 
Other oilseeds 0.10 -0.03 0.07 0.50 -0.11 0.39 
Other meals 0.30 -0.25 0.05 0.25 -0.25 0.05 
Other oils 0.49 -0.44 0.05 0.84 -0.79 0.05 
Cotton 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.70 -0.57 0.13 
Sugar 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.70 -0.66 0.04 
Tobacco 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.75 -0.31 0.44 
Notes: The SWOPSIM stands for the Static World Policy Simulation modelling framework developed in 
the Economic Research Service of the US Department of Agriculture (Roningen 1986, Roningen and 
Dixit 1989). The model uses own-price and cross-price elasticities. G masekera et al. (1991) applied 
SWOPSIM, and the elasticities are revised by the researchers based on the SWOPSIM's original 
numbers. 
Source: Gunasekera et al. (1991), 'Agricultural policy reform in China', Discussion Paper 91.4. Project 
6131.104, Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Canberra; V.O. Roningen and 
P.M. Dixit (1989), 'How level is the playing field? an economic analysis of agricultural policy reforms in 
industrial market economies', Foreign Agriculcural Economic Report No. 239, US Department of 
Agriculture, Washington DC. 
This study focuses on data adjustment. Generally speaking, the state purchase prices and 
procurement quotas fluctuate less sharply than the market-oriented prices and quantities, 
both in terms of frequency and magnitude. 10 Movements in the data series would be 
much smaller without adjustment. Flur.tuations in both price and output series tend to be 
smoothed. Elasticity estimates from the other studies described tend to undervalue the 
actual responses of production to market signals. 11 
10 Assuming that total supply consists of state quota and market supply and that the state quotas 
change less signific:Mtly, it is not surprising that movements in total supply must be smaller than those 
of market supply. 
! ! For grain, there are two prices-the state purchase price f:'ld the market price. If we look only at 
the average pi:ice, the variation would be much smaller than the .::hanges in market price. assuming the 
state price remains unchanged m moves in smaller magnitude. 
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Policy Implications 
The elasticities derived in this study have interesting policy implications, particularly in 
relation to China's grain self-sufficiency policy.12 China has declared that grain self-
sufficiency is one of its national policy objectives, at least for the period 1990-95. 
Policies target wheat and rice in particular. Currently, China exports rice in exchange for 
wheat in the international market. Garnaut and Ma (1992) present predictions which 
indicate that the annual growth of aggregate demand for grain in China will range 
between 1.9 and 2.7 per cent in the years before the end of this century. Continued 
pursuit of grain self-sufficiency will place much greater pressure on domestic grain 
production. Per capita agricultural resources Cl.re very limited in China. This will become 
an increasingly serious constraint for grain production, not only because of continuous 
demand increases but also because other production activities compete with grain 
production for land as income rises. 
If significant improvements in grain production technology do not occur, there are two 
ways to secure grain self-sufficiency in China. One is to restore the planning system and 
force all farmers to produce a sufficient amount of grain to meet national requirements. 
This, however, is unlikely to happen after ten years of economic reform. 13 The other way 
is to distort the domestic grain price, following the methods adopted by other East Asia 
economies like Japan, Korea and Taiwan. But, as evidenced here, the cost of price 
distortion can be extremely high. 
This study provides partial information on this issue. Given that the domestic rice price in 
China is already very close to the international market price, with an estimated nominal 
protection rate of -5 per cent in 1990 (Peng 1992), without significant subsidy it may be 
very difficult for China to continue to export rice in exchange for wheat. The wheat price 
12 This study, focusing on elasticity estimation. can only provide a partial picture of the agricultural 
policy story. Overall assessment involves a general equilibrium framework, which is the subject of 
another related study. 
13 Even if.the govenunent chooses to do so. the planning system is unlikely to work as effectively as 
in the past. 
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in China is already much higher than the world price, with a nominal rate of protection of 
30 per cent (Peng 1992). Opportunities for increasing output through adjustment of 
prices is very limited, unless the government is willing to adopt a policy of substantial 
grain production subsidization. As pressures on the state budgets have already been a 
serious problem for the Chinese government, self-sufficiency policies that subsidize grain 
producers will be more difficult to implement. 
The cost of this, however, goes beyond its being a burden on the state budget. Rising 
grain prices would also tend to distort the domestic economic structure. If a subsidy on 
rice production were adopted in order to maintain grain self-sufficiency, rice production 
might be encouraged (own elasticity 0.20 - Table 6.2), and wheat and other crop 
production would be discouraged but by much larger margins (cross-price elasticities 
being -1.1 for wheat and other crops, Table 6.2). Not only is grain self-sufficiency an 
unachievable goal, but the economy may be forced to import other agricultural crops that 
it exported previously. If prices of grain products are to be subsidized, output of cotton 
and other crops will drop sharply. The Chinese economy could also become more 
dependent on international markets compared with the situation where grain production 
is not distorted because it has to import more cotton and other agricultural products. The 
distortion to domestic comparative advantage will result in a relocation of the national 
welfare. 
Elasticity estimates throw light on how significantly the Chinese economic structure has 
been distorted by price policies. Let us take distortions to the price of cotton as an 
example. According to a sample survey on the textile industry in China (Lu 1992), the 
average state price of cotton for users was 7,381 yuan per tonne and average market 
price was 8,984 yuan per tonne. Currently, the marginal price for cotton growers is the 
state price because growers are unable to access the free market. The output level of 
cotton is decided by farmers according to this price. 
Where there is no price distortion in the case of cotton, the marginal price would be 
8,984 yuan instead of 7,381 yuan (an increase of 21.7 per cent). All other prices are 
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further assumed unchanged. In a static framework, the possible changes in output levels 
of different commodities, resulting from a 21.7 per cent increase in the price of cotton, 
can be computed by using the estimated elasticities. Cotton supply is very inelastic with 
respect to its own price (0.04), and total output would only increase by 0.8 per cent. 
Cotton output could be raised from the current level of 4.508 million tonnes in 1990 to 
4.546 million tonnes. Output of other products would drop. Paddy rice production 
would fall by 3.5 million tonnes, while production of other grain would fall by 23 million 
tonnes in the case of 1990. 
This example, however, has not considered the case where cotton production is forced 
by government. Abolition of price control over cotton may also lead farmers to cease 
production. This would offset rising cotton production and decreasing production of rice 
and other grains. A number of other important factors are also omitted from the above 
computation. A more sophisticated examination of the effects of price distortion and 
other policy interventions on agriculture and other sectors of the economy requires a 
general framework that accommodates the special features of the Chinese economy. 
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An Economy-Wide Model of China 
The effects of agricultural price distortions and the limited feasible choice set of fanners 
are not confined to agriculture. Their impact on agriculture is large, but they also affect 
decision-making in other sectors, with spillovers to other parts of the economy and world 
markets. 
The analysis of the effects of government interventions on agriculture and the economy 
as a whole has so far been within a qualitative or partial equilibrium framework. Here this 
analysis is extended through a comprehensive quantitative framework.. 
A computable general equilibrium model for China (the China model), with special focus 
on the agricultural sector, is constructed. This model is then used as a vehicle for 
analysing agricultural policies. The model follows the spirit of models by Johansen 
(1960), Dixon et al. (1982) (the ORANI model of the Australian economy), Clarete and 
Warr (1992) (the APEX model of the Philippine economy) and Martin (1990) (the 
Martin model of the Chinese economy). Its extension incorporates the two important 
characteristics of Chinese agriculture. 
Developments in Computable General Equilibrium Modelling 
There are a number of quantitative frameworks available for empirical economic analysis. 
Partial equilibrium models such as those utilizing flexible profit functions and consumer 
demand systems, are widely used in economic studies because they are easy to establish, 
to understand and to apply. But deep insights cannot be made through partial equilibrium 
models. The scope offered is narrow with usually only the production and/or 
consumption side of one or two commodities being studied. Partial equilibrium models 
ignore interactions between the sector or commodities being studied and other parts of 
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the economy. They do not capture any feedback effects of policy changes and are unable 
to provide economy-wide implications. 
Macroeconomic models overcome this weakness of partial equilibrium models by 
bringing together all sectors and activities into a consistent economy-wide framework. A 
single change to any sector or activity is quickly transmitted to the other parts of the 
economy through quantitative relationships between variables specified in the models. 
The economy adjusts to achieve a new equilibrium (or disequilibrium). Yet 
macroeconomic models are inappropriate for the purpose of agricultural policy analysis 
in this study. Macroeconomic models incorporate economic activities at an aggregate 
level. Without detailed specification for production and consumption of agricultural and 
non-agricultural products, they can neither accommodate any changes in agricultural 
policy nor capture the effects of structural change. Furthermore, some ad hoc 
specifications of macroeconomic models lack microeconomic foundation. Unusual 
specifications such as the inclusion of lagged variables in behavioural equations are often 
difficult to understand and interpret. 
A Computable General Equilibrium (COE) model was used as the most suitable vehicle 1 
for examilling agricultural policy issues whilst taking an economy-wide perspective. 
Although debate continues on the appropriateness of model specifications, parameter 
choice, disaggregation and the representation of policy measures, COE models have 
become a popularly applied quantitative framework in econorrric analysis (Shoven and 
Whalley 1992). 
Computable general equilibrium models originated in the debate over the feasibility of the 
centralized computation of Pareto optimal allocation of resources within an economy. 
The operation of a market economy is specified in considerable detail. The structure of 
production, consumption, government revenue and expenditure, and foreign trade are 
modelled. COE models emphasize the interdept.~dence of decision-making throughout 
the economy. Whenever the government intervenes in agriculture or an exogenous shock 
occurs, resources are re-allocated across all markets of the economy, with efficiency and 
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distributional consequences. A CGE model describes where resources come from, what 
implications policies have for the rest of the economy and to what extent feedbacks from 
other sectors impact on agriculture. 
To date CGE models fall into two groups according to the way in which they are 
solved: those that are solved at levels and those that are solved in logarithmic 
differentials or percentage changes. The first type is used widely by the World Bank 
(Dervis, de Melo and Robinson 1982), while the second type, pioneered by Johansen 
(1960), is applied extensively by Australian modellers (Dixon et al. 1982). 
The CGE model in its original form incorporates all of the neoclassic assumptions. The 
behavioural assumptions of the model involve cost minimization by producers and utility 
maximization by households, and the assumption that there is sufficient competition for 
i· 
unit profits (at market plices) to be driven to zero. There are many successful examples I 
I· of the application of CGE models to the industrial economies (the ORANI model of the 
Australian economy, Dixon et al. 1982). Economists working on developing economies 
have sought to extend CGE modelling in a variety of directions in order to capture , 
'structural' features of these economies (Robinson 1989). One modification stays within 
the theoretical structure of the neoclassic model, but specifies limited substitution 
elasticities in a variety of important relationships. The second modification assumes that 
various markets do not work properly or are not present at all. Instead, restrictions on 
factor mobility, ligid price<s, rationing and neoclassical disequilibrium in one or more 
important markets are assumed. Such theoretical development helps greatly in capturing 
the features of the Chinese economy. 
CGE models are usually designed to address three types of economic policy problem. 
First, they can be applied to the effects of policies and changes at a sectoral level 
(changes to the variables associated with industries or commodities). Such changes 
include taxes and subsidies on industry (including agriculture) production, exports and 
imports, and sector specific technical change. Second, CGE models are useful to explore 
the consequences of changes which occur at the macroeconomic level, such as changes 
1.d.Sl 
in the aggregate level of government spending or in the exchange rate. And third, CGE 
models are capable of exploring the impact of external shocks, such as changes in the 
world market, to which the Chinese economy has to respond. 
Assumptions and Distinctions of the China Model 
Earlier Modelling of the Chinese Economy 
Martin's pioneering work on CGE modelling of China examined the impact of exchange 
rate policy (Martin 1990). His ORANI type model included 27 sectors, 1390 equations 
and 1390 endogenous variables. In the Martin model, apart from the normal behavioural 
assumptions of the CGE model, domestic and imported products are treated as imperfect 
substitutes following Armington (1969). The model is short-run in character, with capital 
assumed to be fixed in each sector but labour assumed to be perfectly mobile. Another 
important assumption of the Martin model is that official prices are irrelevant to the 
behaviour of the model. 
Since both the Martin Model (Martin 1990) and this China m0del belong to the broad 
ORANI type, they share many characteristics in model specification and structure, such 
as the assamption of rational behaviour by both producers and conswners. As 
comparative-st :itic models, both rely on simplifying assumptions, such as fixed quantities 
of capital stock and agricultural land for each industry. 
Martin mainly used the China Input-Output Table 1981 (World Bank 1985). This model 
uses the China Input-Output Table 1987 (China, State PlaMing Commission and State 
Statistics Bureau 1991) as its primary database. 
The degree of data disaggregation applied depends on the objective of the economic 
analysis and the availability of information. The basic Martin model was constructed to 
analyse the foreign exchange rate regime and fibre demands by the textile industry 
modelling the two-tier exchange rate system and substitution between different types of 
fibres. In the China model constructed for this study, the three distinct features discussed 
above also distinguish it from tl-ie Martin model. 
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The Martin model contains twenty-seven sectors, each of which produces a single 
product. In this China model there are twenty-two industries, two of which are multi-
product industries (farming and livestock). Following the specification of ORANI, 
transformation bet\veen different types of commodities within one industry (such as rice, 
wheat, other grain, cotton and other crops in the farming sector) is introduced for two 
agricultural industries. In particular, the China model separates rural and urban 
industries. 
In the Martin model, the substitution between domesti,::;ally produced and imported 
commodities is modelled at the aggregate level by applying the Armington specification 
(Armington 1969). In this China model, Armington substitution is modelled at the 
disaggregated demand level, such as household, investment and government demands. 
The difference lies in possibilities for variation of Armington elasticities among different 
types of final demands. 
Martin (1992) uses this model to examine the impact of foreign exchange policy on 
textile industry in China. The model is also used to illustrate the effects of changes in 
energy variables and other changes on the Chinese economy (Peng and Martin 1991; 
Peng 1992). 
The Martin model was later developed by Findlay et al. (1992) to examine the impact of 
various exogenous changes. The main development of the model was further 
disaggregation of agriculture and the inciusion of multi-product agricultural sectors. The 
so-called 'Dutch Disease' sirnulation models the intersectoral effects of an expansion in 
rural industries of the economy. In analysis an expansion in the light industrial sector is 
designed to capture some of the effects of the rural industrial boom in China. 
Another advance was implemented by Gao (1993) in examining the impact of exchange 
rate policy incorporating the extemality of export growth. 
Characteristics 
Broadly speaking, the China model developed in this study may be classified as an 
economy-wide, comparative-static computable general equilibrium model of the 
Johansen type. 
The objectives of this study necessitate that the model must be capable of capturing the 
intersectoral features of the Chinese economy. Although a large part of the economy is 
substantially simplified in specification, the model is comprehensive in that all sectors of 
economic activity are included. Projections from the model add up in the sense that 
outcomes appropriately weighted for each sector are equivalent to outcomes for the 
relevant macroeconomic variables. Hence, following a change in the incentive structure, 
the sum of changes of outputs for each sector equals change in the economy's aggregate 
output. 
The model provides projections at only one point in time, the solution year. This solution 
contains no information abom the time path of adjustment as in dynamic models. The ! 
comparative-static models of the Johansen type work in percentage changes in variables. 
Model results demonstrate how much levels of economic activity in China would 
increase (decrease) as a result of a shock, such as a reduction in incentive distortions to 
agriculture. Comparative-static models are not specific about timing, although the China 
model developed in this study is short-run in nature. The time frame reflects the response 
elasticity estimates incorporated in the model. 
Each simulation of the model results in a computable general equilibrium, which refers to 
the inclusion of a treatment of both production relationships and demand conditions, the 
interrelationships between them and the simultaneous determination of prices through the 
interaction of demand with supply in all markets. This does not necessarily imply that all 
markets must be perfectly competitive. In the China model, a set of rigidities are 
introduced. All parts of the model, however, are interdependent and reach equilibrium or 
disequilibriwn simultaneously. 
1.::1 
The general equilibrium conditions can be written as 
F(X) = 0 (7.1) 
where X is the vector of vanables included in the model and F(.) is the set of excess 
demand and unit profit functions of the model (Clarete and Warr 1992). Through an 
appropriate closure, X may be partitioned into a vector of endogenous variables (Y) and 
a vector of exogenous variables (Z). Total differentiation of Equation (7 .1) with respect 
to X yields 
AY+BZ=O (7.2) 
which can be solved for Y 
(7.3) 
The percentage change type model (the Johansen type) has the distinct disadvantage that 
results are only linear approximations to the non-linear system and hence are strictly valid 
only for small changes. The model, however, possesses a number of advantages. The 
solution algorithm is separated from the model and hence unaffected by model design 
changes whi(;h are therefore easier to implement The mechanisms underlying the results 
are easier to understand and explain to policy-makers. When there are several policy 
changes under study the separate effects of each can be decomposed additively (NCDS 
1990). 
Basic Assumptions 
In the designing the China model, crucial assumptions usually made in CGE modelling 
are followed. 
In its treatment of production and demand, the China model incorporates the 
conventional features of neoclassical microeconomics. It assumes optimizing behaviour 
on the part of producers (profit maximization and/or cost minimization) and consumers 
(cost minimization and/or utility maximization) subject to the various constraints in the 
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economy such as the supply of factors (labour, capital and land), the balance of payments 
and technology, etc. The resultant equations emphasize the responsiveness of economic 
agents to changes in relative prices, with the degree of responsiveness imposed 
dependent on the value assigned to substitution elasticities. All markets are assumed to 
be competitive, thus no activity earns pure profits. This, obviously, further requires the 
assumption of constant returns to scale in production activities. Market clearing is 
assumed in all commodity and factor markets. 
The applicability of perfect market assumptions raises questions with respect to 
modelling the Chinese economy. China has a history of nearly thirty years of central 
planning. Commodity and factor markets did not operate competitively during that 
period. After ten years of market-oriented economic reform, the imperfections of the 
market mechanism still suggest significant differences between the Chinese economy and 
market economies. Price distortions and limited factor mobility are identified in this study 
as two important characteristics of Chinese agriculture. Extra caution in applying a CGE 
approach, and careful assessment of each neoclassical assumption is necessary when 
building d1e China model. 
The operation of state enterprises raises doubts when specifying the optimization 
behaviour of industry producers and consumers. Farmers, after the establishment of the 
household responsibility system, became largely independent producers. Farmers 
adjusted their resource allocation in the pursuit of maximum income or profits in the 
second half of the 1980s (see Chapter 4). Lin (1992b) found that, even in nascent factor 
markets, farmers behave in a rational manner. Another important part of the Chinese 
economy is the non-state industrial and commercial sectors, which include the TVP 
enterprises in the countryside and the collective sectors in the urban areas. 
The peculiarity of state enterprises' non-profit maximization behaviour is largely ignored 
for three reasons. First, the state sector no longer dominates Chinese industry, although 
the industry share of the state sectors varies. Non-state sectors, the rural TVP and urban 
collective enterprises, operate at the margin and respond to market changes. Second, 
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after ten years of reform, there is evidence that profit is an increasingly important 
objective of the state enterprises. And third, the China model primarily relates to the 
agricultural sector and its interaction with the rest of the economy. This \';eakness of the 
model leaves room for further improvement 
The second set of questions relates to how price distortions affect economic structure. 
Commodities subject to two-tier pricing systems (the coexistence of the state control and 
a free market), such as grain, are not given particular attention since this kind of 
distortion does not directly affect production and consumption decisions (Sicular 1988a, 
Martin 1990). In addition, the gap between the state purchase price and the market price 
of grain was, in principle, eliminated in April 1992. Price distortions for wool and cotton, 
however, are incorporated carefully in the China model. 
Distinct Features 
The model is built to examine the impact of policy changes on agriculture in China. It is 
therefore important to capture the characteristics of the whole Chinese economy as well 
as agriculture when establishing the quantitative framework. Compared to similar 
economy-wide models, in three aspects of structure and specifications distinguish the 
China model. 
• The China model incorporates labour market segmentation between rural and urban 
areas. It was found earlier in this study that government policies, including administrative 
and macroeconomic policies, have significant influence on farmers' feasible choice sets. 
These, in turn, affect the extent of interaction between agriculture and non-agriculture. 
Factors (labour, capital and land) are not perfectly mobile in the Chinese economy. 
Labour movements between rural and urban areas are strictly regulated. Farmers, born in 
rural areas, can only be employed in rural sectors including agriculture and rural non-
agriculture. Urban residents, on the other hand, can only be employed by urban 
industries. Due to the constraints of their limited feasible choice sets, farmers' responses 
to changes in the incentive structure are limited. This study has shown that the limited 
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feasible choice set significantly affected performance of agriculture and the economy as a 
whole in the 1980s in China. This is an important issue to consider in building the China 
model. Since capital stock and land usage are fixed for each sector in the short-run by 
assumption, limited labour mobility between rural and urban areas was modelled. 
The China mod('l contains two separated labour markets, one rural and one urban. The 
economy's total labour stock is [, of which L, and Lu are rural and urban labour, 
respectively. With perfect labour mobility within each market, labour can move freely 
between agricultural and rural non-agricultural sectors in the rural labour market, or 
between urban sectors in the urban labour market (Figure 7 .1 ). 
Figure 7.1 Labour market segmentation between rural and urban areas 
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In the first instance, no labour flow betwten rural and urban areas is assumed. Labour 
movements between urban and rural areas are now occurring. Some farmers have moved 
to cities, either temporarily or permanently, to find jobs as household-help and 
contracted workers in manufacturing. 
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It is difficult to characterize a labour allocation mechanism which is neither perfectly 
mobile nor absolutely limited. Potentially, there are two ways that can be applied to 
reflect the limited labour mobility. In the first, a fixed volume of labour movement from 
rural to urban areas is introduced by changing labour quantities in rural and urban areas. 
For rnstance, if q farmers move to cities, the assumption of labour market segmentation 
is not changed. However, the movement is reflected in the changes in labour force. Now 
rural labour becomes (Lr -q) al'1d urban labour becomes (Lu + q ). The other difference is 
that now q farmers earn an urban wage rate instead of a rural wage rate. 
In the second, limited labour mobility is introducp :I by specifying partial adjustment. 
Labour movements between rural and urban areas are allowed but the quantity of labour 
reallocated is always smaller than would be expected of the changes in incentive 
structure because of certain restrictions. 
Simulations undertaken in this study do not involve a limited mobility mechanism. 
Rather, a perfect mobility mechanism is implemented as an indication of economic 
equilibrium in ccomparison with that under segmented labour market between rural and 
urban areas. 
• The model incorporates endogenous price distortion for some agricultural products. 
Incentive distortions to agriculture were made endogenous in this study (Chapter 5). In 
most COE models such interventions are modelled exogenously. Those exogenous 
specifications, however, are particularly weak in that the feedback from economic 
adjustment to policy change is missing. It is found that the level of incentive distortions 
to agriculture in China is an equilibrium result of the bargaining process between farmers 
and government. The equilibrium of this bargaining game depends on the relative 
bargaining power of both parties. Bargaining power is further determined by the 
exogenous environments, such as agriculture's share of the national economy, farmers' 
feasible choice set, and changes in the world market 
The policy game story is intuitively that the levels of incentive distortions are dependent 
on endogenous economic variables as well as exogenous factors. This policy endogeneity 
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is incorporated in the China model using the behavioural equation of incentive distortions 
discussed in Chapter 5. State prices for rice, wheat, other grain, cotton and wool are 
modelled. The behaviour equation is specified, in general form, as 
(7.4) 
where P/ denotes state purchase prices of grain (rice, wheat and other grain), wool or 
cotton, sA the share of agriculture in the national economy, s, is the share of agricultural 
population in total population, M is average real income per capita and p * the market 
price (in the case of grain) or world price (in the case of cotton and wool). Following the 
Johansen tradition, the variables can be transformed into percentage changes, (7.4) can 
therefore be expressed in the form of a CGE model equation, 
(7.4') 
where superscript (O) denotes variables or parameters related to production or supply 
beh . (0) (0) (0) d (0) 1 . . . f h . (0) ( h av10ur. YuAJ' "furl' YciMJ an YcipJ are e astic1tles o c anges m P; percentage c ange 
in state price of i) with respect to changes in s A, s,, M and p • (percentage change in 
world/market prices), respectively. In this model, state prices for cotton and wool affect 
directly production decision, while state prices for grains work only as indicators which 
do not have real effects on the economy following Sicular (1988a) and Martin (1990). 1 
By setting incentive distortions as completely exogenous, no information is revealed 
about the i..rilluence they have. Introducing endogenous policy detennination helps to 
clarify variations in price distortions. External shocks not only directly affect the 
structure of incentives (path (1) in Figure 7.2), but also influence farmers' and 
government bargaining powers which, in turn, impact on the incentive structure (path 
(2)). Finally, ai.1y changes in the economic structure determined endogenously, such as 
the share of agriculture in the whole economy, may also affect the bargaining process 
(path (3)). 
I Second round effect of the state grain prices through income effect are not modelled here as they 
are minor in magnitude (Martin 1990). 
157 
r --·- · ·lb 
i' 
I! 
I t __ I 
Figure 7.2 Endogenous state prices of agricultural products 
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• Price distortions for cotton and wool are explicitly specified in the model. Price ~ 
distortions for cotton and wool are one of the important characteristics identified in this 
study. Under the ceatral planning system, the state had absolute control over production, 
consumption and commodity transactions. If the state set the price for one commodity, 
such as wool, at PS• it would be the only price prevailing in the whole economy. 
Assuming that the state price (P s) was lower than the equilibrium price (usually the case 
for agricultural products in China), the amount of wool demanded would be Qd while the 
amount supplied would be Qs (Figure 7.3). The gap between Qs and Qd represents the 
excess demand for wool in the pre-reform Chinese economy. 
Marketization of cotton and wool began in 1985. Both (state anrl non-state) commercial 
departments and textile industries were involved in purchasing activities. A large number 
of textile enterprises were established by local governments in the pursuit of more 
employment opportunities and local budget revenue. State monopoly in the cotton and 
wool markets, however, was restored in 1986 and 1988, respectively (Lin 1991; Watson 
and Findlay 1992). A single state price is announce.cl each year. The mechanism through 
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which the fibre markets operate, nonetheless, has changed. Cotton and wool are 
produced by thousands of farm households in China. It is rather difficult for fanners to 
find an illegal buyer. The industry would only choose direct purchase if a certain 
minimum amount of raw materials was supplied. Sizeable purchases from individual farm 
households are, however, easily dete:cted by the government. Hence, in most cases, state 
prices serve as producer prices for farm households. 
Figure 7 .3 Cotton and wool markets in China 
p 
Ps 
Demand 
0 Qs Qd Q 
Non-official transactions at the commercial and industry levels have become easier, due 
to significant reductions in transaction costs, and the formation of an effective secondary 
market. According to government policy, all cotton and wool purchased by the state 
commercial departments (including rural purchase and marketing corporations for 
agricultural production materials) should be allocated to state textile enterprises. As there 
is excess demand, enterprises are willing to pay a higher prices than the state price. Due 
to the existence of a secondary market price, the commercial departments, driven by 
economic interests, may sell some cotton and wool at this price. The enterprises which 
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obtain a quota for raw materials also have a choice between using these low-price 
materials for own production or selling in the market to make profits (Figure 7.4). 
Figure 7.4 Two Levels of Cotton and Wool Transactions 
Textile enterprises Textile enterprises 
Commercial dept. 
Farm household Farm household Farm household 
This system of two levels of transactions separates producer prices from user prices for 
cotton and wool. Given a state price at P s• the supply level is detennined (Qs). 
Equilibrium occurs in the secondary market. The user price (Pd), however, is driven up. 
The gap between the two prices is the rent that both commercial and state enterprises. 
seek. 
Sector Detail 
One important decision in CGE modelling is the degree to which production is 
disaggregated. This is a crucial detenninant of the model's potential usefulness in policy 
analysis. Disaggregation and detailed sector structure are distinct features of CGE 
models, particularly compared with macroeconomic models. This China model uses 
detailed agricultural sector data since the primary interest lies in the impact of incentive 
distortions on the sector as a whole and on individual farm commcdities. Grain (rice and 
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wheat), cotton and wool are distinguished from other products. However, disaggrega.tion 
does not come without cost. A detailed model structure provides insights to structural 
change, but it demands higher quality inputs as well. CGE models are built on parameters 
and coefficients characterising behaviour of economic agents. Data availability (both 
input-output parameters and behavioural elasticities), therefore, is one of the important 
factors in determining the model's structure. Considering the limited resources available, 
treatment of the non-agricultural sectors is at an aggregated level. In adding up individual 
industrial sectors, attention is given to distinguishing export-oriented and import-
competing industries (Clarete and Warr 1992) and to separate activities that use ctifferent 
production techniques (input combinations) (NCDS 1990). 
The China model contains twenty two sectors, of which four are agricultw al and 
eighteen are non-agricultural sectors (Table 7 .1 ). 
Table 7.1 Industries of the China model 
no. Industry Description no. Product Description 
1 Farming 1 Rice 
2 Wheat 
3 Other grains 
4 Cotton 
5 Other crops 
2 Livestock 6 Wool 
7 Other livestock 
3 Forestry 8 Forestry product 
4 Fishing 9 Fish 
5 Mineral (urban) 10 Minerals 
6 Mineral (rural) 10 Minerals 
7 Food processing (urban) 11 Processed food 
8 Food processing (rural) 11 Processed food 
9 Textile (urban) 12 Textile products 
10 Textile (rural) 12 Textile products 
11 Non-metal manufacture (urban) 13 Non-metal products 
12 Non-metal manufacture (rural) 13 Non-metal products 
13 Metal manufacture (urban) 14 Metal products 
14 Metal manufacture (rural) 14 Metal products 
15 Electricity (urban) 15 Water and electricity 
16 Electricitj (rural) 15 Water and electricity 
17 Construction (urban) 16 Construction 
18 Construction (rural) 16 Construction 
19 Trade and transportation (urban) 17 Trade and transportation 
20 Trade and transportation (rural) 17 Trade and transportation 
21 Service (urban) 18 Service 
22 Sen1ice (rural) 18 Service 
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Agriculture is the industry of particular interest in this study. About two-thirds of the 
value of agricultural production comes from food and other crop production. Over half 
of this is in the production of food crops, including rice, wheat and other grain crops. A 
further quarter of the value of agricultural output from livestock production which 
produces wool and non-wool animal commodities. Forestry and fishing account for 
about five per cent each of the value of agricultural production. 
Agriculture is thus disaggregated into four sectors, Farming, Livestock, Forestry and 
Fishing. Two of the sectors (Farming and Livestock) are multi-product industries while 
the other two (Forestry :ind Fishing) are single product industries. 
In the production process, each agricultural sector uses two categories of production 
inputs (intermediate inputs and primary factors) to produce either a single output (for a 
single product industry) or a composite output (for a multi-product industry, Figure 7.5). 
The composite output is then transformed into individual commodities through a 
specified mechanism. Intermediate input is distinguished as domestically produced or 
imported, while primary factors include labour, capital and land. 
Figure 7.5 Agricultural production 
Intermediate Inputs: 
Domestic Imported 
Primary Factors: 
Labour 
Capital 
Land 
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The key characteristic of the China model is that the rural and urban sectors are 
separated because of differences in production technology, operating mechanisms and 
labour and other factor sources. 
China has a relatively small mining sector, particularly when compared to resource-rich 
countries like Australia and the Middle East economies. Its value of output corresponds 
to about a quarter of that of agriculture. The mining sectors, however, distinguish 
themselves from other sectors in that they are both resource and capital-intensive 
(compared to some other industrial sectors) and their outputs are relatively stable 
(compared to agriculture). In addition, because China is a very large country the 
performance of its mining sectors are critical ta overall growth. 
The mining in the China model is aggregated at two sectors: Mineral (rural) and 
Mineral (urban). Bath sectors include coal, oil, gas mining, other minerals and their 
products (or thirteen sub-sectors, Appendix 7 A). What should be kept in mind is that the 
so-called urban mining sector is not necessarily located in urban areas. The urban sector 
is distinguished from the rural sector in the sense that it is not managed by rural 
townships, villages or farm households. 
Manufacturing has the largest number of sectors (eight) in the China model. The 
classification of manufacturing sectors clearly reflects the focus of the study. 
A more detailed structure was specified for those manufacturing industries heavily 
dependent on agricultural outputs such as raw materials. The interactions between 
agriculture and these manufacturing industries are expected to be significant The 
upstream or downstream effects of any exogenous changes and their feedback influences 
are of particular interest. On the other hand, Textile industries - Textile (urban) and 
Textile (rural) - not only consume agricultural products directly, such as cotton and 
wool, but also contributed significantly to export growth. Other manufacturing industries 
in the model are separated according to production process and exporting/importing 
behaviour. These include Food processing, Non-metal manufacturing and Metal 
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manufacturing (each of these sectors is further splited int~ one rural and one urban 
subsectors). 
The service industry is small in the Chinese economy. A policy was announced recently 
to encourage the development of the service sector. And the non-state enterprises are 
becoming increasingly important parts of the service sector. 
S:ix service sectors stand out as requiring particular emphasis in the China model. These 
are Construction (urban), Construction (rural), trade and transportation (urban), trade 
and transportation (rural), Service (urban) and Service (rural). Definitions of 
construction appear to be straightforward. Trade and transportation industry contains 
communications, domestic and foreign trade, marketing and storage, restaurants, and 
transportation by railway, highway, water, air and pipeline. Other services include public 
utilities, health, education, scientific services, sports and financial institutions (Appendix 
7A). 
Theoretical Structure 
Production Activities 
Since producers are assumed to be price takers in both output and input markets, they 
choose input levels subject to production technologies to minimize production costs. The 
industrial technology of current production is illustrated in Figure 7.6. The production 
function is described in levels 2 and 3. At the third leveJ, effective levels of inputs of 
commodity g (g=l, 2, .... ., 18) are defined as constant elasticity of substitution (CES)2 
combinations of domestic supplies and imports of the particular commodity 
classification, that is, the demand for intermediate input i (i=18) from source s (s=l, 
domestically produced, s=2, imported) by industry j (j=22), xW)j, can be expressed as: 
(I) (1) [ "" s<l) ] X(is)j = Z j - C5 ij P(is)j - £..J (is)jP(is)j (7.5) 
s 
2 The CES (constant elasticity of substitution) production function was developed by Arrow, 
Chenery, Minhas and Solow (1961). 
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ignoring the technological factors, crV) the elasticity of substitution between two sources 
of intermediate inputs. The effective units of primary factors are defined as CRESH3 
combinations of fixed capital, labour and agricultural land. The demand for primary 
factor v by industry j, x~p, in the simplest form, is 
X(~) = z. - a<~) [p(~) - """5*.CI)p(~)] 
VJ J VJ VJ L.J VJ VJ (7.6) 
v 
where cr~J) is the CRESH parameter reflecting the degree of substitutability between 
primary factor v and other primary factors in the production process. Capital and 
agricultural land are treated as though they are non-shiftable between industries (fixed in 
modelling). In effect, it is assumed that there is a rental market for the capital and 
agricultural land of each industry and that each producer in industry j treats the rental 
prices of capital and agricultural land of type j as given. The rental rates adjust so that for 
each j, the sum of the demands from all producers in industry j equals the available 
supplies of capital and agricultural land of type j. 
At level 2, effective inputs of each of g of produced commodities and effective primary 
factor inputs are required for production process in fixed proportion 
(7.7) 
The industry is viewed as buying an activity level or general production capacity (z j ). 
The supply decision (which bundle of corrunodities to produce) is based on producers' 
behaviour to maxinlize total revenue subject to purchased activity level and given 
technology. A case is the livestock industry in the China model which produces two 
products: wool and non-wool livestock products (Figure 7.7). The livestock industry 
purchases the activity level or the production frontier AA. Area OAA represents the 
feasible production combinations of wool and non-wooi products. It is not difficult to 
3 CRESH (constant ratios of elasticities of substitution, homothetic) is a generalisation of CES, 
which defines that the ratio of the elasticity between inputs h and j to the elasticity between h and k must 
be equal to ratio of the elasticities between i and}, and i and k. 
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detennine the output levels for two products (at point X), given the price levels (Pw and 
Pn). 
Figure 7.6 Technology of current production 
Leve! 1 
Level 2 
Level 3 CES 
Composite 
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of industry j 
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Effective primary 
factors input 
Assuming that the price of wool increases from Pw to p~ (a rotation from the original 
iso-revenue line to the new iso-revenue line), a producer will make two adjustments. 
First, a higher activity level of wool production, z~, will result due to the higher 
composite price of wool. The production frontier shifts outward to BB, which is a 
product-neutral (homothetic) expansion of the old transfonnation frontier. This is the 
expansion effect (from point X to Y). Second, the product-mix will change in favour of 
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wool. Since the relative price of wool to non-wool products increases, product mix will 
move along the new transformation frontier to Z. This is referred to as the transformation 
effect 
Figure 7.7 Industry output decisions: the case of the livestock industry 
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In the model, the supply behaviour is specified as a CRETH4 relation between products 
x!.0) = z. + cr~9)* [p!0) - ~ s~.0)*p~0>] 
lJ J lJ I .i...J IJ I (7.8) 
i 
where x~0l is the supply of commodity i by industry j, pf O) is the producer price of good 
i, cr~0>* is the CRETH parameter reflecting the ease of transformation between 
commodity i and other commodities in the output bundle of industry j, and S~o)• is the 
modified output share of good i in sector j. 
4 CRETH represents a transfonnation process with Homothetic and Constant Ratios of Elasticities of 
Transformation. 
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Household and Other Final Demands 
There are two househ1, lds in the present China model: one urban and one rural, reflecting 
model structures on the production side and labour market characteristics. All the 
households within each group are assumed to be homogenous and their behaviour can be 
characterized by a single representation. 
Each household in the model derives its income from returns to factors, capital, labour 
and land. It is assumed that the household, as a price taker in the market, maximizes a 
single utility function subject to an aggregate expenditure constraint. Substitutions are 
allowed between goods (by applying the linear expenditure system) and between sources, 
domestically produced or imported (through a CES mechanism) (Figure 7.8). The effects 
of changes in household preferences can be simulated via quantity-augmenting variables, 
a}3), with the demand specification 
x?) = €; * c + 2: TlcmPi3) + af3l + L 11cm [a}3) + L sus~a{Vi] (7.9) 
I I s 
in which, a positive value of the quantity-augmenting variable indicates a change in 
preference in favour of good i. 
The other final demands include capital investment, stock and government consumption 
demands (export demand is not discussed here). As a short-run model, these demands 
are assumed to be changed proportionally to changes in absorption. 
External Sector 
In this model, the small economy assumption is maintained for the Chinese economy. 
This is a debatable assumption in the case China, particularly in respect of some 
products. 
The external sector mainly involves two activities, exporting and importing. Import 
supply of each good to China by the world economy is specified as a function of the 
importing price with an clastici ty set empirically. 
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Figure 7 .8 Household consumption 
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The export market is separated into two parts, exports from China and exports from the 
rest of the world. The total world's demand for exported goods from these two regions 
is elastic to changes in composite exporting prices. Demand is substitutable between 
alternative sources and the substitution is modelled by a CES mechanism. 
Equations of the Model 
Tables 7 .2, 7 .3 and 7.4 present the equations, variables and parameters of the China 
model. All variables in the model are in the form of percen~.tge change, unless otherwise 
indicated at levels. The equations of the model can be classified into ten groups. 
The first group of equations define the input demands (both intermediate inputs and 
primary factors) of the industry production (Equations in group (I)). Equation (I. l) 
specifies the demand for intermediate inputs of commodities in the production process. 
This is derived from the producers' cost minimization problem according to the 
assumption, with possible technical changes incorporated (Dixon et al. 1982). It is first 
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assumed that there is no change in relative prices, so a change in z i will lead to a 
proportional change in demand for each intermediate input by sector j. This reflects the 
assumption of constant returns to scale. If there are changes in the relative prices, 
suppose that the relative price of intermediate input m to n increases, th~n demand for m 
would increase less 1apidly than zj. Substitution will occur between the demands form 
and n. The strength of this substitution will depend on the value of s)Jl. 
Equation (l.2) defines the demands for the primary factors, labour, capital and land, by 
each industry as a function of the output level in the industry and relative prices of each 
of the primary factor inputs. 5 The assumption is that factors can be aggregated into a 
composite primary factor bundle using a CES function. This demand equation form is 
obtained by imposing the first-order conditions for cost-minimization and linearized in 
percentage changes. Similarly, substitutions between primary factors are assumed and the 
strength of the substitution depends on the value of cr;}). 
Equations (I.3)-(I.6) give the characteristics of the labour market segmentation between 
rural and urban areas. Equations (l.3) and (I.4) calculate the composite wage rate in the 
two broad sectors. Equations (l.5) and (I.6) show how the two labour markets are 
cleared. Within the rural labour market, labour supply is equalled to total demands by the 
agricultural and rural industrial sectors, while urban supply of labour is equalled to total 
demands by urban sector:. in the urban labour market. 
Equations group (II) deal with commodity supply of the economy. Supply of 
commodities is modelled at two levels. First, total amounts of a commodity to bi;-
produced are detennined and then a transformation mechanism is introduced to 
determine the proportion of output for domestic and export markets. The specification 
for non-agricultural sectors follows the usual ORANI format (Equation (II. l)). The 
amount produced depends on activity levels, technical factors and output prices. It is 
assumed that only its own price and the general price of the group it produces affect the 
5 Labour is assumed 10 be perfectly mobile within rural or urban areas. 
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supply level of a particular commodity. For agricultural sectors, individual price 
elasticities are included in the equation detennining output levels (Equation (II.2)). 
However, since urban and rural industries produce the same products, total supply of one 
industrial product equals the sum of the outputs produced by both rural and urban 
industry (Equation II.4). Equation (II.5) specifies the imperfect transformation between 
domestically produced goods supplied to domestic and export markets. This equation :\s 
a linearization in percentage changes of the constant elasticity of transformation (CET) 
function, according Robinson (1988). The interpretation of this equation is similar to 
previous ones. When there is no relative price change between domestic and exported 
goods, the amounts supplied to both destinations will change proportionally to that of 
the total output of the product. Whenever the price for one destination increases 
relatively, the amount supplied to this destination will rise more rapidly. Finally, Equation 
(II.6) gives the composite conunodity price for producers. 
Household income and consumption are characterized in Equation group (III). As 
assumed, the households receive income from factor return (Equation (III.1)). The 
functional forms for consumption demand, Equat.ions (III.2) and (III.3), contains two 
levels. The total demand for one conunodity is dependent on income and prices 
(represented by relevant elasticities) and changes in preference (a}3)). The distribution 
between domestic and imported sources of a commodity is determined by the price 
difference and substitution elasticity ( cr)3l for conunodity i). 
Other final demands are specified simply in the model (Equation group (IV)). Investment 
in fixed capital (Equation (IV.1)), investment in stock (Equation (IV.2)) and government 
consumption (Equation (IV.3)), differentiated by sources of commodities, all keep step 
with the growth rate of the real absorption. These functional fonns are, perhaps, too 
simplified for any further analysis related to these areas. This study, however, does not 
intend to make any efforts to investigate in detail the changes in capital stock or 
government consumption behaviour. 
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The next foreign trade group involves seven equations (Equation group (V)). Demand 
for China's e\.port of each commodity of Equation (V.1) is represented applying a CES 
function consistent with the Armington (1969) model. Whether China's exports could 
grow faster than the rest of the world or not crucially depends on the relative prices of its 
exports in the world market and the relevant substitution elasticities. Equation (V.2) 
specifies total world demand, which is specified as a linear function of the weighted 
average price for the particular good, where the weights are the shares of China and the 
rest of the world in total exports of this good. Following Martin (1990), supply of 
imports, in Equation (V.3), is specified as a function of the world price of imports, 
allowing for the possibility of China being large in particular markets. Equation (V.4) 
specifies the imports volwne by simply summing all the terms of imports together, and 
0 
Equations (V.5) and (V.6) calculate the foreign currency value of imports and exports. 
The balance of trade is reflected iii Equation (V.7). 
agriculture (Equation group (VI)' 
distortions are determined. It i~ 
distortion in which the level of. 
in this case) is dependent on agr. 
".f!Ticul.tural population in total pop~Jla:· .. 
Vv orld/market prices. 
Equation group (VII) is a set of zero profa '\.:'ln:.11titi'm. i •f..t~ 1rr \· t 1 l ~"ia.1::e5 t.trnt the 
total revenue from production is equal to the .irn>t;rnxv.:H;.··;f. ln~'.10.i.<: pi~~ :he returns to 
primary factors. This condition implicitly involves two assumptions, the assumption of 
constant returns to scale of the technology and that of sufficient cnmpetition to drive the 
pure profit at the margin to be zero. The zero profit in Equations (VI.3) and (VI.4) for 
importing and exporting are easy to understand and interpret. The only point that needs 
explanation concerns the conditions for the textile and commerce industry. There exist a 
gap between producer and user prices due to incentive distortion. 
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The Equation group of market clearing conditions contains six equations. Equation 
(Vill.1) tells that the domestic demand for good i from domestic sources must equal 
domestic production for the home market. Similarly, in Equation (VIII.2), the export of 
good i from China must be equal to domestic production for exporting. Equation 
(Vill.3) implies that the demand for labour by the two broad sectors -- agriculture and 
non-agriculture -- is equated to the total suppJy of labour. Equations (VIII.4) and 
(Vill.5) specify the equilibriWTI between labour demand and supply with each of the two 
broad sectors. The stock of capital and that of land in each sector, as we can see from 
Equations (VIII.6) and (VIII.7), are specified exogenously. 
The equations in group (IX) are mostly identities or indexes. Equations (IX.1)-(IX.3) 
compute domestic absorption, GDP and absorption. Equation (IX.4) is an index of GDP 
deflator. 
The last equation (Equation (X.1)) in group (X) is the equilibriWTI condition for the 
money market, with money supply on the left and the money demand on the right. 
Martin's model adopted a simpler equation for the purpose of price determination. Since 
Chow (1987) found that a 1 per cent increase in the money supply would raise official 
prices by one-third of 1 per cent, and if the true inflation in China is 2.5 times the official 
rate as Chow estimated, Martin argued that using of unity elasticity used in his model 
was reasonable. In Equation (X.1), a simple money market (money c~emand equals 
money supply) is incorporated explicitly to introduce some monetary effects in the 
Chinese economy. 
A Model Closure 
The complete model as specified in Table 2 contains (5gh+6hr-~6g+20) equations and 
(14gh+15h+33g+21) variables. This implies that t.he r11ode-1 is closed by assigned values 
to a selection of (7gh+9h+7g+l) exogenous vari3l:rk::;. 
' --~ ~ ' 
The detailed structure of the model provides flexibility for analysing different policy 
issues, according to different purposes of analysis. The typical closure for the China 
model analyses incentive distortions to agriculture. 
The first set of exogenous variables includes the foreign currency price of imports since 
the model contains no equations describing foreign supply conditions. Change in the 
price of imports is one important economic shock being examined in CGE models. 
The second set of exogenous va."":iables include tariffs and export taxes. Their exogenous 
setting allows computation of the effects of protection against imports on the domestic 
economy. 
The other set of exogenous variables include factor endowments, such as labour, capital 
and agricultural land. Factor endowments largely determine the economic structure and 
any change in them (they usually do not change or change very slowly in the short run) 
will bring about economy-wide effects. 
Capital and agricultural land are exogenously fixed for each industry. No increase in 
amount or movement across industries is assumed. 
The next group of exogenous variables are quantity-augmenting variables, including 
those reflecting technical change and preference variations. 
Some other policy measures ar": also set exogenously in this model. These include money 
supply, nominal exchange rate and the degree of labour stock in rural and urban areas. 
State prices for cotton and wool are determined by other factors which, in turn, 
detennine supplies of cotton and wool by fanners. Since demands must be higher than 
supply given these prices, markets for cotton and wool are finally cleared by pushing up 
user prices. 
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Table 7.2 Equations of the China model 
(a linear system in percentage changes) 
I. Demandsfor Intennediate and Primary Inputs 
I.1 Demands for intermediate inputs, domestic and imported 2gh 
x(ll)j = zj -crVi[P8Jij- I.sUlijP(UijJ+ayi +a~1i +a(Uij -aVl[a[~)j- I.s8J)ja(Uijl 
s s 
(s =1, domestic; 2, imported) 
I.2 Industry demands for primary factors 
X(~) = Z · - uCl) [p(~) - '°' s<!l*p<'.l] + a~I) +a<~) - aCl) [a<'.l ·-" s<!l* a<'.l] VJ J VJ VJ ~ VJ VJ J VJ VJ VJ ~ VJ VJ 
v v 
(v =labour, capital and agricultural land) 
I.3 Composite rural wage 
Pol - '°'L*pCll IA - ~ j lj 
j 
(j e R, rural sectors) 
I.4 Composite urban wage 
Pc1i - '°' L#poi IN - ~ j lj 
j 
(j e U, urban sectors) 
1.5 Rural labour market equilibrium 
- " • (1) lR - ~LjX'labour'j 
j 
(j e R, rural sectors) 
I.6 Urban labour market equilibrium 
Lu = L ~x.?Jbour' j 
j 
(j e U, urban sectors) 
II. Supply of Commodities 
3h 
1 
1 
1 
1 
II.1 Supply of commodity by non-agriculture, undifferentiated by destinations gN 
X~_D) = Z. + cr\~)*(p~O) - "Sl\Ol*pl(O)]-a~O) -a~.0) -cr\~)*(a~.0) - '°' 51(_0)* a,<.Ol] 
I) J I) l ~ !I J l} l} l} L-i !I !I 
I I 
(le n, commodities supplied by sector j; j e N, non-agricultural sectors) 
Il.2 Supply of commodity by agriculture, undifferentiated by destination gA 
x~.o) = z. +" cr<<~lll~p\Ol - a~o) - a\.OJ 
I) J ~ l J l J l} 
I 
(l e a, commodities supplied by sector j; j E A, agricultural sectors) 
IJ.7S 
Il.3 Total supply of agricultural commodities 
X~O) ="' S~O)X~.0) 
I L.J IJ IJ 
j 
(j e A agricultural sectors; i e a agricultural products) 
Il.4 Total supply of non-agricultural commodities 
X~O) = "' S~O) X~.0) 
I L.J IJ lJ 
j 
(j e N non-agricultural sectors; i e n non-agricultural products) 
Il.5 Transformation in production, domestic and export 
(0) _ (0) 't [ (0) " sCO) (0) ] (0) 
x(id)j - xij + crij Pcid)j - .Li (id)jP(id)j -a(id)j 
d 
(d = 1, for domestic; 2, exporting) 
Il.6 Producers' commodity price 
co) _ "' s<o) co) "' s<o) co) 
Pi - L. (id)jP(id) + £... (id)ja(id)j 
d d 
(d = 1, for domestic, and 2, for exporting) 
III. Household Income and CQnsumption 
III. I Consumer nominal income 
- "' "' s<c) [ (I) (1)] Cy - L.J £... (vj)Y Pvj + xvj 
j v 
9 
9 
2gh 
g 
2 
(T = r rural household for which j e R and T = u urban household for which j e U, 
and v =labour, capital and agricultural land) 
III.2 Household demands for commodities classified by source 4g 
(3) _ (3) (3) [ (3) "' s<3) (3) J (3) (3) (3) [ (3) "' s<3) (3) J 
XusJY - XiT - CT;y Pusl - L.J Cis)Y PcisJ + aiT + a<isJY - cr;y a<is>Y - £... Cis)TaCis)Y 
s s 
(s = 1, domestic; 2, imported; T = r, rural household; 2, urban household) 
Ill.3 Household demands for commodities, undifferentiated by source 
x.~) = eiT *Cy+ L 'TlunyP?) + aii) + L 'Tlul)Y[a~> + rs«~~Ya((~))Y] 
I I s 
(s = 1, domestic; 2, imported, le g) 
III. 4 Total household demand for commodities, differentiated by source 
X (3) - "' s<3)x(3) is - L.J iT (is)Y 
y 
(T = r, rural household; 2, urban household) 
III.5 General price of each commodity to households 
P(3) - "'s<3) p(3) +"' s<3) a(3) i - "-' (is) (is) £... (is) (is) 
s s 
(s = 1, domestic; 2, imported) 
2g 
2g 
g 
I .. 
W. Other Final Demands 
IV.1 Investment in fixed capital 
(2) -
X(is) - aR 
(s = 1, domestically produced; 2, imported) 
IV.2 Investment in stock 
X (2) - a *(is) - R 
(s = l, domestically produced; 2, imported) 
IV.3 Government consumption 
(5) -
x(is) - aR 
(s = 1, domestically produc~d; 2, imported) 
V. Foreign Trade 
V.l Export demand from China 
X (4) - x(4) - 0'(4) [pe - "s<4)pe ] i - wi i (is) "-' (is) (is) 
s 
(s = 1, from China; 2, from the rest of the world) 
V.2 World demand for export both from China and the rest of the world 
(4) R "S(4) e 
xwi = 1-'i ,t...; CisJP(is) 
s 
(s = 1, from China; 2, from the rest of the World) 
V.3 Import supply to China 1-iy the rest of the world 
* E m xi = ;P; 
V.4 Imports volume 
(6) " c<1) c1) c<2) c2J c<2J c2) c<3J .(3) c<5) (5) 
Xi2 = "-' (i2)jx(is)j + (i2)x(is) + *(i2)x*Cisl + (i2)x(is) + (i2)x(is) 
j 
(s=2, imported) 
V.5 Foreign currency value of imports 
m = L [pi + x{?:])] * Mci2) 
V.6 Foreign currency value of exports 
e = L[P: +xf4)]* Eil 
i 
V.7 The balance of trade 
100* DB =E*e-M*m 
l"n 
2g 
2g 
2g 
g 
g 
g 
g 
1 
1 
1 
VI. Endogenous Incentive Distortion and Rents for Grain, Wool and C<Jtton 
VI. I Endogenous setting of producers' prices (incentive distortions) 
s _ coi S coi S coi M coi • 
Pi - 'Y (iA) A + 'Y (iR) R + 'Y (iM) + y (ip)P 
(i =rice, wheat, grain, cotton and wool) 
VI.2 State prices for cotton and wool equal their producer prices 
(0) - s 
Pc;dlj - P; 
(i = cotton and wool) 
VII. Zero Pure Profits in Economic Activities 
VII. I Zero pure profit in production 
~)~ 5CO) (0) ~ ~ 5Cll (1) ~ 5Cll (I) 
.L./..J (id)jP(Ui) = L.L. (is)jP(is)j +Li vj Pvj 
i d i s v 
(N(j) the number of goods produced by industry J) 
VII.2 Zero pure profit for importing 
(1) m th 
P(is)j = Pi +ti + 't' 
(s=2, imported) 
VII.3 Zero pure profit for exporting 
(0) e th 
PcUJ)j =Pi +vi+ 't' 
(d=2, exported) 
VIII. Market Clearing Conditions 
VITI.I Market clearing in the domestic market, domestically produced 
(0) ~ 5 (1)# ,{l) 5 (2)# (2) s<2l# .(2) 5C3)# (3) 5C5J# (5) x(id)j = .L. (i.s)jx(is)j + <isl xCisl + *Cislx*Cisl + (isl x(is) + (i.sl x(i.s) 
j 
(d = 1, domestic destination, s = 1, domestic source) 
VIII.2 Market clearing of exports 
(0) - (4) 
x(Ui)j - xi 
(d = 2, for exporting) 
VIII.3 Capital market clearing 
(I) - k X2j - j 
VID.4 Agricultural land market clearing 
X3(I) = j. 
J J 
5 
4 
h 
g 
g 
g 
g 
h 
h 
IX. GDP and Real Absorption 
IX.1 Domestic absorption of good i from all sources 
_" "["BCI) .CI) BC2) (2) BC2) (2) BC3) .(3l B(S) (5)] 
xi - £.... £.... £.... (is)jx(is)j + (is)x(is) + *(is)x*(is) + (is)x(is) + (is)x(is) 
i s j 
(i e g, j e h, and s = 1, domestic, s = 2, imported) 
IX.2 Total output 
X
(O) _ "B(O) X(O) 
R - £.... (il)j ij 
i 
IX.3 Real absorption 
aR = L,\Xi 
i 
IX.4 Price deflater for GDP 
pY = L Si# pjO) 
X. Money Market 
X.l Equilibrium in money market 
ms = CT mp Py +CT maaR +CT mrr 
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1 
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l 
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Table 7.3 Variables of the Chins model 
(all variables are percentage changes) 
Variables Number Description 
z. 
J h Industry activity levels 
(1) 
x(if)j 2gh Demand for inputs (domestic and imported) for current production 
x<9 VJ 3h Demand for primary factors (labour, capital and agricultural land) for 
current production 
(0) 
x(id)j 2gh Supply of good i by industry j (domestic and exporting) 
x~.0) 
lJ gh Supply of good i by industry j, undifferentiated by source 
x<2) (is') 2g Demand for invesnnent in capital stock (domestic and imported) 
(2) 2g Demand for invesnnent in stock (domestic and imported) x*<if) 
i (3) 
X(is)T 4g Household demand for goods by type, source and household ~ 
;;<3l 1T lg Household demand for goods by type and household 
x~3l 
IS 
2g Household demand for goods by type and source ~ 
e 
x~3) r g Household demax1ds for goods, W1differentiated by source ~ l 
~ ~ rt-r 
.x~4) Export demand from China by the rest of the world , -~···· u~ 
A g 
(4) 
xwi g World demand for export both from China and the rest of the world 
• Imports supply to China by the rest of the world X· g l 
X(S) 
(is) 2g Govenunent demands for goods by type and source 
x<6J 
i2 g Imports volwne 
x<1) 
Vi 2 Labour in agriculture and non-agriculture (h !:: A.N) 
x?' 1 Total supply of labour 
(0) 
X(rl)j h Total outputs, by industry 
(0) 
x<,ll· 1 Total output 
:X.;, g Domestic absorption of goad i from all smm:e'.ll 
j 
X(C) 
R l Total output (GDP) 
\? 
aso 
~ ... 
(1) 
Pcu>i 2gh Purchasers' prices for produced inputs for current production 
p<~) 
VJ 3h Purchasers' prices for primary factors for current production 
(0) 
PcUJ>i 2g Prices of outputs (domestic and export) 
Pt 5 StatP. prices for rice, wheat, other grain, cotton and wool 
p(3) 
(is) 2g Consumers' price of good i from sources 
pf3> g General price of commodity to household 
pj4) g Local currency price of export (including export tax) 
(0) 
Pci2) g Local currency prices of imports (including tariff) 
e P(is) 2g Foreign currency prices of exports from China and the rest of the 
world 
pf g Foreign currency prices of imports to China 
PlO) gh Prices of output ~ ~ 
pY 1 Price deflator for GDP 
p(l) 2 Aggregate wage rates in agriculture and non-agriculrure f: 111 (h = A,N) I\ 
a~I) l! h Neutral-input-augmenting technical change u J y 
f; 
a~.1) ~ ,--g'fi. Input - i - augmenting technical change .. _. ... ~ ..... ~:. IJ 
(1) 
a(is)j 2gh Input - (is) - augmenting technical change 
a<.O) 
I h Neutral output - augmenting technical change 
a~.o) 
IJ gh Output - i - augmenting technical change 
aR l Growth rate of real absorption 
!,> a~3) 
I g Commodity - i - augmenting change in households' preference 
a<3J 
'(io) 2g Commodity - (is) - augmenting change in households' preference 
a<ll rn l Factor causing - h (A,N) - augmenting change in labour allocation 
,~·- l@l(~} VJ ]!h Factor - v - augmenting technical change 
(0) 2gil Destination - d - augmenting technical change in transfonnation 
·o-.::; 
a<id)j 
) c 
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DB 1 The balance of trade (This is the variable in value rather than in 
percentage change) 
k; h Fixed capital stock in industry j 
J. J h Fixed capital stock in industry j 
c 1 Disposable income of urban and rural consumers 
m 1 Foreign currency value of imr:orts 
e 1 Foreign currency value of exports 
ti g Tariff on imports 
$ 1 Exchange rate 
V· I g Export tax 
ms 1 Money supply 
r 1 Interest rate 
Table 7 .4 Coefficients and Parameters of the China model 
Equation Coefficients or 
Number Parameters Description 
(I.l) cr~~) IJ Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign sources of 
0 good i for use as a current input in the production of industry of j. 
s<l) (is)j Share of purchasers-price value of good i from source s (s = 1 for 
domestic, s = 2 for imports) in industry j's total purchases of good i 
for use as a ~urrent input to production. 
c cr<~) (I.2) CRESH parameter reflecting the degree of substitutability between VJ 
primary factor v (v = I for labour, v = 2 for cnpital, v = 3 for 
agricultural land) and other primary factors in the production process 
if industry j. 
s<~>· 
VJ Modified share of primary factor v in the total cost of prunary factors 
used in industry j, defmed as a function of the urunodified shares and 
the CRESH'. substitution parameters. 
(I.3)(1.S) L~ J Share of labour in each of rural inJustry (j e R). 
) 
(I.4)(1.6) I!. J Share of labour in each of urban industry (j e U). 
(II.I) (O)• aij CRETH parameter reflecting the ease of transfonnability between 
commodity i and other commodities in the output bundle of industry 
j. 
s~.o)• 
I) Modified share of commodity i in total revenue of industry j defmed 
as a function of urunodified share and the CREIB transformation 
parameter: /N(j) s~.01 "' = a\~>* s~~i I. cr\~>* s~0> 
l) l) l) l) l) 
i 
(II.2) (A)* cr (il)j Price elasticity of supply of agricultural products (i) by agricultural 
industry (J) with respect to price of q~ricultural product (/). 
(Il.3)(1I.4) S~O) !I Share of industry j in total outrut of i. 
(!1.5) 't crij Elasticity of substitution between domestic and export production of 
good i. 
5CO) (id)j Revenue share of commodity i produced for destination d (d = i for 
domestic market, d = 2 for export} in total revenue derived from the 
producfon of commodity i. 
(III.I) s<~> VJ Household income share of return from factor \' of industry j. 
(111.2) a<1~ 
•T Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign somces of 
good i for use by household T. 
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5'(3) 
~ (is)T Share of the purchasers value of good i from sources s in the total 
purchases of good i by household T. 
(III.3) E;r Household expendi:ure elasticity of demand for good i from either 
source. 
1lu1ir Household elasticity of demand for good i in general with respect to 
changes in the general household purchasers' price for good l. 
(III .4) 5(3) iT Household rs share in total househoid demand for i. 
(III.5) 5(3) (is) Share of good i from source s in total household demand for i. 
(V.l) aj4> Elasticiey of substitution between Chlnese and rest of the world 
products in world market for commodity i. 
5(4) 
(is) Share of China and the rest of the world in world export market for 
}1 
commodity i. ~ 
r ~', (V.2) ~i Global elasticity of excess demand for commodity i. 
( ·' (V.3) E. Elasticity of impon supply for commodjty i to China. I 
~···· ' '• (V.4) (1) Share of imports of good i which is absorbed by industry j for purposQ Cc.,>. 1~ J ~. ' of intermediate i.J1put. 
. ~~ 
r·. 
<k~. c<2J Share of i.Jnports of good i absorbed by fixed capital investment. \''· (i2) ~ :~: ;l 
C*<2J Share of i.Jnports of good i absorbed by stock invesunent. ~i (i2) 
I~' ~~.:._ c<3> Share of i.Jnports of good i for the use of households c. (i2)c 
c<5) (i2) Share of i.Jnports of good i for the use of government consumption. 
(V.5) M., Share m foreign currency cost of total imports which is accounted for !_ 
'•\ by imports of commodity i. 
(V.6) Eil Share in total export earnings w!llich is accounted for by exports of 
commodity i. 
(V.7) ,.VJ Aggregate foreign currency value of i.Jnports. 
E Aggregate foreig11 currency value of exports. 
'( 
}· (V1.l) (0) Elasticity of change in the incentive distortion of good i (grrun, cotton YumJ 
or wool) with respect to change ill world market price. 
(0) y (irp) Elasticity of change in the incentive distortion of good i (grain, cotton 
or wool) with respect to change m farmers' feasible choice set. 
I" 
l 
i 
t,,:, 
(\ 
I ~ 
(VII.I) 
(VII.2) 
(VIII.I) 
(IX.1) 
(IX.2) 
Y~~) Elasticity of change in the incentive distortion of good i (grain, cotton 
or wool) with respect to change in agriculture's share in the national 
economy. 
Y~~) Elasticity of change in the incentive distortion of good ' (gr!lin, cotton 
or wool) with respect to change in GDP deflator. 
S(O) (id)j 
S(l) (is)j 
5(0) 
(h)j 
S(l)# (is)j 
5(2)# (is) 
S(2)# 
*(is) 
5(3)# 
(is)c 
S(5)# (is) 
B (I) (is)j 
B (2) (is) 
B (2) 
*(is) 
B (3) (is) 
B(O) 
(il) 
Revenue share of production of corrunodity i for destination d in total 
revenue of production of conunodity i by industry j. 
Cost share of intermediate input i from source s in total cost of 
production by industry j. 
Cost share of primary factor v in total cost of production in industry j. 
Revenue share of rents from transaction of commodity h (cotton or 
wool) in total revenue of production of corrunodity i by industry j 
(textile or commerce industries only). 
(For s = I) Share of corrunodity i from domestic source used by 
industry j as intermediate input in total amount of domestic 
production for domestic market. 
(Fors= 1) Share of commodity i from domestic source used for fixed 
capita! investment in total amow11 of domestic production for 
domestic market. 
(Fors= 1) Share of corrunoclity i from domestic source used for stock 
investment in total amount of domestic production for domestic 
market. 
(For s = 1) Share of corrunodity i from domestic source used for 
conswnption by households c in total amount of domestic production 
for domestic market. 
(For s = 1) Share of corrunodity i from domestic source used for 
government consumption in total amount of domestic production for 
domestic market. 
Share of intennediate input i from source s used by industry j in total 
absorption of corrunoclity i. 
Share of fixed capital investment i in total absorption of commodity i. 
Share of stock investment i in total absorption of good i. 
Share of household's consumption in total absorption of corrunodity i. 
Share of government consumption of good i in total absorption of this 
commodity. 
Share of output i in total output of the economy. 
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(IX.3) ,\ Share of good i in real absorption. 
(IX.4) s~ 
I Revenue share of good i in total GDP. 
(X.l) ()mp Price elasticity of demand for money. 
()ma Income elasticity of demand for money. 
()mr Interest elasticity of demand for money. 
Appendix 7A 
Construction of a 22.Sector Input.Output Table for China, 1987 
This table is constructed on the basis of the China 117-sector input-output table 
constructed by the State Statistical Bureau and the Office of the National Input-Output 
Survey (1991). The building of this 30-Sector Input-Output Table takes three steps. The 
first is to derive new sectors by splitting some of the existing sectors in the larger table 
according to input-output infonriation; the second is to aggregate the other sectors; and 
the third is to estimate the value added shares for each primaiy factor. 
Deriving the New Sectors 
Some of the sectors required in the 30-sector version do not appear individually in the 
J 17* 117 version. For instance, there is only one Grain Cropping Sector in the original 
table, so we have to split this grain sector into Rice, Wheat and Other grains. Likewisely, 
Cotton and Other crops have to be separated from the existing other crop classification. 
Again, Wool has to be derived from rhe livestock sector. 
Martin derived a new sector from an aggregate sector by estimating a gross output value 
for the new sector using the value of its imports and fae ratio of gross output to imports 
(Martin 1990). In this work, we obtain the gross output value of Paddy rice, Fr'heat, and 
Other grain by multiplying the gross output (China Statistical Yearbook 1988.) and the 
average prices (China Price Statistical Yearbook 1988). The values of impm:ts and 
exports are obtained from the China Statistical Yearbock 1988, and converted from US 
dollars to RMB yuan, accounting for changes in the exchange rate. In splitting the three 
grain sectors from an aggregate grain cropping sector, assumptions are made that in 
general the shares for all intermediate inputs and value adding factors were the same as 
those for the total grain cropping sector, and that shares of intermediate and final use of 
each grain were the same. However, the net exports were directly derived from the 
statistical yearbook, and adjustment was made to the Grain's intermediate use as input of 
husbandry sector and final use for consumption. In China, very little rice and \Vheat was 
used as feed for the livestock production. Since there is no better information, we assume 
that, of the total amount of grain input to the husbandry sector, 85 per cent was grains 
other than wheat and rice, 10 per cent was wheat and 5 per cent was rice. The allocation 
of grain for consumption was also readjusted in association with the above adjusti11ent. 
This second adjustment is consistent with an increasingly high share of rice and wheat in 
direct consumption in China. Furthermore, this adjustment guarantees the sums of 
intermediate and final use of each grain to be consistent with those in the aggregate 
sector. 
The Wool sector was derived from the livestock sector in the same manner. However, 
more adjustments were made to the Wool sector since it in general has some differences 
from the aggregate husbandry sector in the sense of both production inputs and the use 
of its output. Gross output value and the net exports were obtained from the statistical 
yearbook. Following Martin, wool input use was allocated to sectors which used animal 
husbandry inputs. Since, in most cases, these allocations involved very small amounts, 
with the exception of the textile industry, which was assumed to use more than 90 per 
cent of total value of wool use. Wool investment into capital formation and stock change 
were set at zero. For the inputs used in wool production, w·e apply the same shares of 
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inputs-gross output value in Martin's table to estimate the production inputs used by 
wool. 
Aggregating Sectors 
In the 117-sector version, other agricultural production contains wild plant collecting, 
wild animal hunting, and small scale handicrafts makir.g and industrial producing. It is 
difficult to add it to any of the newly created 22 sectors. However, since gross output 
value was not large (a bit more than 6 per cent of total agricultural output value in 
1987), it was added to the Sf~ctor of other livestock and livestock products. 
The other sectors are aggregated ta accord with production technology. Caution was 
also taken to distinguish the export-competing and import-substituting sectors following 
Clarete and Warr (1992). Table 7A.1 shows the transformation relationship of the 117-
sector to 22-sectors. 
Estimating Shares of Primary Factors 
By deducting the value of intermediate inputs from gross output, we obtain the net 
revenue for each sector. Follov.'ing Martin, for t"ie non-agricultural sectors, the return to 
land was assumed to be zero. So, the return to capital was derived simply by deducting 
the total wage bill (which was the return to labour) from the net revenue. For 8 
agricultural sectors, the situation is complicated since the total wage bill may contain 
certain parts of the return to labour, profit, returns to capital and land, due to self-
employment. The results by McMillan, Whalley and Zhu (1989) are applied, that is, of 
the total net revenue, factor shares of 59 per cent for labour, 12 per cent for capital and 
29 per c-=nt for land. 
The derived China 22-sector input-output table is presented in Table 7 A.2. 
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Table 7 A.l Sectors derived from the China 117-sector I/O table 
Rice (Paddy rice) 
Derived from 
01101 Grain crop cultivation (see part 1) 
Wheat (Wheat) (see part 1) 
Derived from 
01101 Grain crop cultivation (see part 1) 
Grain (Grain other than wheat and rice) 
Derived from 
01101 Grain crop cultivation (see part 1) 
Cotton (Cotton) 
Derived from 
01109 Other crop cultivation 
Crops (Other crops) 
Derived from 
01109 Other crop cultivation 
Wool (Wool) 
Derived from 
01300 Livestock production (see part 1) 
Animals (Other livestock and livestock products) 
Derived from 
01300 Livestock production, and adding 
01400 Other agricultural production (see part 1) 
Forest!)' (Forestry products) 
01200 Forestry 
Fishing (Fishery products) 
01500 Fishing 
Mineral (urban) (Co3J, oil, gas and their products and other minerals) 
Mineral (n1ral) (Coal, oil, gas and their products and other minerals) 
Derived from 
02100 Coal mining 
02200 Coal cleaning and screening 
03100 Crude petroleum production 
03200 Natural gas production 
12000 Petroleum i·efineries 
13001 Coking 
13002 Manufacture of gas and coal products 
04100 Ferrous ore mining 
04200 Non-ferrous ore mining 
05 WO Quarrying of building materials and non-metal minerals 
05200 Salt mining 
05300 Logging and transport of timber and bamboo 
05400 Production and supply of water 
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;; Food (urban) (Food processing) 
' 
,. 
Food (rural) (Food processing) ' 
Derived from 
06102 Slaughtering and preparing meat 
06103 Manufacture of egg and dairy products 
06101 Grain mill products and vegetable oil manufacturing 
06104 Fish processing 
06105 Sugar refining 
06109 Manufacture of food products not elsewhere classified 
06201 Wine and spirits industries 
06400 Forage manufactures 
06209 Manufacture of beverages 
06300 Tobacco manufactures 
Textile (urban) (Textile goods) 
Textile (rural) (Textile goods) 
Derived from 
07001 Manufacture of cotton textiles 
01200 Manufacture of woollen textiles 
07003 Manufacture of hemp textiles 
i 07004 Manufacture of silk textiles 
~· 07005 Knitting mills 
07009 Manufacture of textiles not elsewhere classiiied Ii 08100 Manufacture of wearing ap;:iarel ' 08200 Leather, fur and their products \ ~ ! 
rJ Non-metal (urban) (Non-metal manufactured goods) t (! Non-metal (rural) (Non-metal manufactured goods) [: 
Derived from 
": 
k'" 09100 Sawmills and manufacture of fibreboard 
Q [~ 09200 Manufacture of furniture and other wood products :.~-'t 
14300 Manufacture of chemical fibres 
;,·,) 10100 Manufacture of paper and paper products 
10200 Printing industries 
10300 Manufacture of articles for cultural activities. education, sports, arts and crafts 
14101 Manufacture of basic chemicals 
141('2 Manufacn1re of chemical fertilizers 
14103 Manufacture of chemical pesticides 
., 14104 Manufacture of organic chemii.:al products 
' 
14105 Manufacture of chemical products for daily use 
\' 14106 Manufacmre of synthetic chemicals ;·,r 14109 Other chemical industries '. {li 11200 Manufacture of medicines 
·fl. 
; 14401 Manufacture of rubber products for production use 't 
~ { 14402 Ma11ufacturr:. of rubber products for daily use 
14501 Manufacmre of plastic products for production use 
14502 Manufacture of plastic products for daily use 
15001 Manufacture of cement 
\~ 15002 Manufacture of cement and asbestos products 
15003 Manufacture of bricks, tiles, lime and light-weight building materials 
' ( 15004 Manufacture of glass and glass products ,. 
15005 Manufacture of pottery, china and earthenware .:·~c 
! 15006 Manufacture of fireproof materials 
0 
, i" 15009 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products not elsewhere classified 
16100 Primary iron and steel manufacturing 
'( 
0 ~; 
() 
~ 
s ,, " l i. r 
d 
0 
: ~' 
' . 
' 
,t,i 
Metal (urban) (Iron, :.tee!, machinery and other metal manufactured goods) 
Metal (rural) (Iron, steel, machinery and other metal manufactured goods) 
Derived from 
16200 Primary non-ferrous metals manufacturing 
17001 Manufacture of metal products for production use 
17002 Manufacture of metal products for daily use 
18001 Manufacture of boilers, engines and turbines 
18002 Manufacture of metalworking machinery 
18003 Manufacture of special industrial machinery and equipment 
18004 Manufacture of agricultural, forestry, animal husbandry and fishing machinery 
18005 Manufacture of machinery for daily use 
18006 Manufacture of special equipment not elsewhere classified 
18009 Manufacture of machinery not elsewhere classified 
20001 Manufacture of generators 
20002 Manufacture of household electrical appliances 
20009 Manufacture of electric machinery not elsewhere classified 
21001 Manufacture of computers 
21002 Manufacture of electronic appliances 
21009 Manufacture of electronic and telecommunication equipment not elsewhere classified 
22000 Manufacture of instruments, meters and other measuring equipment 
23000 Maintenance 11nd repair of machinery and equipment 
24001 Manufacture of products for production use not elsewhere classified. 
24002 Manufacture of products for daily use not elsewhere classified 
19001 Manufacture (1f railroad transport equipment 
19002 Manufacture of motor vehicles 
19003 Ship building 
19004 Manufacture of aircraft 
19005 Manufacture of transport equipment not elsewhere classified 
Electricity (urban) (Electricity, gas and water) 
Electricity (rural) (Electricity, gas and water) 
Derived from 
11000 Electricity, steam and hot water production and supply 
Construction (urban) (Construction) 
Construction (rural) (Construction) 
Derived from 
25000 Construction 
Trade&trans. (urban) (Trade and transportation) 
Trade&trans. (rural) (Trade and transportation) 
Derived from 
26101 Railway freight transport 
26102 Highway freight transport 
26103 Water freight transport 
26104 Air freight transport 
26105 Pipeline transport 
26200 Communications 
27101 Domestic and foreign trade 
27102 Trade of grain and cooking oils 
27200 Supply and marketing of materials and sturage 
28000 Restaurants 
29001 Railway passenger transport 
29002 Highway passenger transport 
29003 Water passenger transport 
29004 Air passenger transport 
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Service (urban) (Private and public services, inclusing housing) 
Service (rural) (Private and public services. inclusing housing) 
Derived from 
30100 Real estate 
30200 Public utilities 
30300 Services to household 
31101 Health service 
31102 Sports 
31103 Social welfare institutions 
31201 Education services 
31202 Cultural services, arts, radio and television broadcasting 
31301 Research and scientific institutions 
31302 General technical services 
32001 Financial institutions 
32002 Insurance 
33000 Public administration 
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Table 7 A.2a 22-sector input-output table for China, 1987: imports (million RMB yuan) 
Agricultural sccturs Mineral Food processing Textile Non-metal Metal Electricity 
Farming Animals Forest Fish Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Rice u 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 () 0 0 0 0 
Wheat 657 185 0 30 0 0 1042 170 5 2 46 20 0 0 0 0 
Grain 133 153 0 4 0 0 149 24 0 0 7 3 0 0 0 0 
Cotton ;) 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 764 328 59 25 8 2 0 0 
Crops 29 16 0 0 0 0 77 13 35 15 13 6 0 0 0 0 
Wool 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1365 585 31 13 9 3 0 0 
Animals 0 2 0 0 0 0 5 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Forest 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fishing 0 0 0 4 () () 7 1 () 0 G 0 0 0 0 0 
Mineral 53 13 6 13 676 138 21 3 16 7 519 223 518 155 397 8 
Food 148 308 () 45 2 0 531 87 30 13 110 47 11 3 I 0 
Textile 37 24 2 I 44 9 ?.4 4 3035 1301 602 258 291 87 14 0 
Non-metal 2841 77 68 36 406 83 552 90 1012 434 6499 2785 3130 935 94 2 
Metal 558 115 38 110 1668 342 274 45 460 197 3587 1537 28563 8532 425 9 
Elect 11 2 0 0 21 4 4 0 6 2 66 28 58 17 6 0 
Construction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 () 
Trade&tnrns. 7 3 0 0 5 1 18 3 14 6 19 8 25 7 2 0 
Service 0 0 0 0 u 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Intermediate 4476 898 117 245 2825 579 2705 440 6746 2891 11560 4954 32613 9742 939 19 
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Table 7A.2a 22-sector input-output table for China, 1987: imports (million RMB yuan) (continued) 
Construction Trade&trasn. Service 
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Rice 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wheat 0 0 4 0 16 5 
Grain 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Colton 0 0 0 0 13 4 
Crops 0 0 9 2 2 0 
Wool 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Animals 0 0 I 0 0 0 
Forest 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fishing 0 0 10 2 0 0 
Mineral 294 109 360 74 146 44 
Food 4 2 233 48 34 IO 
Textile 94 35 200 41 121 36 
Non-metal 4767 1763 909 186 2356 704 
Metal 9245 3419 2080 426 2478 740 
Elect l l 4 10 2 15 5 
Construction 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Trade&trans. 14 5 8 2 15 5 
Service 0 0 0 0 0 0 
lntennediate 14429 5337 3826 784 5200 1553 
Int'diate Household 
input Rural Urban 
0 0 0 
2183 2423 362 
478 145 22 
1207 0 0 
218 173 136 
2006 0 0 
18 20 6 
0 0 0 
24 25 24 
3791 152 115 
1669 1362 1642 
6261 1737 1394 
29731 689 1961 
64848 5336 4875 
276 8 19 
0 0 0 
169 34 30 
0 0 0 
112879 12105 10585 
i94 
;\ 
:::1 
Gov'L 
cons. 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
127 
78 
426 
148 
0 
0 
15 
0 
798 
Investment 
Capital Stock 
0 0 
0 99 
0 0 
66 588 
0 0 
0 0 
0 2 
0 0 
0 5 
0 0 
0 139 
0 441 
89 387 
22926 4177 
0 0 
0 0 
10 8 
0 0 
23092 5846 
Final 
Import use 
0 0 
5071 ?.888 
639 167 
1861 654 
520 309 
2004 0 
47 29 
0 0 
75 54 
4038 267 
4940 3271 
9910 3649 
33283 3552 
102311 37463 
300 27 
0 0 
266 97 
0 0 
165265 52427 
0 
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Table 7 A.2b 22-sector input-output table for China, 1987: Domestic goods (million RMB yuan) 
Agricultural sectors Mineral Food processing Texlile Non-metal Metal Electricity 
Farming Animals Forest Fis!l Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Rice 9259 850 9 453 0 0 15635 2545 74 32 684 293 0 0 0 0 
Wheat 5387 1516 5 248 0 0 8549 1392 40 17 374 160 0 0 0 0 
Grain 12443 14301 8 404 0 0 13948 2271 66 28 610 261 0 0 0 0 
Cotton 0 0 () 0 22 5 0 () 6182 2649 480 206 62 19 0 0 
Crops 6553 3604 88 58 19 4 17513 2851 8068 3458 3017 1293 10 3 6 0 
Wool 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~·· .-, 394 21 9 6 2 0 0 
Animals 1996 4737 113 75 144 29 11416 1858 .L 2068 4662 1998 259 77 18 0 .q.. 
Forest 687 1143 2489 108 555 114 198 32 19 4385 1879 467 140 84 2 
Fishing 0 0 0 1099 0 () 1801 293 {J 0 51 22 0 0 0 0 
Mineral 1390 341) 146 348 17827 3651 546 89 411 176 13698 5871 13664 4081 10464 214 
Food 5210 1083:1 10 1573 75 15 18670 3039 1070 458 3864 1656 388 116 35 0 
Textile 658 421 39 26 770 158 425 69 53542 22946 10625 4553 5131 1533 248 5 
Non-metal 28566 771 688 366 4085 837 5553 904 10179 4363 65345 28005 31476 9402 946 19 
Me1al 2335 480 160 458 6977 1429 1147 187 1923 824 15001 6429 119452 35680 1776 36 
Elect 1545 281 51 66 2894 593 609 99 788 338 9242 3961 8186 2445 876 18 
Construction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tra<le&trans. 5845 2547 379 403 3987 817 14205 2312 11051 4736 14807 6346 19592 5852 1693 35 
Service 4953 1686 371 872 1272 261 3814 621 3748 1606 6528 2798 9980 2981 405 8 
lntennediate 86826 43519 4558 6558 38628 7912 114028 18563 1029~~:::! 44114 153394 65740 208673 62331 16552 338 
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Table 7A.2b 22-sector input-output table for China, 1987: Domestic goods (million RMB yuan) (continued) 
Construction Trade&1rasn. Service Int'diate Household Gov't Investment Final Total 
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural input Rural Urb;m cons. Capital Stock Exporl u:,e ou1pu1 
Rice 0 0 65 13 243 73 30228 30726 4591 39 0 1513 698 37567 67796 
Wheat 0 0 36 7 133 40 17903 19874 2970 26 0 816 0 23685 41588 
Grain 0 0 58 12 217 65 44693 13540 2023 18 0 -555 1404 16430 61129 
Colton 0 0 0 0 104 31 9758 0 0 0 538 4751 56 5345 15104 
Crops 163 60 2047 419 385 l 15 49734 39388 30947 21 I 0 -1749 12465 8.'263 131005 
Wool 0 0 0 0 0 0 1352 0 0 0 0 -5 0 -5 1350 
Animal 470 !74 2303 472 424 127 38246 42834 13527 369 1076 3548 5316 66670 104916 
Forest 227 84 146 30 242 72 13148 725 608 0 8181 -979 516 9051 22198 
Fishing 0 0 2633 539 222 66 6729 6912 6577 44 0 1473 1747 16753 22486 
Mineral 7749 2866 9506 1947 3851 1150 99995 4008 3024 () () -525 9005 15512 l 15528 
Food 151 56 8174 1674 1212 362 58642 47862 57691 4474 0 4874 11157 126057 184698 
Tex Ii le 1649 610 3529 723 2135 638 110432 30642 24580 1367 0 7784 37978 102352 212783 
Non-metal 47931 17728 144 1873 23686 7075 298940 6926 19714 4284 898 3892 24641 60355 359294 
Metal 38662 14300 8699 1782 10364 3096 271197 22316 20390 620 95879 17468 40095 196767 467963 
Elect 1611 596 1467 301 2152 643 38764 1118 2608 0 0 -310 0 3416 42183 
Construction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 243056 0 0 243056 243056 
Trade&tr;ms. 10802 3995 6647 1361 11936 3565 132915 27049 23987 11533 7597 6593 0 76759 209674 
Service 1366 505 22124 4531 13648 4077 88154 27979 37501 109209 215 -1097 2694 176501 264654 
lnlennediale 110784 40975 76578 15685 70951 21193 1310830 321898 250739 132194 357440 47492 147772 1257534 2567405 
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Table 7 A.2c 22-sector input-output table for China, 1987: Total (million RMB yuan) 
Agricultural sectors Mineral Food processing Textile Non-metal Metal Electricity 
Farming Animals Forest Fish Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urbaro Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Rice 9259 850 9 453 0 0 15635 2545 74 32 684 293 0 0 0 0 
Wheat 6044 1700 6 278 0 0 9591 1561 45 19 419 180 0 0 0 0 
Grain 12576 14454 8 409 0 0 14097 2295 66 28 616 264 0 0 0 0 
Cotton 0 0 0 0 25 5 0 0 6946 2977 539 231 70 21 0 0 
Crops 6582 3619 89 58 19 4 17590 2863 8103 3473 3030 1299 10 3 6 0 
Wool 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2285 979 53 23 14 4 0 0 
Animals 1997 4739 113 75 144 29 11422 1859 4828 2069 4665 1999 259 77 18 0 
Forest 687 1143 2489 108 555 114 198 32 45 19 4385 1879 467 140 84 2 
Fishing 0 0 0 1103 0 0 1808 294 0 0 52 22 0 0 0 0 
Mineral 1442 363 152 361 18503 3790 567 92 427 183 14217 6093 14182 4236 10860 222 
Food 5358 11141 IO 1617 77 16 19201 3126 1100 471 3974 1703 399 119 36 0 
Textile 695 445 42 28 814 167 449 73 56577 24247 11227 4812 5422 1620 262 5 
Non-metal 31407 848 756 403 4491 920 6105 994 11192 4796 71843 30790 34607 10337 1040 21 
Metal 2893 595 199 568 8645 1771 1422 231 2383 1021 18588 7966 148015 44212 2201 45 
Elect 1556 283 51 66 2915 597 613 100 794 340 9308 3989 8244 2463 882 18 
Construction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Trade&trans. 5853 2551 380 404 3992 818 14223 2315 11065 4742 14826 6354 19617 5860 1696 35 
Service 4953 1686 371 872 1272 261 3814 621 3748 1606 6528 2798 9980 2981 405 8 
Intennediatc 91301 44417 4674 6803 41453 8490 116733 19003 109678 47005 164954 70695 241286 72073 17491 357 
Factor returns 
Labour 132839 36491 10339 9253 11843 2426 6299 1025 11780 5048 23476 10061 3001 I 8964 2524 52 
Capita! 27018 7422 2103 1882 42592 8724 35808 5829 27491 11782 63076 27033 89035 26595 21324 435 
Lmd 65464 17936 5082 4548 
Total cost 316622 106266 22198 22486 95888 19640 158840 25858 148948 63835 251506 107788 360332 107631 41339 844 
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Table 7 A.2c 22-sector input-output tab!e for China, 1987: Total (million RMB yuan) (continued) 
Construction Tradc&lrans. Service Inl'dialc Household Gov'l Invcslmcnl F'.Jreign trade Final Total ..., 
Urban Rural Urb:m Rural Urban Rural input Rural Urban cons. Capital Stock Import Export USC output 
Rice 0 0 65 13 243 73 30228 30726 4591 39 0 1513 n 698 J7567 67796 
Wh<.!al 0 0 40 8 149 45 20086 22297 3332 29 0 915 5071 0 26573 41588 
Grain 0 0 59 12 219 65 45171 13685 2045 18 0 -555 639 1404 16597 61129 
Collon 0 0 0 0 116 35 10965 0 0 0 604 5339 1861 56 5999 15104 
Cro!JS 164 61 2055 421 387 115 49952 39561 31083 212 0 -1749 520 12465 81572 131005 
Wool 0 0 0 0 0 0 3358 0 0 0 0 -5 2004 0 -5 1350 
Animals 470 174 2304 472 425 127 38264 42854 13533 369 1077 3550 47 5316 ·6698 104916 
Forest 227 84 146 30 242 72 13148 725 608 0 8181 979 0 .: 16 9050 22198 
Fishing 0 0 2643 541 223 67 6753 6937 6601 44 n 1478 75 1747 15808 22486 
Mineral 8043 2975 9867 2021 3997 1194 103786 4160 3139 0 0 -525 4038 9005 15780 115528 
Food 155 57 8406 1722 1:.1,46 372 60311 49224 59333 4601 0 5013 4940 11157 129327 184698 
Textile i743 645 3729 764 2256 674 116693 32379 25974 1445 0 8225 9910 37978 106000 212783 
Non-metal 52698 19491 10053 2059 26041 7179 328671 7615 21675 4710 987 4279 33283 24641 63907 359294 
Metal 47906 17719 10779 2208 12842 3836 336045 27652 25265 768 118805 21645 102311 40095 234230 467963 
Elect 1623 600 1478 303 2167 647 39040 1126 2627 0 0 -310 300 0 3443 42183 
Construction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 243056 0 0 0 243056 243056 
Tradc&trans. 10816 4000 6656 1363 11951 3570 ~33084 27083 24017 11548 7607 6601 266 0 76855 209674 
Service 1366 505 22124 4531 13648 4077 88154 27979 37501 109209 215 -1097 0 2694 176500 264654 
Intcnnediatc 125214 46312 80404 16468 76150 22746 1423707 334003 261324 132990 380260 53610 165263 147771 1308959 2567403 
Factor returns 
Labour 36090 13348 48793 9994 64909 19389 
Capital 16128 5965 44832 9182 62724 18736 
Lru1d 
Total cost 177431 65625 174029 35645 203784 60870 
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Changes in the Economic Environment and Agricultural 
Adjustment 
The effects of policy can be of two kinds, that which changes the feasible choice set 
(factor mobility) and that which affects the incentive structure in the economy. A single 
policy measure may affect both. A monetary expansion may expand farmers' feasible 
choice set outside agriculture thus increasing the potential mobility of agricultural 
factors. It may also lead to a change in relative prices, particularly when price controls 
are present. 
The computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is applieci here to examine the effects 
of policy changes on agricultural performance. Following one of the major arguments of 
this study, price policies, for example state purchase price of grain, are determined 
endogenously. The exogenous shocks of interests to this study include: 
• changes in the world market 
• economic reforms such as tariff reduction 
• variations in macroeconomic policies 
• a rapid expansion of rural industry 
• improvement of labour mobiJicy between urban and rural areas. 
The exogenous shocks are designed to illustrate how Chinese agriculture reacts, within 
the economic framework modelled in this study, to various shocks and policy changes. 
Before economic reform, the Chinese economy was almost an autarky, and internally, 
individual sectors were insulated from each other. Not only did changes in the world 
market have little effect on the domestic economy, \Jut changes in one sector had very 
limited impact on other sectors. Economic reforms, however, have been raising the 
degree of economic integration with the economy between the Chinese economy and the 
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rest of the world. Simulations of changes to the world market and rapid expansion of the 
rural industry (the 'Dutch Disease') are designed to show interdependence between the 
agricultural sector and the rest of the economy. 
Tariff reform and monetary expansion are also introduced to show economic 
interdependence. Simulation of a tariff reduction on wool - one key product of interest 
to this study - has direct and indirect impacts on wool production, textile production 
and other parts of the economy at the same time. Simulation of monetary expansion 
exposes an important effect that money may have in a sem.i-marketized economy. Money 
may not be neutral in the presence of price distortions. A change in money supply 
therefore influences the real structure of the economy. 
Most indirect effects are created by the increasing degree of economic integration, both 
externally and internally. Economic reform in China, however, is far from complete. 
Labour market segmentation between rural and urban areas persists. This is one of the 
key characteristics of the current Chinese economy limiting the indirect effects of 
exogenous shocks. The simulation of labour market reform is therefore designed to show 
the cost incurred by the Chinese economy due to limited labour mobility and the 
economic potenti.il of further reform. 
The key issues of interest are endogenously determined changes in price distortion, 
changes in agricultural performance including production, consumption and trade of 
agricultural products, and changes in the macroeconomy, particularly GDP growth, trade 
balance and the overall price level. 
Shocks to the World Markets: Demand Shift and Price Change 
International Markets and the Chinese Economy 
Two kinds of shocks in the world markets are examined: a rise in demand for Chinese 
manufactured exports and changes in world agricultural prices. 
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Examination of the effects of changes in international markets on the domestic economy 
are commonly undertaken, particularly in the application of economy-wide models 
(Higgs 1986). The effects tend to be greater as the economy opens. In an autarkic 
economy, influences are limited. 
As the Chinese economy increasingly integrates into the world economy, it will become 
more dependent on the rest of the world. Any changes in the international market will 
have greater impacts on its economic structure and agricultural performance. 
Since economic reform began, China's exports and imports have risen rapidly. The most 
significant component of the export increase is of labour-intensive manufactured goods, 
including textile products. Export of some textile products, however, is still subject to 
the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) (Yang 1992). As manufactured exports are likely to 
continue to increase in the near future, it is of interest to study the impact on agricultural 
performance of a shock to world demand for Chinese manufactured exports. The shock 
can be thought of as a significant rise in the reputation of the Chinese goods or removal 
of the MFA. 1 This change will affect price distortions and agricultural perfonnance. 
Following Higgs (1986), the impact of MFA removal can be described with the 
assistance of Figure 8 .1. 
Assume demand for China's textile products (D) consists of two parts, domestic demand 
(D d) and foreign demand (D1). Chinese textile industry supply is ~epresented by the 
schedule S (products produced by other countries are separated from this market). 
Equilibrium occurs at the intersection of D and S(A). Total supply is Oe, Oa to the 
international market and ae t' the domestic market. 
If the MFA is removed in the process of international trade negotiation, some industrial 
countries, including the United States, will have to abolish restrictions imposed on 
1 Yang argued that, though China may have benefited from the MFA system in early years when it 
started to enter the international markets, the MFA system has increasingly become a constraint on the 
growth of China's exports of textile products. China may enjoy a more rapid increase in its exports if the 
MFA system is to be removed (Yang 1992). 
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Chinese textile exports. This suggests that a shift of foreign demand for Chinese textile 
products, from D1 to Dr will occur. Accordingly, the total demand curve (D) will shift to 
the right (D'). The new equilibrium would be at point B. The direct result is that total 
supply increases and the textile industry expands, and the price of Chinese textile 
products rises from P* to P'. Supply to the international market rises from Oa to Ob, 
while supply to the domestic market drops from ae to bf (or from Od to Oc). 
Figure 8.1 Direct effects of a rise in demand for China's exports 
Price s 
P' 
P* 
0 
'---~~~---~.....:..~~~..__..;._~~~~~--''--~~~~~~ ..... 
a b c d ef Quantity 
Due to the characteristics of production activity and the nature of demand, fluctuations in 
agricultural markets are more rapid than in other markets. Domestic policies, such as 
subsidies to agricultural exports, have resulted in increasing fluctuations in the world 
markets (Tyers and Anderson 1992). 
World grain prices have exhibited a long-run declining trend, particularly wheat prices 
(Tyers and Anderson 1992). China pursues a grain self-sufficiency policy but in recent 
years has imported some wheat, 14.9 million tonnes in 1989 and 12.5 million tonnes in 
1990,2 and exported some rice and soybeans. China's response to changes in the 
international grain markets may be limited because of the grain 'self-sufficiency' policy 
2 State Statistics Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook 1991, China Statistics Press, Beijing:626. 
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(Chapter 5). But substitution exists between domestic and imported grains. This study 
investigates the impact of a decline of world wheat price on Chinese agriculture. 
Figure 8.2 Real prices of Australian wheat exports, 1971-92 (1979-80=100) 
0 +--+---l~-+--+---l---+--+------+---+-~---1---..~._,_-1--;..~.;-.-1--J.~ 
1971-72 1976-77 1981-82 1986-87 1991-92 
Note: Wheat prices are export price quotations for Australian standard white (eastern states) and expport 
prices are deflated by the Australian producer price index. 
Source: ABARE (1992), Commodity Statistical Bulletin 1992. Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics, Canberra. 
Experiment: Rise in Demand for China's Textile Exports 
Changes to the Chinese economy and the agricultural sector following a 10 per cent 
increase in world demand for China's textile exports are presented in Tables 8.1, 8.2 and 
8.3. 
The textile industry is a major industrial and exporting sector. In the current Chinese 
economy, a 10 per cent increase in world demand for China's textile exports would have 
a significant macroeconomic effect. Real GDP would rise by 0.18 per cent, equivalent to 
4.15 billion RMB yuan in 1987 prices (Table 8.1). The impact on foreign trade is 
significant. Export volumes would increase by 0.46 per cent and import volumes rise by 
0.14 per cent. As a result of these changes, the balance of trade would improve by 1.32 
per cent. 
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Table 8.1 Macroeconomic impact of a change in foreign demand 
10% increase in demand for China's textile ex orts 
Real Gross Domestic Product 
Balance of trade 
Export volwne 
Import volwne 
Real rural wage 
Real urban wage 
Employment in rural industry 
Em lo ment in agriculture 
Note: All numbers in the table are percentage changes. 
Source: Simulation results. 
0.18 
1.32 
0.46 
0.14 
0.65 
0.46 
2.34 
-0.78 
Another interesting result is the effect on wages and employment Increases in textile 
exports would result in real wage rises of 0.65 and 0.46 per cent in the rural and urban 
areas, respectively. Labour relocation would occur, rural industrial employment rises by 
2.34 per cent and agricultural employment drops by 0.78 per cent. On the basis of 
current employment levels, this implies a labour flow of 2.4 million persons from 
agriculture to rural industry. 
Endogenous price distortions are also affected by this exogenous shock. Two of the 
major outcomes in this simulation directly influence the levels of state prices for grain 
and fibre. One is changes in market prices and the GDP deflator, and the other is changes 
in the share of agriculture in the whole economy. As the first factor has a positive effect 
while the second factor has a negative influence on the levels of the state prices, state 
prices for grain and fibre all rise in this simulation, although the changes are not 
significant in magnitude (Table 8.2). The results show, however, that relaxation of 
restrictions on labour flow would lead to larger adjustment in state prices. 
Table 8.2 Impact on price distortion of a change in foreign demand 
10% increase in demand for China's textile ex orts 
State price of rice 
State price of wteat 
State price of other grain 
Purchase price of cotton 
Purchase rice of wool 
Note: All numbers in the table are percentage changes. 
Source: Simulation results. 
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This shock only has indirect effects on the agricultural sector. The changes in Chinese 
agriculture following this shock, however, are not insignificant (Table 8.3). 
Table 8.3 Impact on the agricultural sector following a change in foreign demand 
10% increase in demand for China's textile ex arts 
Agricultural outputs 
Rice 
Wheat 
Other grain 
Cotton 
Other crops 
Wool 
Other livestock 
Forestry products 
Fishery products 
Agricultural trade 
Export of rice 
Export of other grain 
Import of wheat 
Import of wool 
Agricultural market ;:irices 
Rice 
Wheat 
Other grain 
Other crops 
Other livestock 
Farmer's real income 
A riculture's share in econom 
Note: All numbers in the table are percentage changes. 
Source: Simulation results. 
-0.02 
-0.04 
-0.03 
-0.09 
0.03 
-0.11 
0.00 
-0.01 
-0.01 
-0.57 
-0.16 
0.83 
7.80 
0.35 
0.97 
0.12 
1.34 
0.53 
0.48 
-0.78 
Market prices for all agricultural products would rise, from between 0 .12 to 1. 34 per 
cer1t. This is because the rise in export demand stimulates development of the textile 
industry. Textile output increases by 1.4 per cent equivalent to 1.90 billion RMB yuan, 
and actual textile exports rise by 9.3 per cent. The booming textile sector competes for 
more resources, such as labour. Non-tradable sectors are stimulated due to higher 
income. Other tractable sectors, including some tractable agricultural products, are hit by 
these changes. Economic structural change would be accelerated, the share of the 
agricultural sector in the whole economy would drop by 0.78 per cent, from 20.26 per 
cent to 20.10 per cent. This overall decline is reflected in the fall in most agricultural 
outputs. Grain output falls by 0.02-0.04 per cent and cotton and wool output drop 0.09 
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and 0.11 per cent, respectively. The only exceptions are output of other crops which 
rises by 0.03 per cent and output of other livestock which is unchanged. 
To understand why a rise in price combines with a drop in output, it is important to 
follow the mechanism for output determination in the CGE framework. Although 
agricultural prices increase unevenly, activity levels decline because they are dependent 
on demands for intermediate inputs as well as primary factors including labour. After the 
shock, the factor demand declines as a consequence of the growth in the textile and other 
sectors. Individual agricultural output thus decreases. This provides an added reason for 
the rise in the domestic market prices for most agricultural products (also taking the rise 
of total income into account). 
Of panicular note are changes in cotton and wool output. In a CGE model of a market 
economy, a shock to the demand for textile exports would obviously stimulate domestic 
production of cotton and wool as ·hese products are principal raw materials for the 
textile industry. Yet, both outputs of wool and cotton decline in the case of China 
because producer prices for wool and cotton are controlled by the government, 
detennined by a farmer-state bargaining process. State prices of cotton and wool respond 
to this shock but at much smaller magnitudes than the market prices for cotton and wool 
would. As a result, domestic supplies of wool and cotton do not increase; instead, they 
fall. 
Fanners' income is influenced by two factors. First, farmers' real income from 
agriculture may drop due to the contraction of the agricultural sector. On the other hand 
their labour income, particularly from the industrial sector, rises. A combination of these 
two factors results in an increase of 0.5 per cent in farmers' real income. 
Experiment: Increase in the World Price of "''heat 
Changes in world market prices may be driven by various factors including technological 
innovation in supplier countries and shifts in taste affecting demand. These changes will 
have a significant impact on economies involved in these markets. 
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In a market economy importing wheat, a rise m the world wheat price would raise 
domestic wheat production and affect production activities competing for resources with 
wheat production. In an economy where the state determined wheat price is exogenously 
set, a rise in world wheat price would reduce wheat imports but would not directly affect 
domestic wheat production, as the state price for wheat would not change unless the 
government adjusted it. 
Both of these responses occur in the Chinese economy (see Table 8.4). 
Table 8.4 Simulation results of changes in world wheat price 
10% increase in wheat rice in the world market 
Macroeconomic impacts 
Real GDP 
Balance of trade 
Export volumes 
Import volumes 
Employment in rural industry 
Employment in agriculture 
Price distortions 
State price of rice 
State price of wheat 
State price of other grain 
Purchase price of cotton 
Purchase price of wool 
Agricultural outputs 
Rice 
Wheat 
Other grain 
Cotton 
Other crops 
Wool 
Other livestock 
Agricultural trade 
Exports of rice 
Exports of other grain 
Imports of wheat 
Imports of wool 
Textile industry 
Output of textile products 
Export of textile products 
Farmer's real income 
Agriculture's share in economy 
Note: All numbers in the table are percentage changes. 
Source: Simulation results. 
-0.003 
0.001 
-0.011 
-0.010 
-0.416 
0.104 
-0.003 
1.249 
-0.001 
-0.031 
-0.031 
-0.002 
1.132 
-0.591 
-0.004 
-0.000 
-0.010 
-0.789 
-0.003 
-0.398 
-5.439 
-0.412 
-0.113 
-0.551 
-0.103 
0.018 
A 10 per cent rise in the world wheat price leads to a 5.4 per cent in imports of wheat, 
from 13.2 million tonnes to 12.5 million tonnes (Table 8.4). State price for wheat rises, 
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while all other state prices fall. All agricultural outputs drop, except wheat and other 
crops. Domestic wheat output rises by 1.1 per cent, up from 87 .8 million tonnes to 88. 7 
million tonnes. 
More importantly, this change leads to labour relocation (about 0.3 million persons) from 
rural industry to agriculture. Farmers' income is affected both by the supply of 
agricultural output and their wage income from the rural industry. The combination of 
these two effects reduces farmers r~al income by about 0.1 per cent. The share of 
agriculture in the whole economy increases. 
Trade Policy Reform and a Reduction in Tariff on Wool Imports 
Trade reforms of the transition period have been an important driving engine for the 
rapid growth of the Chinese economy. Trade reform measures can be classified into two 
general groups: institutional reform and correction of incentive distortions. 
Institutional reforms mainly include decentralization of importing and exporting activities 
and implementation of the enterprise responsibility system. Correction of incentive 
distortions includes the gradual liberalization of exchange controls and reduction of 
import tariffs. 
As the Chinese government has decided to seek membership of GA TT, it has committed 
to fllfther and more complete trade reforms, particularly the removal of quantitative 
restrictions and import tariffs. This study places special emphasis on tariff reduction on 
wool imports for two reasons. First, China benefits greatly from the realization of its 
comparative advantage, namely the rapid development of labour-intensive 
manufacturing. One important sector in this respect is textile and clothing. Wool is one 
of the important material inputs into this sector. China has dramatically reduced its tariff 
on wool imports in the past ten years or so. It can be expected that a further reduction 
may facilitate more rapid growth of textile production and exports. Second, Australia 
recently proposed establishment of free trade between Australia and China in textiles. 
This proposal received positive response in China during a visit by the Australian Prime 
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Minister in 1993. Further tariff reductions are a step towards free trade. The simulation 
of reduced wool tariff is therefore designed to examine the detailed impacts on the 
Chinese economy of such a policy. 
The mechanism of economic adjustment to a tariff reduction is similar to that for a 
change in world market prices except that this reform involves re-allocation of tariff 
revenue. 
Experiment: Abolition of the Tariff on Wool Imports 
The tariff rate for wool (greasy and scoured) was 22.3 per cent in 1986 on average 
(Yang 1992). This was reduced to 15 per cent in 1988 (Morris et al. 1993). Again, in 
December 1992, the government adjusted the tariff rates on raw materials for the textile 
industry, including wool, downward by 9.6 per cent (Fang Xing and Meng Ming 1993). 
The current tariff rate on wool is about 13 per cent. The simulation was carried out by 
removing this tariff on wool imports (Table 8.5). 
The removal of the tariff on wool imports would push the domestic price down by 4.3 
per cent. The change in the state price is influenced by agriculture's share in the economy 
(it drops 0.034 per cent) as well as the import price (exclusive of the import tariff). 
Wool imports increase by 6.4 per cent (9. 7 thousand tonnes) but output decreases by 3.5 
per cent (7.3 thousand tonnes). This change in wool production and imports is 
transmitted to other agricultural commodities and the rest of the economy. Change~ in 
output of other agricultural products are minor with the exception of cotton output 
which decreases by 1.2 per cent. This reduction is presumably a result of an inward shift 
of the cotton demand curve due to fibre substitution effects generated by lower wool 
prices. The textile industry is also affected directly. Output of textiles and clothing 
(including footwear) increases by 3.2 per cent and exports increase by 1 per cent. 
This shock also affects labour allocation between agriculture and rural industry. About 
12 thousand persons move out of agriculture. The balance of trade worsens a little. This 
is because the wool textile industry, encouraged by the reduction of import tariffs, is 
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largely domestic-market oriented compared with the cotton textile industry. Real GDP, 
however, increases by 0.01 per cent (about 230 million yuan). Farmer's real income rises 
marginally, although the agricultural sector contracts (by 0.034 per cent). 
Table 8.5 Simulation results of changes in tariff on wool imports 
Macroeconomic impacts 
Real GDP 
Balance of trade 
Export volumes 
Import volwnes 
Employment in rural industry 
Employment in agriculture 
Price distortions 
State price of rice 
State price of wheat 
State price of other grain 
Purchase price of cotton 
Purchase price of wool 
Agricultural outputs 
Rice 
Wheat 
Other grain 
Cotton 
Other crops 
Wool 
Other livestock 
Agricultural trade 
Exports of rice 
Exports of other grain 
Imports of wheat 
Imports of wool 
Textile industry 
Output of textile products 
Export of textile products 
Fanner's real income 
Agriculture's share in economy 
Note: All numbers in the table are percentage changes. 
Source: Simulation results. 
Abolition of tariff on wool im orts 
O.OiO 
0.003 
0.004 
0.003 
0.011 
-0.004 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
-0.024 
-4.280 
-0.011 
0.024 
0.013 
-1.230 
0.003 
-3.508 
0.002 
0.002 
0.000 
-0.001 
6.401 
3.179 
1.046 
0.001 
-0.034 
Macroeconomic Policies: Changes in Money Supply 
Linkages Between Money and Agriculture in China 
In earlier policy analysis in China, agricultural performance was only related to changes 
in agricultural policies. But the linkage between sectoral performance and 
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macroeconomic policies is an important issue in economic study (Brown 1978, Krueger, 
Schiff and Valdes 1988, Mundlak, Cavallo and Domemech 1989). 
Analysis of agricultural performance in China in the second half of the 1980s sfiMJiws that 
variations in farmers' feasible choice set is the main cause of agricultural stagnation 
(Chapter 3). Farn1ers' feasible choice set was affected by economy-wide policies as well 
as sector-specific policies. The monetary expansion in the mid- l 980s stimulated the 
development of the rural industry. Farmers' employment and investment opportunities 
outside agriculture widened dramatically. 
Money supply policy is chosen here as an exogenous shock for simulation. The model 
constructed in the previous chapter assumes only two kinds of effects of monetary policy 
in the short-run. First, a change in the money supply will change the overall price level in 
the economy. The price structure will change since controlled prices may respond to the 
monetary change differently from market prices. Second, in the Chinese economy, 
monetary expansion usually targets growth of particular industries, such as the rural 
industry in the rnid-l 980s. Monetary expansion therefore will not only widen farmers' 
feasible choice set, but may also affect the endogenously determined price distortions. 
Id~nti.fication of linkages between monetary policy and the agricultural sector is a 
difficult and interesting issue. A complete theory of the interaction between macro 
variables and micro analysis has not yet been developed in the literature. In 
macroeconomics, however, the neutrality property of money in a real economy has been 
a controversial topic (Morgan 1978; Gale 1982). The interest of macro economists lies in 
relating money to fluctuations in aggregate output levels (Keynes 1935, Patin.kin 1965, 
and Reinhar~ and Reinhart 1991 ). No light was cast on structural aspects of the economy 
because, in a macroeconomic world, commodities and agents are assumed homogeneous 
and thus highly aggregated. 
Some recent studies suggest that changes in the money supply are likely to affect sectors. 
differently depending on economic structure. Analysts found that inflation, which can be 
solely caused by an increase in money supply, is seldom fully anticipated. Even when it is 
211 
; 'l 
' J, 
fully anticipated, there are often institutional and other constraints preventing economic 
agents from making the adjustments necessar1 tti preserve their real incomes. A rise in 
the general rate of inflation is therefore associated with different relative price 
movements, depending on the adjustment process in different factor and product 
mark~ts. Inflation may favour one sector or one group of individuals over another 
(Blanchard 1990). The relationship between money and the relative price of agricultural 
output has been increasingly studied and empirical work has been undertaken by some 
ecor10IT'Jsts. Bardo (1980) and Frnnkel (1986) argue that agricultural commodity prices 
are more responsive than manufactured goods prices to an increase in the money supply. 
Tweeten (1980) suggested the opposite. In a recent study of the Canadian case, Taylor 
and Spriggs (1989) supported the Borda-Frankel hypothesis. Whether or not agricultural 
prices are more respon~ive, the important impression is of differential change among 
sectoral prices. If relative prices do change as confirmed by Bordo (1980), Frankel 
(1986) and Tweeten (1980) (though in different directions), then sectoral output levels 
will change differently. Therefore, money supply policy will definitely have structural 
effects on the economy. 
The model applied in this study is not able to capture the full impact of money supply 
change on agricultural performance for two reasons. First, the differential mechanism of 
individual sectoral prices responding to money supply shock, as studied by Frankel 
(1986), Bordo (1980) and others, is not incorporated into the model structure. Second, 
some of the possible effects on the real variables are long-term phenomena, while the 
model developed in this study is short-run in nature. 
The effects that this model can capture directly relate to price distortion policies. A 
monetary expansion would caus.e general inflation in the economy. All market prices 
would float up, when state prices are controlled by the government. Economic structure 
is expected to change. This is a simple interpretation of the monetary effects. But the 
story described in this study does not stop there. State prices are not completely 
exogenous, they also respond to changes in market prices and other changes in the 
economy. The adjustment of state prices, following the monetary expansion and general 
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:inflation, would bring further real effects to the economy. This mechanism can be 
illustrated using Figure 8.3. 
Figure 8.3 The mechanism of monetary effects in a short-run China model 
Monetary expansion World prices 
Economic 
structure 
(C) Agricultural performanc~ General inflation Incentive structur 
(A) 
' 
<J- - (B )_ - - j 
There are three effects following a change in money supply which should be emphasized 
in looking at the simulation results: how market prices change; how changes in market 
prices and economic structure affect distorted prices; and what the equilibrium economic 
structure is after the shock. 
One important issue in modelling trade and monetary relationships is the treatment of the 
exchange regime. In pre-reform China, only one official exchange rate existed. This has 
changed during the reform period. Martin (1990) discussed the dual-tier exchange and 
foreign exchange-retention system and introduced it into a CGE framework. For 
simplicity in this study, however, only a market exchange rate is introduced. Recent 
developments in Chin11 have brought a large number of foreign exchange markets into 
existence. Individuals and firms can exchange on those markets. Following the marginal 
condition in economic decisions, the market exchange regime modelled in this study 
could be thought of as an approximation to reality. 
Money supply is examined carefully ill this study because it has been an important policy 
instrument over the past decade. Real money supply has varied dramatically under 
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different macroeconomic envirorunents since 1979 (Figure 8.4). When the government 
attempted to stimulate ~conomic grnwth, money supply was expansionary, such as 
between 1984 and 1987. When inflation became a serious problem, the government 
tended to contract the money supply, as in 1988 and 1989. Tnese dramatic monetary 
changes have had a significant impact on the economy and the agricultural sector. 
Figure 8.4 Growth rates of real money, 1979-89 (per cent) 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Note: M refers to CUITency, Ml equals M plus finn deposits, and :M2 equals Ml plus household deposits 
(Huang 1988). All the money variables are deflated by the inflation rate of the same year. 
Sources: State Statistics Bureau, China Statistics Yearbook, various issues, China Statistics Press, 
Beijing; Huang (1988). 
Experiment: A Monetary Expansion 
The major effects that this model captures relate to the asynunetry generated by price 
controls, since in the absence of controls money would be neutral. The essence of the 
monetary simulation is to study the impact of price distortion policies in the economy 
when there is an exogenous shock. 
Changes in real variables are the result of differential adjustments following the monetary 
shock. Given a 10 per cent increase in money supply, all nominal variables would float up 
by around 10 per cent. State prices of grain, wool and cotton, however, respond in a 
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different way although they are not strictly controlled by the government. These prices 
move with changes in general inflation, world market prices and economic structure. 
Whilst the GDP deflater rises 9.9 per cent, state prices increase by smaller margins, 5.63 
per cent for cotton and 7.63 per cent for wool (Table 8.6). 
Table 8.6 Simulation results of a monetary expansion 
Macroeconomic impacts 
Real GDP 
GDP deflator 
Real wage in urb'"1 areas 
Real wage in rural areas 
Employment in rural industry 
Employment in agriculture 
Price distortions 
State price of rice 
State price of wheat 
State price of other grain 
Purchase price of cotton 
Purchase price of wool 
Agricultural outputs 
Rice 
Wheat 
Other grain 
Cotton 
Other crops 
Wool 
Other livestock 
Textile industry 
Output of textile products 
Farmer's real income 
A rici..:~e's share in econom 
Note: All numbers in the table are percentage changes. 
Source: Simulation results. 
10% increase in mone su l 
0.05 
9.98 
-0.03 
0.01 
0.28 
-0.09 
7.83 
8.84 
8.35 
5.63 
7.63 
-0.01 
-0.02 
-0.01 
-4.28 
-0.01 
-3.35 
0.00 
0.98 
0.01 
-0.02 
These differential price responses cause changes to relative prices in the economy. 
Relative prices of wool and cotton decrease. A lower aggregate agricultural price results 
in relocation of labour. Industrial sectors tend to demand more labour due to rises in the 
relative prices of their products. 
Labour relocation generates higher activity levels for industry and lower levels for 
agriculture. Industrial output therefore increases, for example by 0.98 per cent for textile 
products, and agricultural output decreases. In particular, output of cotton and wool 
drops by 4.28 and 3.35 per cent, respectively. Outputs of rice, wheat and other grain do 
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not fall significantly because free markets exist for these commodities alongside the plan 
system. 
These structural changes impact on real GDP because the productivity of labour in 
industry and agriculture are different. The marginal productivity of labour in industry is 
more than double that in agriculture (see Chapter 4). The 276,000 farmers relocated in 
the industrial sector now produce more real product than they did in the agricultural 
sector. The increased industrial output, less the product decline in agriculture, causes real 
GDP to rise by 0.05 per cent. The share of agriculture in the economy decreases 0.02 per 
cent. 
The real wage in the urban sector falls, while that in the rural sector rises. Given nonnal 
production technology and other fixed factor inputs, the marginal productivity of labour 
decreases as the amount of labour input rises changing marginal productivities and 
narrowing the gap between real wages in the two sectors. 
The impact of this monetary expansion on farmers' real income depends on several 
faL.:ors. First, agriculture declines in the Chinese economy after the shock. Second, 
farmers who still work in the agricultural sector now receive higher real wages. Third, a 
number of farmers move to the industrial sector and receive industrial real wages. The 
combination of these factors causes farmers' real income to rise by 0.01 per cent. 
The results support the argument of previous chapters that changes in monetary policy 
were one important cause of the expansion and contraction of Chinese agriculture in the 
second half of the 1980s. 
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The Dutch Disease: Rapid Growth of Rural Industry 
Interaction of Rural Industry with Agriculture 
As a result of the rural liberalization policy and the maintenance of restrictions on factor 
movements between rural and urban areas, rural industry has developed rapidly in the 
past decade. This rural industry is of particular importance to Chinese farmers. Their 
resource allocation decisions are usually made between agriculture and rural industry. 
Rural industry is created by the farming community. Looking at Chinese farmers as a 
whole, rural industry is their second most important economic opportunity apart from the 
agriculture. Resistance to resource relocation between agriculture and rural industries is 
much smaller than between rural and urban areas. Not only has a large amount of labour 
and capital moved from agriculture to the rural industry in the past decade, but industrial 
profits are sometimes returned to agriculture to build agricultural infrastructure. Some 
rural enterprises directly use agricultural products as raw materials. These firms provide 
a secure market for local agricultural production. They also constitute a competing force 
to urban enterprises in both raw material and output markets. 
Rural industry has become an important economic sector in China, particularly in 
contrast with the rel11tively declining agricultural sector and the slowly growing state 
industry. In 1990, employment in rural industry accounted for 16.3 per cent of the total 
labour force and 22.1 per cent of the rural labour force (China Statistical Yearbook 
1991). At the same time, output from rural industry accounted for 22.3 per cent of 
national output and 50.9 per cent of rural output. The importance of this sector is likely 
to increase. 
The rapid development of rural industry has had very significant effects on agriculture 
ano farmers in China. This industry will continue to play an important role in competing 
for resources with agriculture in infrastructure construction and in processing agricultural 
products. The linkages between rural industry and agriculture will not only affect the 
development of the rural area, but may impact on the whole economy. 
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The Dutch Disease originally referred to the effects of a sudden expansion of mineral and 
energy sectors. In this study, the term is borrowed to describe the effects of an expansion 
of the rural industry (Findlay, Martin and Watson 1992). 
Findlay, Martin and Watson (1992) introduced such a shock by extending a model 
previously developed by Martin. The efficiency of textiles, clothing and miscellaneous 
manufacturing indu•;tries was increased. They found that absorption increased by 2.5 per 
cent and that the price level fell by the same amount. Exports and real wages rose. More 
importantly, the effects on agricultural output were uneven. The output of crops declined 
because resources were bid away to booming sectors and to the expanding non-tradables 
sector. 
This study replicates this shock. Rural industry is probably the most important non-
agricultural sector to agriculture and farmers in China. In the framework of the COE 
model, it is of interest to see what the effects are of sudden growth in the rural industry, 
in comparison with the results by Findlay et al. (1992 ). Furthermore, this study is able to 
reveal the ffifluences of such a shock on agricultural price distortion policies and their 
feedback to the agricultural sector and the economy. 
Experiment: A Sudden Expansion of the Rural Industry 
One distinct feature of this study is that rural and urban industries are explicitly separated 
in the model. Therefore we can directly introduce changes in rural industries and examine 
their effects on agriculture and the economy as a whole. The shock is designed as a 10 
per cent rise in the efficiency with which all inputs in all rural industries are used. The 
rationale for this design is that rural industry, particularly in the coastal provinces, is 
experiencing a transformation from an industry using traditional and out-of-date 
technology to a modem one. This transformation is raising productivity rapidly. By 
designing a uniform improvement in all rural enterprises, the aim is to expose the likely 
impacts of a dramatic expansion of rural industry on agricultural performance. 
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In 1987, rural industry accounted for about 20 per cent of GDP in China. If a 10 per cent 
increase in the productivity of rural industry is transformed into an extra 10 per cent 
output, its direct contribution should raise GDP by about 2 per cent. The actual effect on 
GDP, however, is real growth of 3.56 per cent (Table 8.7). This suggests that efficiency 
improvement in the rural industry has a multiplier effect of about 1.8. The extra 1.56 
percentage points of growth can be thought of as the gain from resource re-allocation, 
and the growth impact transmitted from the rural industry to other parts of the economy. 
This shock has very significant consequences for China's trade: export a11d import 
volumes increase by 9.36 and 7.33 per cent, respectively. The balance of trade improves. 
Table 8.7 Macroeconomic impact of the Dutch Disease 
Real GDP 
Export volwnes 
Import volumes 
10% rise in the efficienc of in ut use b rural indus 
Real wage in urban area 
Real wage in rural area 
Employment in rural industry 
Em lo ment in a riculture 
Note: All numbers in the table are percentage changes. 
Source: Simulation results. 
3.56 
9.36 
7.33 
0.38 
3.39 
7.91 
-2.67 
Due to the efficiency improvement and rapid expansion ofrural industry, rural real wages 
increase by 3.39 per cent. As labour is not mobile between rural "nd urban areas by 
assumption, urban real wages only increase by 0.38 per cent as 
,direct effect of the 
rmal industry expansirm. The gap between rural and urban wages would narrow. About 
8.1 million farmers, 2.67 per cent of the agricultural labour force or 7 .91 per cent of the 
rural industry labour force, move to industrial production as a result of this shock. 
There are similar effects on state prices. As the industrial sector expands rapidly, the 
agricultural sector contracts. This leads to a rise in all endogenously determined state 
prices (Table 8.8). 
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Table 8.8 Impact on price distortions of the Dutch Disease 
10% rise in the efficienc of in ut use bv rural indus 
State price of rice 
State price of wheat 
State price of other grain 
Purchase price of cotton 
Purchase rice of wool 
Note: All numbers in the table are percentage changes. 
Source: Simulation results. 
1.03 
2.02 
0.59 
3.56 
2.78 
As expected, most agricultural outputs decrease, 0.12 per cent for rice, 0.56 for wheat, 
0.08 per cent for other grain and 1.33 for other crops. Supplies of cotton, wool and other 
livestock rise by 0.53, 0.79 and 0.1 per cent, respectively. Agricultural trade also changes 
greatly. Rice exports fall because of the decline in domestic production and the rise in 
income. The reduction in other grain exports is likely to be related to the need for 
development of husbandry industry due to higher income, apart from reduced supplies. 
Imports of wool increase significantly (Table 8.9). 
Table 8.9 Impact on agricultural performance of the Dutch Disease 
-======================r========================================== 
10% rise in the efficienc of in ut use b rural indus 
Agricultural output 
Rice 
Wheat 
Other grain 
Cotton 
Other crops 
Wool 
Other livestock 
Agricultural trade 
Exports of rice 
Exports of other grain 
Imports of wheat 
Imports of wool 
Fanner's real income 
Agriculture's share in econom · 
Note: All numbers in the table are percentage changes. 
Source: Simulation results. 
-0.12 
-0.56 
-0.08 
0.53 
-1.33 
0.79 
0.10 
-1.21 
-3.55 
4.89 
3.91 
2.04 
-1.13 
These results reinforce the arguments and findings presented in Chapter 4. An expansion 
of rural industry apparently results in contraction of agriculture. From the point of view 
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of agriculture or grain fundamentalists, this might be a serious economic problem as 
wheat self-sufficiency falls by 1 percentage point (from 87 to 86 per cent). 
The contraction or stagnation of the agricultural sector, however, does not necessarily 
imply a failure in economic development if a wider perspective is applied. As the 
i;imulation results show, a decline in the share of agriculture by 1.13 per cent is 
accompanied by a 2.04 per cent increase in farmers' real income and a rise of 3.56 per 
cent in real GDP. 
Liberalization of the Labour Market: Achieving Perfect Labour 
Mobility 
Implications of Labour Market Segmentation 
The implications of limited labour mobility for agricultural perfonnance are that an 
optimal allocation of resources cannot be achieved. Marginal factor productivities are not 
equalized across sectors, at least between rural and urban areas. 
Whether or not the government should lift all controls over factor movement between 
rural and urban areas has been a controversial question in the study of rural development 
China has pursued policies which encourage industrialization of the rural economy. A 
large number of township, village and private enterprises have been established because 
the cities are closed to farmers. This method of industrialization protects cities from 
sudden population expansions (due to the crowding-in of farmers) ard social chaos 
(increasing urban unemployment). The impact on rural areas and the economy has been 
briefly discussed in earlier chapters. 
The story can be illustrated using Figure 8.5. Figure 8.5(a) characterizes the adjustments 
of the economy with perfect labour mobility. The horizontal axis represents the total 
number of workers in the economy. The vertical axis on the left represents the 
agricultural wage and the vertical axis on the right represents the industrial wage. The 
c:lownward sloping line is the marginal product schedule for agricultural production and 
the upward sloping lines are marginal product schedules for industrial production. The 
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number of workers employed in agriculture is measured along the horizontal axis starting 
from point OA, while the number of industrial workers is measured from the opposite 
direction starting from point O,. With perfect labour mobility, the equilibrium wage rate 
and labour allocation between agriculture and industry are determined by the intersection 
of the agricultural and industrial marginal product schedules (E). In this case, agricultural 
and industrial wages are in fact equalized. 
Figure 8.S(a) Labour mobility and economic adjustments: perfect market 
Agricultural 
real wage 
w* 
Q' Q 
Total number of workers 
MPL/ 
Industrial 
real wage 
On the other hand, Figure 8.5(b) illustrates the case of labour markets segmented 
between rural a.nd urban areas. As labour cannot move between the two areas, two wage 
rates exist in the economy, an urban wage rate for urban industries and a rural wage rate 
for agriculture and rural industries. Assume that ORR is the total amount of labour in 
rural areas and it is allocated between agriculture and rural industries. 
Major differences arise in the economy's responses to exogenous changes in the two 
cases discussed above. Using a rise in industrial marginal product as an example (such as 
would result from a rise in the world market price), in the case of perfect labour mobility, 
the industrial marginal product schedule shifts upward from MPL1 to MPL1• This causes 
a change to the aggregate wage rate and a re-allocation of labour. The equilibrium wage 
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rate would rise from w • to w and Q' Q of agricultural labour relocates to industrial 
production. 
In the case of segmented labour markets, the relocation effect is limited because the 
effects of a rise in urban industry marginal product cannot be transmitted to the 
agricultural sectors. The marginal product schedules for both industries would shift 
upward (from MPL1 to MPL1 for rural industry and from MPL1 to MPL, for urban R R U U 
industry). Both urban and rural wages would rise, probably by different margins. 
Relocation of agricultural labour to industry (Q1 Q2 ) is smaller than in the case of perfect 
Figure 8.5(b) Labour mobility and economic adjustments: segmented market 
Rural 
real wage 
w* 
Q2Qj R 
Total number of workers 
Urban 
real wage 
MPL' Iu 
PL1 
u / 
- - - - - - Yiu 
- - - - - - - - WU 
Ou 
This simplified story suggests that labour market segmentation n 1ust distort economic 
structure. By modelling the removal of this segmentation, this study attempts to illustrate 
how the Chinese economy can gain from such reforms. 
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Experiment: Removal of Restrictions on Labour FIO'ws 
The simulation is designed to investigate what might happen if labour is perfectly mobile 
between rural and urban areas. In this case, there will be one unified market wage in the 
economy. Perfect labour mobility is, of CO•trse, only a theoretical case. To achieve this 
not only requires the abolition of all administrative regulations, but also changes in other 
aspects of the economy including market information system and transportation and 
communication facilities. 
The removal of restrictions on labour flows is simulated together with the shock of a 10 
per cent increase in foreign demand for China's textile exports. The second column in 
Table 8.10 is reproduced from Table 8.1 and the third column reports the results from 
the simulation of perfect labour mobility. 
Table 8.10 Impact of a 10 per cent increase in foreign demand for textile exports 
Real GDP 
Balance of trade 
Export volumes 
Import volwnes 
Real urban wage 
Real rural wage 
Employment in rural industry 
Em lovment in a riculture 
Labour market se mentation 
0.18 
1.32 
0.46 
0.14 
0.65 
0.46 
1.03 
-0.78 
Perfect labour mobilit 
0.28 
2.35 
0.98 
0.23 
o.o8a 
o.o8a 
1.11 
-1.56 
Note: In the case of perfect labour mobility, there is only one wage rate in the economy. All numbers in 
the table are percentage change11. 
Source: Simulation results. 
Generally speaking, economic adjustments following a demand shock when perfect 
labour mobility prevails are much more dramatic. For instance, real GDP would increase 
by 0.3 per cent (c8mpared to 0.2 per cent) and the balance of trade improves by a larger 
margin. These results are associated with the re-allocation of labour. If labour is not 
mobile between rural and urban areas, when there is a shock to export demand, 
adjustments to urban industry production are limited while rural industry can adjust its 
output to a larger degree. 
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This is supported by the results in employment allocation. In the perfect labour mobility 
case, a 10 per cent export demand shock could cause a 1.6 per cent reduction in 
agricultural employment (compared to a 0.8 per cent reduction in the earlier simulation). 
This means that agricultural labour relocates not only to rural industry but also to urban 
industry. 
Some Discussion 
Simulations presented in this chapter reveal interesting information about how the whole 
Chinese economy and the agricultural sector respond to various exogenous shocks, 
including changes in the world market, an expansion of money supply and rapid growth 
of rural industry. Government interventio1 ,, such as price distortions and restrictions on 
labour flows, are incorporated into the model and given particular ar-ention. 
The results, however, should be interpreted with caution as there are two shortcomings 
with this China model, apart from the general problems associated with the CGE 
framework. 
One problem relates to the coefficients, particularly the elasticities. Due to the nature of 
the CGE model, the effects isolated are, in many cases, very sensitive to the adoption of 
different elasticities. In this study, although appropriate elasticity coefficients for the 
Chinese economy have been chosen carefully, for example those from the World Bank 
(1985), Martin (1990) and others, efforts were orJy made to estimate empirically the 
supply elasticities of agriculture and elasticities related to endogenous policy 
determination. 
The monetary mechanism is not completely incorporated into the structure. The potential 
real effects of monetary change on an economy take various forms, particularly in the 
longer term. This model, however, accepts the neutral treatment of money in principle. 
Money is only non-neutral and therefore has some real effects beer. .i3e of the existence of 
incentive distortions. The main purpose of the monetary expansion simulation is to 
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illustrate the difference that price distortions can make to the real economy, not to show 
the real effects of monetary change. 
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China's Agriculture in Transition: Some Conclusions 
This study has analysed agricultural performance in China during the country's transition 
from a centrally planned system to an economy increasingly reliant on market 
mechanisms. The experience of China's agriculture in the second half of the 1980s, and 
the relationship between the agricultural s.ector and other sectors of the economy and the 
outside world, were given particular attention. 
The most important feature of the study is its economy-\vide perspective. New 
characteristics of Chinese agriculture in the 1980s are identified and factors affecting 
farmers' decision making and agricultural perfonnance in this new environment are 
explored. The important findings were incorporated into a computable general 
~uilibrium framework to reflect the reality of Chinese agriculture. The model was then 
used to quantify adjustments in the agricultural sector and the Chinese economy in 
response to various exogenous shocks. 
A Summary of the Study 
The central argument is that the agricultural sector is being increasingly integrated into 
the rest of the Chinese economy and the world economy through the process of 
economiL: reform. Economy-wide policies and changes are as important as sector-specific 
policies in affecting agricultural performance. At the same time, some restrictions on 
factor movements and price distortions remain and affect the response of the agricultural 
sector to exogenous changes. 
How Has Chinese Agriculture Changed Since the Reform Started? 
The Chinese economy today is neither a perfectly free market nor a stylized central 
planning system. 
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The economic system before reform in China was inherited largely from the former 
Soviet Union. The basic elements of that economic regime included the central planning 
system, public ownership and a heavy industry-oriented development strategy. Free 
resource and product flows did not eyist since all production and exchange were 
managed through the planning system. Economic signals like prices and economic 
policies like fiscal and monetary policy did not have the same functions they have in a 
market economy. 
Take agriculture as an example. Agricultural production and distribution were organized 
by the production team under the commune system. The central or local government 
decided what to produce and how to produce it. Farmers and production teams did not 
have autonomy in decision-malcing. Agricultural prices did not have the function of 
guiding resource allocation. Rather, they acted more as accounting measures in the 
transfer of agricultural products to the government. 
Economic reforms in the agricultural sector included three main elements. 
• Microeconomic reform focused mainly on the restoration of the household 
production system replacing the inefficient commune system. Farm households 
regained their autonomy in decision-making for agricultural production. This change 
contributed the most important part of agricultural growth in the first half of the 
1980s. Rapid growth of township, village and private enterprises in rural China was 
another positive consequence of this newly established household responsibility 
system. Although fanners are still restricted from allocating their production 
resources to urban industries, they are, nevertheless, able to reallocate resources 
between agriculture and rural industry in the pursuit of maximum income or profit. 
• Another dimension of economic reforms was the re-introduction of a free market to 
the Chinese economy. The marketization process can be divided into two steps, the 
first step being adjustment of state prices toward market prices and the second step 
being the opening up of free markets. In the first stage of agricultural reform, the 
main reforms focused on upward adjustment of the state prices for important 
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agricultural products including grain and cotton and marketization of less important 
agricultural products. A more complete marketization scheme was introduced to the 
rural economy toward the end of 1984. Although some government controls over a 
number of agricultural products were resumed soon after that, the rural economy as 
a whole has a higher degree of marketization compared to the urban economy. 
The final dimension was macroeconomic reform. The basic objective of 
macroeconomic reform is to transform macroeconomic policies from direct resource 
allocation tools to indirect macroeconomic management measures and to 
decentralize decision making powers, in line with the effort of introducing market 
mechanism. Reform of the monetary system, decentralization of fiscal policy 
management and other related measures introduced in the past ten to fifteen years 
have facilitated more efficient use of economic resources and higher economic 
growth. 
The essence of economic reform was to reduce direct intervention by the government in 
the operation of the economy and to allow more decision-making autonomy to economic 
agents. Economic reform in China can in this way be characterized as economic 
liberalization. Changes in the economic system call for different approaches to be applied 
in analysing economic phenomena including agricultural performance. The Chinese 
economy is not yet a mature market economy. There are two new characteristics 
requiring particular attention in agricultural policy analysis while admitting the important 
role played by the market. 
The degree of economic integration, both between different parts of the Chinese 
economy and between the Chinese economy and the rest of the world, has increased 
significantly in the reform period. Restrictions on resource movements, however, remain 
in many areas. Resource movements between rural and urban areas, for example, are still 
restricted. Within the rural economy, farmers' employment and investment opportunities 
are affected by government policies and regulations. In other words, farmers' feasible 
choice set is still limited. 
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Most economic signals including agricultural prices in rural China are determined by the 
market mechanism, but price distortions remain for some agrietlJl.tural pi;.c;1ducts such as 
grain and natural fibre. There was a two-tier price system for ~ain before '1992. 
Agricultural production was still subject to state purchase quoit@ ·Of grari'il. Farmers ~till 
had to fulfil this quota regardless of the economic benefits before they could freely 
decide resource allocation to pursue maximum income. 
These two characteristics imply that a conventional profit or income maximization model 
may not be able to capture Chinese fanners' economic behaviour accurately. 
Farmers' Production Decisions 
Because the above two characteristics are still playing an important role in economic 
activity, they have a significant impact on economic equilibrium. This requires theoretical 
investigation in relation to farmers' production decision-making. 
A simple illustrative model is constructed for theoretical analysis. The model consists of 
two producers, an urban producer and a rural producer, and three production activities, 
agricultural production, rural and urban industrial production. Both producers are 
assumed rational, that is, they maximize profits or minimize costs. 
As a reference point, economic equilibrium is studied in a competitive case (no 
restriction on resource movements within the economy and no price distortion). Then the 
two characteristics identified above are introduced to the model to examine what effects 
they have. 
If the assumption of perfect labour mobility is relaxed and farmers are restricted from 
moving to urban areas for employment, they can only either be involved in agricultural 
production or develop their own industries in the rural area. This is the reason for the 
rapid growth of the township, village and private enterprises in rural China in the reform 
period. It is also assumed that urban consumers can only be employed in urb£Jn industry. 
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Without any flow of la.hour between rural and urban areas, there will be naturally a 
relatively low marginal product of labour in the rural economy and higher marginal 
product of labour in the mban economy. Without restrictions, labour would flow from 
rural 1to urban areas to achieve maximum income (or to equalize marginal products of 
labour in the two sectors). 
Compared with the case in which there are no restrictions on the movement of labour 
from the rural to the urban sector, the agricultural sector (including grain and natural 
fibre production, assuming no price distortion) expands relatively, but farmers' wage 
income is lower than it would be if farmers were able to earn higher wage income in 
urban industry. There is also a loss to the total output or GDP because of the inefficient 
use of resources. More importantly, this result implies that abolition of restrictions on 
labour movement between rural and urban areas would reduce agricultural output. 
The impact of price distortions in the grain, cotton and wool markets is clear. Lower 
state prices for cotton and wool would depress output levels for wool and cotton 
compared to the case in which there is no price distortion. 
The case of a two-tier price system is more complicated. Some economists argue that the 
state price will not affect production decisions so long as an effective free market exists 
alongside the state plan (Sicular 1988a; Byrd 1988). This argument is based on the 
assumption that the state purchase quota is exogenously set. In this case, the state price 
would not affect the first-order conditions for profit maximization. On the other hand, 
Lin (1993) argues that the state price will affect farmers' production decisions if the state 
procurement quota is set endogenously. Which of these arguments is closer to the reality 
simply depends on whether or not state purchase quotas are set endogenously or 
exogenously. 
Since labour market segmentation between rural and urban areas tends to increase 
agricultural output while price distortions tend to reduce output levels of grain, cotton 
and wool, the net effect of these characteristics on agricultural output is ambiguous and 
depends on the strength of the two effects working in the opposite directions. 
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To show that the characteristics identified will also affect the way the economy responds 
to exogenous change, a set of changes in economy-wide policies and in other parts of the 
economy is introduced in the theoretical model. 
One important change introduced is trade liberalization for industrial products, say a 
reduction of the import tariff. The reduction of tariffs would reduce the domestic price of 
the imported industrial product. This would further reduce the values of the marginal 
products of labour in rural and urban industries assuming that the imported product is 
produced in both industries. As the marginal product of agriculture remains the same 
(and second round effects are neglected at this stage), there would be a gap between 
values of marginal products in different sectors. In a market economy, labour would 
move from agriculture to rural and urban industries until marginal product is equalized. 
There would be an adverse effect on agricultural production. 
But the flow of labour between rural and urban areas is generally prohibited in China. 
Labour can be reallocated from agriculture to rural industry but not to urban industry. 
Within the rural economy, equilibrium can be attained, but the difference between rural 
and urban wages would widen. There would also be an adverse effect on agricultural 
production. The effect, however, is smaller in magnitude compared with the perfect 
labour mobility case. 
Another important change introduced is monetary expansion. There is much discussion 
in economic literature of the role of money in the real economy. In classical economics, 
money is neutral. Changes in money supply only affect the level of prices but leave all 
real variables unchanged. These assumptions have been questioned in recent literature. 
This study only attempts to show that, given price distortions, a change in money supply 
may change real economic structure. An increase in money supply is assumed to raise all 
market-determined price levels at the same rate, but state prices would respond in a 
different way, at least in magnitude. Relative price structure would therefore change and 
relative price change naturally leads to structural change to the economy. Assuming that 
the state price for cotton always increases at a slower rate than other market prices 
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following a monetary expansion, the share of cotton output in the economy will be 
smaller compared to that before monetary change. 
Understanding Agricultural Growth in China 
This framework is applied to the case of agricultural growth in the second half of 1980s. 
There are two objectives in this research. First, the case study shows the usefulness of 
the above framework. Second, existing explanations of agricultural performance in that 
particular period are not satisfactory. 
Agricultural growth in China in the first stage of agricultural reform was remarkable and 
was viewed as an economic "miracle". The agricultural growth rate jumped from about 3 
per cent in 1952-78 to 7 per cent in 1979-84 due to the introduction of reform }'vlicies. 
Economists have successfully explained sources of this dramatic growth. The main 
causes were the implementation of the household responsibility system, the rises in 
government purchase prices and increases in agricultural inputs including chemical 
fertilizers. 
Following the introduction of the marketization scheme in the rural economy at the end 
of 1984, agricultural production and grain production in particular dropped significantly 
in 1985 and remained at low levels in the following several years until 1989. 
Explanations offered in the literature for this agricultural stagnation include: 
• the completion of the household responsibility system reform in 1983 
• worsening of agriculture' terms of trade 
• adverse weather conditions 
• changes in relative factor endowment 
These hypotheses are examined in this study. It is found that, although some of these 
factors may have contributed to the pattern of agricultural development in the second 
half of the 1980s, none of them can be regarded as dominant. 
The analytical framework outlined above is then applied to this case. Within the rural 
economy, it is assumed farmers can freely reallocate resources between agriculture and 
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rural industry. Rural industry, however, is heavily influenced by government policies and 
other economic variables. In particular, in the early years of economic reform, farmers 
were restricted from being involved in rural industrial production. There were also 
restrictions on resource movements between agriculture and rural industry. As rural 
industry experienced dramatic expansion and some contraction in the second half of 
1980s, farmers' non-agricultural production opportunities changed accordingly. 
Because of policy restrictions, the value of marginal products in agriculture and rural 
industry were not equalized in the 1980s. Marketization reform introduced at the end of 
1984 suddenly opened up many rural industrial opportunities for farmers. Assuming that 
the value of marginal product in rural industry is much higher than that in agriculture, 
farmers will re-allocate resources from agriculture to rural industry in an effort to achieve 
maximum income. Alongside the rapid growth of the rural industry, agriculture will 
contract due to the outflow of resources from agricultural production. This is the story 
of agricultural stagnation in the years following 1985. At the end of 1980s, because of 
the contractionary policies particularly targeted at rural industry, farmers' non-
agricultural opportunities were affected. Some resources flowed back to agriculture and 
resulted in agricultural resurgence. 
From this hypothetical explanation of development in agricultural production in the 
1980s, two testable working hypotheses are developed. First, if this argument is valid, 
the value of marginal product of labour in rural industry should be much higher than that 
in agriculture at least before 1985. Second, as resources are reallocated from agriculture 
to rural industry, the gap between the values of marginal product in the two sectors 
should narrow after 1985. 
Proof of this hypothesis was divided into three steps. First, by using a simple theoretical 
two-sector model, it was shown that an increase in the relative price of agricultural 
goods and a decline of real production can coexist when farmers' feasible choice set 
changes dramatically. In other words, as long as the value of marginal product in rural 
industry is still higher than that in agriculture, farmers would continue to reallocate 
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resources from agriculture to rural industry although relative agricultural prices might be 
rising. 
Second, empirical evidence is provided. Reforms in agricultural policies, macroeconomic 
policies and policies toward rural industries in the mid-1980s, in fact, increased farmers' 
non-agricultural opportunities dramatically. One such example was the monetary 
expansion which began in 1984. Together with other preferential poiicies toward rural 
industry and abolition of policy restrictions on agricultural production, this expansion 
facilitated the rapid growth of rural industry. Resources moved quickly from agriculture 
to rural industry in those years. 
Third, and more importantly, the hypothesis is proved by statistical estimation of values 
of marginal products in agriculture and rural industry. Not only was the value of marginal 
product of labour in agriculture significantly lower than that in rural industry (about 30 
per cent in 1985), but the gap between the two sectors also narrowed from 1985 to 
1988. This was the main cause of dramatic resource re-allocation. 
Dramatic changes in farmers' feasible choice s0t was the dominant factor behind the 
extraordinary pattern of agricultural development in the second half of the 1980s. This 
case underlines the importance of restrictions on factor mobility in Chinese economy. 
Changes in factor markets may sometimes offset changes in price structure and require 
particular attention in analysis of the Chinese economy. 
Agricultural Price Distortions 
The above conclusion does not deny the important role played by price structure in 
production decisions. Price distortion is also important in agricultural policy analysis. 
However, in most studies of Chinese agricultural policy, price distortion is usually set as 
an exogenous variable. 
Economic policies including state prices are not determined randomly, according to the 
theory of political economy. Because most paradigms for endogenous policy developed 
in the literature do not fit the case of agricultural prices in China, a state-farmer policy 
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game framework is developed to examine the determination of state prices in relation to 
farmers' feasible choice set. The state purchase price of grain was taken as a case study. 
'The game contains only two parties: the state and farmers. Consumers, another 
important party in the usual framework for agricultural policy, are excluded because state 
sale policies did r..ot change much from the early 1950s to the beginning of the 1990s. 
The relationship between farmer and consumers and between the state and consumers 
are therefore assumed to be stable during that period. Because the state sale prices to 
urban consumers were consistently lower than market prices, the game is defined to 
allocate this loss (the gap between the state sale prices and market prices) between the 
state and farmers. 
Both parties in the game attempt to let the other party bear that loss. The state wishes to 
lower the state purchase prices from farmers while farmers wish to raise state purchase 
prices. Both parties have destructive powers over the other party in threatening 
strategies. The state can force farmers to sell grain at low prices by threatening 
punishment measures like the allocation of education and employment opportunities. 
Farmers can also refuse to se 11 if they wish and this would be disastrous for the 
government. The effectiveness of these threatening powers determines relative strengths 
in the policy game. The effectiveness of the threatening powers, in turn, depends on 
other factors and change over time. 
In the early stages of economic development under a repressive and vindictive central 
state system, fanners tend to be weak in the state-farmer policy game. As agriculture is 
the major industry in the economy and farmers are the dominant group within the 
population, any small marginal benefit to fanners could entail a very significant loss to 
the other members of society and a St.,;Vere burden on the state budget. The state would 
therefore be willing to give up relatively large amounts of resources to implement its 
policies. Farmers, on the other hand, are unable to exercise any significant destructive 
strategy on the government collectively because of the distance of their residence and 
poor communication and transportation conditions. 
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As the economy develops, agriculture a becomes smaller part of the economy. The 
government has less interest than before in agricultural revenue. It is willing to sacrifice 
less in preventing rises in state purchase prices. Its destructive power over farmers also 
declines siI1ce economic opportunities for farmers increase rapidly. As the number of 
farmers falls and rural infrastructure improves, it becomes less costly for farmers to 
organize to lobby for favoured policies. Their destructive power rises accordingly. 
The game is characterized as cooperative because both the state and farmers respect the 
policies (willingly or unwillingly) when they are set. 
Given the two-tier price system for grain, one important characteristic of this game is 
that the government has monopsony power in setting the state grain price. Since it is the 
only buyer, the more the government buys, the higher the price it has to pay. But in early 
years, since the government is extremely powerful, the government may be able to 
depress the state price significantly by other threatening strategie~. As farmers become 
stronger, they are increasingly unwilling to accept any prices lower than market prices. 
At the other extreme, the state may have to subsidize farmers, as happened in many 
industrial countries and some East Asian economies as industrialization proceeded. 
Based on this framework, a cooperative game-theoretic model is developed and 
estimated empirically. Bargain strength coefficients are defined as functions of the share 
of agriculture in the whole economy, the share of agricultural population in total 
population, income per capita and the market price of grain. It is found that farmers' 
relative bargaining power is negatively correlated with agriculture's share in the economy 
and the share of agricultural population, and positively correlated with income per capita 
and the market price of grain. In general, farmers were still relatively weaker than the 
state. But it can be expected that farmers' bargaining power will continue to increase as 
the economy develops. 
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Effects of Price Distortion in Agricultural Production 
The next question of interest is what is the quantitative impact of price distortion on 
agricultural production. This is answered in two steps. First, agricultural supply 
elasticities are estimated to provide a partial picture of the effects of a depressed 
agricultural price on production structure within agriculture. Second, applying these 
elasticity estimates, policy effects are examined in a more general framework. 
There are quite a few models which can be used for estimation of production elasticities. 
Most of these models are based on stringent assumptions about the operation of market 
mechanism and farmers' production behaviour. It has to be resolved first whether these 
models can be applied to the Chinese farmers. 
As discovered in this study, farmers' decision-making in China is influenced by a 
combination of government policy and market conditions (market prices). Farmers have 
to fulfil policy requirements like state purchase of grain. Having fulfilled state quotas, 
they then try to utilize remaining resources and market information to maximize income. 
The assumption proposed in this study is that, in a semi-marketized economy like China, 
farmers' production activities are guided by the dual system. On one hand, farmers have 
to fulfil the quantity and price requirements set by the government. On the other hand, 
they, like any other farmers in the world, respond to changes in marginal prices. 
Thus a profit maximization framework can be applied to Chinese farmers so long as data 
arising from highly distorted activity can be separated from the data set. 
The specific model used is the generalized McFadden unit profit function. Two data 
adjusonents are applied in this study to make it possible to use the model. One 
adjustment is made to price data and the other is made to quantity data. 
The model is estimated using time series provincial data for the period 1985-90. Supply 
elasticities are the1, derived for rice, wheat, other grain, cotton and other crops. 
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Compared with the elasticities used in other studies, elasticities derived in this study are 
somewhat higher. There are several reasons for this general difference. One possible 
reason is that this study uses more recent data which reflect a higher degree of 
marketization. Farmers are freer to adjust their production structure now than they were 
in early years. Another possible reason is that data are adjusted in this study in order to 
separated activites highly distorted by the government intervention. Generally speaking, 
state purchase prices and procurement quotas fluctuate less sharply than market-oriented 
prices and quantities, both in telms of frequency and magnitude. Movements in data 
would be much smaller without adjustment. Elasticities estimated from other studies tend 
to under-estimate the actual response of agricultural production to market changes. 
From these elasticity estimates. a rough picture of how Fice distortions have affected 
agricultural structure is drawn. For example, if the state cotton price is 10 per cent lower 
than market price, that means cotton output is 0.4 per cent lower than it otherwise would 
be (own-price elasticity is 0.04) and rice production is 0. A per cent higher than it 
otherwise would be (cross-price elasticity is -0.04). 
A General Model of the Chinese Agricultural Economy 
These numbers provide only an indication of the policy effects because they do not take 
into ac;count the second round effect of a lower cotton price on rice and cotton 
production. To capture both the direct and indirect effects, it is necessary to build an 
economy-wide model. 
The model built is a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Johansen type. 
It follows the spirit of the ORANI model (Dixon et al. 1982) and the Martin model of the 
Chinese economy (Martin 1990). However, it incorporates some important special 
features. 
The China model reflects the characteristics of labour market segmentation between rural 
and urban areas. Rural and urban industries are separated in model structure as they are 
very different in the Chinese economy. Two separate labour markets, one urban and one 
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rural, are specified. While in the urban labour market, urban residents sell their labour to 
urban industries, farmers sell their labour to agriculture and rural industry in the rural 
labour market. Urban and rural wages are therefore determined in separate markets. 
Endogenous state price determination is explicitly incorporated in the model. This allows 
examination of how changes in state prices and how price distortions affect economic 
structure. 
The model contains 22 sectors in total, among which four are agricultural sectors, nine 
rural non-agricultural sectors and another nine urban sectors. Two of the agricultural 
sectors, farming and animal husbandry, are multiproduct sectors. 
Simulations are designed to illustrate how Chinese agriculture, within the economic 
framework modelled in this study, would adjust when it encounters various shocks and 
policy changes. Experiments involve 
• changes in world markets 
• economic reforms such as tariff reductions 
• variations in macroeconomic policies 
• a rapid expansion of rural industry 
• improveme:r.t of labour mobility between urban and rural areas. 
A rise in demand for China's textile exports. Of particular interest to this study is a 
rise in the demand for China's textile exports because it can show how a change in 
another sector of the economy may affect agriculture. The textile sector has a special 
connection with the agricultural sector because it uses cotton and wool as its main 
inputs. A sudden rise in demand for China's textile exports is possible because currently 
China's e}('.ports to many industrial countries, including the United States, is subject to 
the Multifibre Arrangement (MF A). As efforts have been made to remove this system, it 
is important to know what the effects on the agricultural sector and the economy as a 
whole are likely to be. 
240 
,,. 
i 
Results show that benefits from such a change are significant. A 10 per cent increase in 
demand for China's textile exports would increase China's real GDP by 0.18 per cent. 
Export volumes would increase by 0.46 per cent and import volumes by 0.14 per cent. 
Labour re-allocation from agriculture to rural industry would occur as a result of the 
booming textile industry. Most agricultural outputs would decline while their domestic 
market prices would increase. As a whole, agriculture's share in the whole economy 
would decrease by 0.8 per cent, but farmers' real income would rise by 0.5 per cent. 
An increase in world price of wheat. China currently imports wheat and exports rice, 
while it pursues a basic self-sufficiency policy for grain. Changes in the world grain 
market would affect domestic agricultural production, which would then be transmitted 
to the other parts of the economy. 
A 10 per cent increase in the world wheat price would increase domestic wheat 
production but reduce all other agricultural outputs. The state price for wheat, affected 
by this increase in world and domestic markets, is also increased by 1.2 per cent (much 
smaller than the increase in world price). 
From the point of view of the whole economy, this price change has a negative impact. 
Real GDP would fall by 0.003 per cent. While agriculture's share in the economy would 
increase by 0.02 per cent, farmers' real income would drop by 0.1 per cent. 
A reduction in wool import tariffs. A reduction in the tariff on wool imports may 
benefit wool exporting countries like Australia, but it would also have welfare effects in 
China and has interest in the context in China's efforts to join GA TI. 
The abolition of wool import tariff (about 13 per cent currently) would reduce the 
domestic wool price by 4.3 per cent. Consumers would benefit from this lower price. 
Agricultural production would adjust as outputs of wool and cotton would fall. Wool 
imports would rise dramatically by 6.4 per cent or about 9.7 thousand tonnes. The textile 
industry is the main sector that benefits from this policy change. Textile industry output 
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would increase by 3.2 per cent and exports by 1 per cent. There would not be must 
change to farmers' real income, the real GDP would increase by 0.01 per cent 
Monetary expansion. The mechanism here is simple as previously argued. The 
experiment is designed to verify the story told for the case of agricultural stagnation in 
1985. 
A 10 per cent monetary expansion would increase market price levels, in turn, lifting 
state prices (all less than 10 per cent). Output of wool and cotton, for which prices are 
strictly controlled by the state, would decrease significantly. 
Other simulation results are consistent with experience in the mid-l 980s. Labour would 
be reallocated from agriculture to rural industry. The textile industry would expand by 1 
per cent. Agriculture's share in the economy would decline but both farmers' real income 
and real GDP would increase by 0.01 per cent and 0.05 per cent, respectively. 
A sudden expansion of rural industry (the 'Dutch Disease'). The purpose of 
designing this experiment is the same as that for the monetary expansion. The simulation 
results are very similar to that experiment. 
A 10 per cent improvement in intermediate input use would have a dramatic effect on 
agriculture. All state prices, particularly those for wool and cotton, would increase 
sharply. Labour would move from agriculture to mral industry as a result of the boom in 
rural industry. Agricultural employment would drop by 2.67 per cent. Surprisingly, real 
GDP would increase by 3.6 per cent. Farmers' real income would rise by 2 per cent 
while agriculture's share in the economy drops by 1.1 per cent. 
Removal of restrictions on labour movement between rural and urban areas. All 
the above experiments are designed to demonstrate the interdependence of agriculture 
with rest of the economy. But the other equally importan~ argument advanced is that the 
integration of different parts of the Chinese economy is still limited. The economy's 
response to exogenous shocks is therefore also limited compared with the circumstance 
in which there is a perfect market economy. To illustrate, a 10 per cent increase in 
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demand for China's textile exports is simulated in two environments: one with, and one 
without, labour flows between rural and urban areas. 
If labour is perfectly mobile within the economy, the effect of a 10 per cent increase in 
demand for China's textile exports would be much stronger on the economy. For 
example, real GDP would increase by 0.3 per cent instead of 0.2 per cent. The 
agricultural workforce would drop by 1.56 per cent instead of 0.8 per cent. The 
additional fall in the agriculture workforce would be absorbed in booming urban 
industry. 
Main Findings of the Study 
The most important finding of this study is that as the Chinese economy is a system in 
transition, agriculture operates in neither a perfect market nor a stylized c~ntral planning 
system. Economy-wide policies have begun to play important roles in the determination 
of agricultural performance. The adjustment of the agricultural sector to exogenous 
changes remains limit"',d because of residual restrictions and distortions. More detailed 
findings can be outlined as follows. 
• There are two important characteristics of Chinese agriculture: the limited factor 
mobility and price distortion which not only directly affect production decisions but also 
change the way in which the economy responds to exogenous shocks. 
• The dramatic expansion and contraction of farmers' feasible choice sets were the 
dominant factors detemlining agricultural growth and contraction in the second half of 
the 1980s. 
• Price policies for grain in China were endogenously determined through bargaining 
between farmers and the state. 
• Farmers' production decisions are guided by a combination of policy regulations and 
market signals, but their behaviour can be modelled by a profit maximization framework 
given careful adjustments in the data set. 
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• The Chinese economy and the agricultural sector adjust to exogenous change but the 
adjustment is smaller than it would be in the case of perfect factor mobility. 
Policy Implications 
These findings generate implications for policy making and policy analysis in China. 
Policy Makers Should Abandon Agricultural Fundamentalist Perspectives 
Economic policies, including agricultural policies, should facilitate the movement 
towards the comparative advantage of the economy. China had a history of pursuing self-
sufficiency for all agricultural products before economic reform. It proved a very costly 
policy. In the reform period, agricultural (or grain) self-sufficiency continued to retard 
overall economic development. 
Criticisms that the agricultural reform policies of the mid-1980s caused agricultural 
stagnation are unfounded. Although agricultural production slowed relatively from 1985, 
farmers' real income rose dramatically. The relative decline of agriculture was not a 
failure of the policies introduced in 1984, but a natural consequence of marketization 
reform and farmers' income maximization behaviour. Resources were used more 
efficiently, as shown by the narrowing gap between the values of the marginal products 
of labour in agriculture and rural industry. 
Policy measures aimed specifically at recovery of agricultural production and the 
discouragement of rural industry in 1988 and 1989 were misdirected. Chinese agriculture 
recovered from 1989 but declined again in 1991. This temporary boom in agricultural 
production cannot be regarded as a result of successful policy change, because 
production resources were forced to move away from more efficient uses. Although 
agricultural production increased quite dramatically, farmers real income nearly stood 
still. 
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Policy Coordination is Essential in Agricultural Policy-making 
Economy-wide and macroeconomic policies were shown to have significant effects on 
the agricultural sector in the past decade in China. As demonstrated by the experience of 
the second half of the 1980s, sector-specific factors cannot be regarded as the dominant 
factors affecting change in agricultural production. Rather, changes in rural industry (or 
farmers' opportunities in rural industry) proved to be a more fundamental cause of the 
sudden drop in agricultural production. 
But different policy measures are designed for different purposes and often have different 
influences on agricultural performance. It is therefore critical for agricultural policy-
makers to be aware of potential changes in the macroeconomic environment and their 
impact on the agricultural sector. Otherwise, agricultural policies may not be able to 
achieve their objective. 
Restrictions on Labour Movement Limit Farmers' Adjustment Capacity and 
Prevent the Economy from Achieving Optimum Efficiency 
Economic integration in China is still limited. China is not a mature market economy yet, 
so care has to be exercised in applying an analytical framework which relies on market 
assumptions. Prices are important in detennining econo1nic structure in China, but other 
factors also play a large role. 
In analysis of a market economy, farmers' feasible production choice set is taken as 
stable: production decisions only change when the incentive structure changes. But in a 
refonning economy like China, all institutions and policies are changing dramatically. 
Farmers' feasible choice set may expand or contract suddenly. When this happens, price 
changes may become less important in guiding economic decisions. In the mid-1980s 
when farmers' opportunities in rural industry expanded dramatically farmers moved their 
resources to rural industry regardless of relative prices in agriculture. 
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This study has shown that restrictions on labour movement cost the economy 
significantly in terms of total output losses. Reforms appropriately designed to remove 
these restrictions smoothly are highly desirable. 
Farmers Are Weak in Policy Games with the Government, but Are Becoming 
Increasingly Powerful: the Danger is Demand for Agricultural Subsidies Will Grow 
Agricultural price policy is endogeriJusly determined in a political economy framework. 
The application of a cooperative game-theoretic model in this study helps better 
understanding of this mechanism. This is an improvement in agricultural policy analysis 
in China, as most previous studies treat government policies as exogenous. 
But the implications of this model are not limited to theoretical analysis. Although 
farmers are still very weak in a state-farmer policy game, farmers' bargaining power is 
increasing with the decline of agriculture's share in the economy and the share of 
agricultural population in total population, and with the increase in average incorr,e per 
capita and agricultural market prices. 
There is a danger that China may follow the path of other East Asian economies where 
farmers are substantially subsidized by the government, with significant and adverse 
effects on overall economic development. This will come sooner in China if the 
government continues to support self-sufficiency for a set of agricultural products. The 
self-sufficiency objective makes farn1ers more powerful in bargaining with the 
government. 
The best way to avoid this undesirable outcome is to promote the internationalization of 
agricultural production. 
Self-Sufficiency Policy for Grain will Escalate the Burden on the State Budget, 
Further Distorting China's Economic Structure 
China has declared grain self-sufficiency as one of its national policy objectives, at least 
for the period 1990-95. Currently, China exports rice in exc·hange for wheat in the 
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international market. Further pursuit of grain self-sufficiency will place much greater 
pressure on domestic grain production. Per capita agricultural resources are very limited 
in China. This will become an increasingly serious constraint for grain production, not 
only because of continuous demand increases but because other production activities 
compete with grain production for land as income rises. 
If significant improvements in grain production technology do not occur, the only 
possible way for China to secure grain self-sufficiency is to distort the domestic grain 
price. But the cost of price distortion can be extremely high. 
Given that the domestic rice price in China is already very close to the international 
market price, without significant subsidy, it may be very difficult for China to continue to 
export rice in exchange for wheat. The wheat price in China is already much higher than 
the world price. Opportunities for increasing output through price adjustments are very 
limited, unless the government is willing to adopt a policy of substantial grain production 
subsidization. As pressures on the state budgets have already become a serious problem 
to the Chinese government, the self-sufficiency policies that subsidize grain producers 
will be more difficult to implement. 
The cost of this, however, goes beyond a burden on the state budget. Rising grain prices 
would also tend to distort the domestic economic structure. If a subsidy on rice 
production is adopted in order to maintain grain self-sufficiency, rice production might 
be encouraged and wheat and other crop production would be discouraged but by much 
larger margins. Not only is grain self-sufficiency an unachievable goal, bm the economy 
may be forced to import other agricultural crops that it previously exported. If prices of 
grain products are to be subsidized, output of cotton and other crops will drop sharply. 
The Chinese economy may also be more dependent on international markets because it 
has to import more cotton and other agricultural products. The distortion to domestic 
comparative advantage will result in a reduction of the national welfare. 
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Directions for Future Research 
There are generally three further directions which this study suggests could be fruitful 
areas of future research. 
First, this study has shed some light on the labour market segmentation between rural 
and urban areas and limited labour mobility between agriculture and rural industry. The 
real picture is that there is some kind of limited labour flow between rural and urban 
areas. Theoretical and empirical modelling of this feature is difficult but important. 
Second, the game-theoretic policy model applied in this study may be able to capture the 
essence of policy changes before 1992 in China. Since consumers are excluded from that 
framework, it is unable to explain how the abolition of the low state sale prices happened 
in 1992. A framework including farmers, consumers, the government and, sometimes, 
industrial producers would provide a more satisfactory model of agricultural policies in 
the future. 
Finally, theoretically speaking, the limited economic integration identified in this study is 
important not only to economies in the process of reform like China, but also to other 
market economies. Conventional economic theory assumes quick and efficient 
adjustment by all economic agents. Equilibrium can be achieved at any time. In real life, 
however, economic adjustments involve both time and cost. A limited response 
mechanism may better capture the actual story even in developed market economies. 
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